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Professor Mohammed Arkoun 
(1928–2010)
Professor Mohammed Arkoun was a prominent and influential figure in 
Islamic Studies. In a career of more than thirty years, he was an outstanding 
research scholar, a searching critic of the theoretical tensions embedded in 
the field of Islamic Studies, and a courageous public intellectual who carried 
the banner of an often embattled Islamic modernism and humanism. 
Arkoun was born into a traditional extended family in Taourirt-Mimoun, 
a small town in the Great Kabylia, in February 1928. As a Berber in colonial 
Algeria, he initially spoke neither the language of the colonial rulers nor 
that of the Qur’an, and as a result he found himself marginalised from an 
early age. He attended a college run by the White Fathers and completed 
his schooling in Oran, and in Algiers. He began degrees in Arabic literature, 
law, philosophy and geography. He established his scholarly reputation 
with his early studies (1969, 1970) of the Persian historian and philosopher 
Miskawayh. As he began to consider how one might rethink Islam in the 
contemporary world, his sophisticated questioning provided a welcome 
counterpoint to the highly ideological interpretations that had dominated 
debate in both the Muslim world and the non-Muslim West. 
As Professor of the History of Arab Thought at Vincennes University, 
Arkoun accepted a chair at the Sorbonne Nouvelle in 1980. There, he was 
the director of the department of the history of Arab and Islamic thought 
and editor of the magazine Arabica. He not only maintained Arabica’s 
very high standard of scholarship; he considerably broadened its scope and 
urged it to play a significant role in shaping Western-language scholarship 
on Islam. 
Arkoun is the author of numerous books in French, English and Arabic, 
including Rethinking Islam (Westview Press, 1994), L’immigration, défis et 
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richesses (Centurion, 1998) and The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic 
Thought (Saqi Books, 2002). His shorter studies appeared in many academic 
journals and his works have been translated into several languages. In 2001, 
Arkoun was asked to deliver the Gifford Lectures, which enable a notable 
scholar to contribute to the advancement of theological and philosophical 
thought; there he was announced as the recipient of the Seventeenth 
Georgio Levi Della Vida Award for his lifelong contribution to the field 
of Islamic Studies. As a visiting Professor, he taught at the University of 
California, Princeton University, Temple University, the University of 
Louvain-la-Neuve, the Pontifical Institute of Arabic Studies in Rome and 
the University of Amsterdam. He also served as a jury member for the Aga 
Khan Award for Architecture. At his passing, he was Emeritus Professor at 
La Sorbonne as well as Senior Research Fellow and member of the Board of 
Governors of The Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS) in London. In October 
2009, the IIS organised a symposium in honour of Arkoun’s efforts to renew 
the study of Islam. 
Professor Arkoun died in September, 2010.
In an obituary, one of the contributors to this volume, Ursula Günther, 
wrote of Arkoun’s humanism and his approach to teaching. “Mohammed 
Arkoun was not only a sharp-witted intellectual and humanist from the 
depth of his heart, with a subtle sense of humour,” she observed. “He was 
also a passionate, charismatic speaker and a dedicated teacher. He felt a part 
of all that is capable of opening up new links to intelligence, as he put it, and 
saw himself as ‘an intellectual in revolt’. May his idea that thoughts develop 
a life of their own prove right, continuing to take effect beyond the walls of 
cognitive demarcations and dominant ideologies.”1 
Notes
1.  Ursula Günther, “Obituary for Mohammed Arkoun: A Pioneer of Modern Critical 
Islam Studies”, Quantara.de, 21 September 2010, Web 7 March 2011 <http://www.
qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-1104/i.html>
Preface: Situating Arkoun
Abdou Filali-Ansary
In an article that was a tribute to Claude Cahen, Mohammed Arkoun 
begins by quoting a sentence from the late Professor, written when he in 
turn was paying tribute to another distinguished colleague. The sentence 
reads as follows: 
Respect for the memory of a deceased man implies, in the first place, 
respect for science and for the readers he (Maurice Lombard) had. It is 
thus that I would like to be treated if the same thing happened to me.1 
This volume was conceived, planned and realised as a tribute, and, as befalls 
a festschrift volume, with the blessings and active participation of the late 
Professor Arkoun. The idea of respecting science first and foremost was 
in fact the only possible option in an endeavour that seeks to pay tribute 
to Mohammed Arkoun, regardless of the feelings and attitudes of those 
present. The main “struggle” (the French word “combat” was prominent in 
titles chosen by Arkoun for his interventions) was to make science prevail 
over myth and belief. The chosen topic The Construction of Belief, for 
which credit must be rendered to my friend and colleague Dr Aziz Esmail, 
alludes to the “Copernican Revolution” that has engulfed the humanities 
and social sciences in recent decades, through which belief is not seen as a 
given that overwhelms individuals and communities, thereby defining their 
symbolic world – but rather, as a complex set of views and attitudes that 
emerge through historical and social processes liable to observation, analysis 
and scrutiny. The chapters of this volume all illustrate ways in which the 
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Copernican Revolution has prevailed in academia, as the only objective 
way to approach the discussion of belief, now seen as a human artefact – 
regardless of the claims implied by that belief. Such an objective approach to 
the study of faith becomes particularly significant in the case of Mohammed 
Arkoun, given his impassioned stance on and contribution to prevailing 
scholarly approaches to “Islam” and all things “Islamic”.
In a way, every scholar and every thinker is unique. However, we 
are tempted to say that some may be more unique than others, and that 
Mohammed Arkoun is one of these. The obvious argument for this is his 
general style, which combines, in his writing and his lectures, (which he 
understood as interventions) a strict scholarly rigour with a great display 
of vehemence. Concern for exactitude coupled with intense emotion are 
not often seen together, however they are what marks the “uniqueness” 
of Professor Arkoun. This is witnessed in the language he chose for his 
speech and his writing, and by the image he had of himself and his role in 
the context of academia and well beyond. There are however other reasons, 
which make it important and at the same time difficult, to situate him in the 
contemporary landscape of discourse about things “Islamic”. 
If we look at the intellectual ferment in Muslim contexts during the 
twentieth century, we can identify with relative ease a number of salient 
currents, although categorisations and classifications are abundant and differ 
sometimes quite substantially. One of the main trends to emerge during the 
twentieth century was the legacy of nineteenth-century reformism. This 
influenced above all the “modernists”, who believed that Muslims had a 
unique cultural offering – a vision laid down in the sources of their faith – 
and who felt that this vision and the dynamic it entails had been obscured by 
literalist traditions. Once polished and brought back to its original purity, 
this vision would provide the impetus for a collective return to rationality, 
discipline, morality and strength. This conciliatory and self-assuring 
message, while still resisted by staunch traditionalists early in the twentieth 
century, was challenged by a turn that proved to be deeply disruptive. 
Following the quick collapse of traditional institutions in the Muslim 
world, including the disintegration of political centres of power, new 
questions were raised from within the ranks of future reformists. Ali Abder 
Razek was to fire the first shot by raising bold questions about what had 
been considered to be core or essential beliefs, such as the political message 
of religion. The questions were most disturbing as they came from a religious 
scholar and cleric, formally trained in the strictest traditions and, more 
importantly, not exposed to ideas or views from modern philosophy or 
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political thought. A new seed of dissent was sown, reviving an atmosphere 
of heated controversy that had been forgotten for centuries.
We now know that other Muslim thinkers had raised elsewhere, more or 
less at the same time, similar questions that had been set aside or repressed 
by a heavy-handed tradition. The book by Ma’ruf al-Rusafi was written in 
1934 but could not be published until 2002. There were other intellectuals 
with a comparable profile to al-Rusafi and Abder Razek, who felt strongly 
about the limitations imposed by a frozen tradition and expressed their 
need to break free by daring to pose bold questions, but without reference 
to or use of the methods and concepts derived from modern thought and 
scholarship. These include Mahmud Mohamed Taha and Ahmad Kasravi.
At a later stage came a generation of thinkers who had been exposed 
to modern ideas about religion, politics and their conflicting relationships 
in European contexts, especially since the Enlightenment. They were also 
exposed to modern approaches to questions of religious and cultural heritage, 
especially historical-critical scholarship, and came to discover endeavours 
that aimed to apply these methods to the heritage of Muslims. Mohammed 
Arkoun is definitely of this later generation. He emerges as someone who 
has assimilated and mastered concepts and theories of contemporary social 
science and philosophy, particularly in the forms and terminology that were 
worked out within French-speaking academia. However, he does not seek to 
advocate some kind of religious reform by redress or to correct traditional 
views through a scholarly re-examination, as was attempted by a number of 
Muslim scholars of his generation, for example, Fazlur Rahman, Abdelmajid 
Charfi, Abdolkarim Sorouch. Rather, he stresses that we need to subvert, 
not to reform. He fully adopts the scholarly agenda, but with a substantial 
reservation. In short, his principal aim was to broaden the impact of the 
“Copernican revolution” accomplished by historical-critical approaches, to 
question one specific type of categorisation still in use not only in public 
debate and discussion but also within an academia that had embraced 
historical-critical methodologies. Indeed, it was the categorisation that 
singles out Islam and Muslims as one, broad, enduring and efficient reality in 
the past as well as in the present, that Arkoun spent his lifetime passionately 
questioning. 
Arkoun’s aim was to scrutinise and dissolve notions which were derived 
from ideologies and that had shaped the perceptions of realities in the past 
and still remained in use today. The “Copernican revolution” was not, in his 
view, complete and effective until it dissolved the remnants of ideologies that 
had prevailed in various historical contexts, including those inherited from 
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the “rational” Enlightenment. Many have consequently situated Arkoun 
within the wave of postmodernism, but there is a need for caution here. He 
does not reject the ideal of truth, or the ambition to reach some degree of 
reliable, well-supported forms of representation. All discourses are definitely 
not equal in their claims to truth and it is important to dispel the illusions 
and distortions that have accumulated through, and can be fully explained 
by, various historical processes. In a few paragraphs in a paper bearing a title 
which could be considered to be his “manifesto”, “Transgresser, déplacer, 
dépasser” (Transgress, displace, overcome), Arkoun formulates his most 
formal statement about history:
The philosophical substance of modern historical thought can 
be made explicit in the following epistemic and epistemological 
propositions:
• All human social units, whatever may be their size, are subject 
to mechanisms of transformation, change, evolution either in 
the direction of integration, complexification, heading towards 
hegemony, or, to the contrary, in the direction of disintegration and 
weakening that may lead the unit to effacement, dissolution, demise;
• All that happens in the life of social units is the consequence of 
the continuous play of external and internal forces which determine 
the wills, initiatives and perceptions of social actors, thus labelled 
precisely in order to highlight the theatrical setup of power behaviour 
in particular;
• Spheres of the supernatural, of divine or metaphysical 
transcendence, of active and omnipresent gods or of one, living but 
distant god, of magical, popular, legendary, religious beliefs, all linked 
to the imaginary, are equally products of social actors. As such, they 
must be submitted to the same analytical and critical investigation as 
conducted by social sciences in order to assess their pertinence and 
their effect in the historical shaping of societies;
• The historical argumentation which underlies all modern 
historical writing aims at progressively absorbing the sociological 
reasoning as defined by Jean-Claude Passeron,2 with the clearly stated 
ambition to objectify the actors’ subjectivities.3 
The frustration, short temper and lack of patience Arkoun showed are 
clearly due to the fact that his campaigning did not yield the desired effect. 
He felt that he was completely misunderstood, as he was often faced by a 
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polite but coldly dismissive silence. There was, no doubt, something that 
created embarrassment among his audiences. An assessment made by Ira 
Lapidus of one of Arkoun’s works is perhaps not untypical: 
In a series of recent works he [Arkoun] has become the leading 
French-language spokesman calling for a rethinking of Islam in a 
modern mode. Unfortunately, his book is full of French academic 
jargon, scholarly polemics and allusions to subjects that will not be 
familiar to ordinary readers. […] it is also a frustrating work to read 
because Mr. Arkoun raises important questions, announces that 
further research is necessary and leaves them unresolved.4 
Arkoun was perceptive in calling for an outright adoption of historical-
critical approaches. It is the case that in most Muslim contexts education 
in religious matters, and the prevailing perceptions in general, are 
overwhelmingly dogmatic and built upon assumptions that are often 
unacceptable to the modern mind. Religious instruction is given in ways 
which were widespread during pre-modern times, shaping the minds of 
people for a lifetime. At the same time, in order to achieve consistency, 
Arkoun was also right in insisting that the historical-critical attitude be 
taken seriously, and therefore be applied to the concepts and terminology 
used to represent history and culture where they come to define collective 
identities and common aspirations. 
Pushing the “Copernican revolution” achieved by modern social 
sciences to its ultimate consequences, ensuring that it is comprehensive and 
consistent in Muslim as well as in “Western” contexts, seems well overdue; 
particularly, if we take into consideration the pernicious effects of the uses 
and misuse of categories such as “civilisation”, “culture” and “religion”. 
The vast accumulation of literature intended to dispel the idea of a clash of 
civilisations gives us a very good reason for a systematic reconsideration of 
categories that we take to be elementary building blocks for public discussion. 
Without a thorough comprehensiveness and consistency, without a 
methodical critique of such categories or concepts, it becomes impossible to 
destroy the false idols that populate our imaginations. Misunderstandings 
created by the uncritical use of these categories weigh heavily on perceptions 
in the public opinion, and create deep gaps between the understanding 
brought about by scholarship and by perceptions that are firmly rooted in 
societies. All this, Arkoun was well placed to perceive, understand and feel 
the need to fight. Having found himself on the margins of two societies with 
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different historical heritages and a history of intense confrontation, he was 
able to perceive acutely the devastating effects of categories, concepts and 
terms that are understood to be markers of elementary realities.
There remains a gap between the ideal Arkoun called for and the social 
and anthropological realities on the ground. It is striking to call for subversion 
against, rather than reform of, deeply entrenched but grossly inappropriate 
views. Attempting reforms that may amount to simple face-lifting, while 
leaving fundamental attitudes unaffected, will not bring about the change 
that Arkoun (and many contemporary scholars of Muslim background) felt 
to be overdue. But this does not take into consideration the religious needs 
(‘spiritual aspirations’, if we wish to follow the established terminology) in 
societies at large. In this way Arkoun was a utopian intellectual, not in terms 
of what he insistently requested from fellow scholars, but rather in regard 
to what he hoped to achieve in the public sphere. He simply seemed to be 
insensitive to the fact that societies do need myths and allegories, that no 
established religion can be subverted through rational argument (otherwise, 
which popular religion would have survived?), that religious attitudes 
evolve not because people are convinced to adopt change, but rather when 
they are ‘seduced’ by rival alternatives. Preaching a form of enlightenment 
that is not accessible to the multitude, he seemed to be insensitive to the 
Rushdian (or Averroist) principle, following which the social order needs to 
be built on foundations derived from supernatural perceptions, at least until 
secular worldviews can and do prevail. At moments, his thought seemed to 
be frozen in sophisticated phrases that he derived from scholarly works little 
known to those whom he addressed. He also became increasingly reluctant 
to listen to the world around him, to interact with other thinkers who were 
voicing concerns similar to his own, which may explain the little influence 
his thought has had in predominantly Muslim contexts.
Ultimately, Arkounian views, utopian as they may be, may not have 
caught the interest or understanding of the multitude during his lifetime, 
but they do call upon ideals that are universal and of all times. They may 
inspire and motivate scholars in the future, as there should be individuals 
who are prepared to brave the hurdles of his terminology and make their 
way to the numerous gems that his message contains. He may, with time, 
find his place next to great and fecund utopians like Rousseau or Proudhon 
who, long after their demise, continue to inspire, at least within circles of 
committed devotees.
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Notes
1. Mohammed Arkoun. “Transgresser, déplacer, dépasser”, in Arabica; T. 43, Fasc. 1, 
L’œuvre de Claude Cahen : Lectures Critiques, pp. 28–70. 
2. Le raisonnement sociologique: un espace non poppérien de l'argumentation (éditions 
refondue et augmentée), (Paris : Albin Michel, 2005).
3. “Transgresser, déplacer, dépasser”, pp. 57–8 (my translation).
4. “Islam without Militance”, in The New York Times, 21 August 1994.

Mohammed Arkoun:  
A Personal Tribute and an Intellectual 
Assessment
Aziz Esmail
I (i)
I first met Mohammed Arkoun in the late 1980s in the United States. The 
occasion was formal. It was a small seminar on an Islamic issue (a “workshop” 
– a word academics do not mind using nowadays, borrowing factory idiom). 
Arkoun spoke with the force, the vehemence which – as I was to discover 
– was characteristic of him. He made a strong, immediate impression on 
me. The vehemence was striking, if only because it is unusual in learned 
seminars, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world. But this impression could have 
faded, and his passion might as easily have been something to deplore as to 
admire (for passion in the absence of intellect is always deplorable, and of 
Arkoun’s intellect I was able to take true measure only afterwards). What 
caught my attention were a few telling remarks of a serious kind. They left 
me intrigued.
The remarks impressed me less for themselves than that they came from 
a professor of Islamic Studies. This, in turn, made an impact because my 
own experience of Islamic Studies had been a great disappointment. For this 
reason, Arkoun’s approach struck me as a rare intellectual treat.
In a piece on Arkoun I must check a temptation to digress to myself. But 
to convey why I found in Arkoun a person rare of a kind I must say a word 
about why I had found academic Islamic Studies unsatisfactory. For it was 
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this common perception which fed the intellectual friendship that was to 
flourish between us.
(ii)
Graduate Islamic Studies had never been an aim of mine. It was a product of 
pure chance. On the other hand, religion represented a very powerful force 
in my life, and it was this, perhaps, more than an intellectual attraction to 
the field, that impelled me towards Islamic Studies.
I had been born and brought up in the Ismaili faith in its Indian 
subcontinental form. In culture – language, custom, food and entertainment 
– my world was Indian. (In cultural matters we were unconcerned to sift 
supposedly ‘‘Islamic’’ elements from supposedly others. In this respect 
we enjoyed the blessings of unselfconsciousness, denied to more recent 
generations in similar contexts.) The land – East Africa – was ruled 
by the British, and so our schooling was in the British mode, in modern 
subjects, with supreme importance given to English, a necessary means of 
advancement in the world.
Our religious ideas and practices belonged to a remote past. They carried 
a sense of the timeless and the transcendental, of pleasure and passions not 
of this world. Carried in our Indian vernacular, they were at once intimate 
and untouched by ways of modern thought. But the teaching of our faith 
at the time (as now) advocated a harmony of the ancient and the modern. 
It lauded the spiritual, but also embraced the modern world. So, someone 
like me, participating in at least two worlds, did so not only without conflict 
but with a sense of fulfilling a mandate. Yet it is hard to over-emphasise how 
distinct the two worlds then were. At school the teachers of all secular subjects 
(in my time) were of other faiths. This was never an issue. The religion was 
not allowed to encroach unduly on our time at school, and certainly not on 
what we studied. So, although one had no way of realising this, the school 
– or more accurately, what we learned there – was a microcosm of England, 
itself a microcosm of the modern West; while our religious and cultural 
pursuits were a microcosm of the Indo-Islamic world, in an African setting.
This simple experience (common to so many people in so many lands 
in so much of modern time) was for me to become in later, more self-
conscious years an object of analysis and wonder and a wish for integration. 
At school my mind was long excited by science rather than the arts (though, 
happily, we did not think of them yet as alternatives). At the same time my 
knowledge of our sacred Indo-Islamic poetry (even this hyphenated word 
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belies its freedom from duality) fostered an early sensitivity to language. 
Later, this sensitivity was carried over to my studies in English at university. 
The realism of English literature offered me a counterpoint to mysticism, 
and although I never objected to the literature as “foreign”, and though it 
was to open to me the new world of European thought and culture, it took 
me back to my own setting and background in a wish to understand it anew 
with the discipline, largely self-taught, of thinking about literature.
In due course, seeking more than means of cultivation, seeking means 
of rigorous and methodical analysis, I turned to other subjects. Philosophy, 
which I was later to teach, became an enduring interest. So did psychoanalysis; 
and later, sociology and anthropology.
This was the intellectual make-up that had come to be mine. I do not 
call it inter-disciplinary (though that would not be altogether incorrect). 
Having had an “inter-disciplinary” background, I have grown to realise the 
folly of pursuing it as a deliberate, artificial end. The ideal form of inter-
disciplinariness is where it is inherent in the way a subject is understood; 
when, in other words, it is organically present – unsought, unnamed – and 
has the properties, so to speak, of a compound rather than a mixture.
If, then, I turned to Islam as a subject of study, I was less after knowledge 
understood as facts than knowledge understood as perspective. I hoped to be 
able to use the ideas in the various disciplines I was interested in to this end. 
Ultimately, I suspect, I was also concerned to bridge the two worlds I had 
mentally lived in. It is very likely that every motivated student of humanistic 
topics is at bottom a seeker. What he or she seeks is inevitably personal. This 
becomes a liability if the search becomes romantic or self-indulgent instead 
of self-transcending. It is not the business of universities to serve personal 
odysseys. But if a subject like philosophy or religion or art or literature is 
conceived in a way which a student cannot use for personal as much as for 
professional development, it is safe to say that it must be badly conceived.
I have allowed myself these personal observations to qualify rather than 
inflate my claims about the field. I do not present these claims as objective. 
But neither are they capriciously personal. The personal factor in one’s 
estimation of things can be a means to more general, impersonal truth. 
Whether this is so or not in the present case is, of course, a matter for debate 
and discussion.
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(iii)
Let me highlight, then, some of what I see as serious drawbacks of Islamic 
Studies in Western universities, especially at graduate level. To anyone 
sensitised to them they were too obvious to be missed. I have the past decades 
in mind, but I suspect the deficiencies have not entirely disappeared.
To begin with, the subject itself is anomalous. By definition Islamic 
Studies is the study of Islam. But what is Islam? The obvious answer is: 
the religion of that name. But, as it happens, Islamic Studies turns out to 
be a historical study of societies called “Islamic”. The field spans politics, 
economics, cultures, jurisprudence, intellectual and literary traditions, and 
of course, religious ideas and practices. To do justice to these would require 
the skills of what at present are the separate disciplines of philosophy, 
literary criticism and the social sciences, together with knowledge of sources 
and texts in primary languages.
The point is not that this is too tall an order for anyone (though this is 
so). It is, rather, that the field, has rarely, if ever, appreciated it as a tall order. 
It has failed to perceive, for example, that “Islamic” philosophy cannot 
be properly understood without a training in the history and methods 
of philosophy; that “Islamic” political and social institutions cannot be 
grasped, beyond superficial judgements, without appropriate conceptions 
of social and political order; that cultures, like languages, are systems rather 
than elements, and require, for their understanding, tools equivalent to (if 
not indeed overlapping with) those of linguistics; that, in short, none of 
these yield full or systematic meaning through history understood solely as 
narration.
Islamic Studies makes sense only as a field built jointly out of contributions 
of perspectives such as those of history, sociology, psychology, linguistics 
and philosophy. This is precisely what in its traditional form it has never 
been.
To reiterate, however, the problem is of a different order than one 
that can be corrected by an injection, from outside as it were, of an inter-
disciplinary cocktail.
The two principal disciplines in the tradition of Islamic Studies are 
philology and history. Philology is a demanding and rigorous discipline 
dedicated to the study of texts. But texts are only part of a society’s 
expression, and in pre-modern times this part was but a tiny sliver. This was 
an obvious consequence of the highly limited literacy (by the standards 
of even a century ago, let alone today) as well as the absence of print. 
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Consequently, although the classical Islamic world abounded in texts, many 
of them bearing witness to great learning and sophistication of mind in their 
authors, it is easy to forget that their content does not represent the mental 
outlook (itself pluriform), the beliefs and practices we call “Islam”, of people 
at large. This is true even of a non-scholarly text like the Qur’an, whose study 
and exegesis in colleges (madrasas) was a pursuit of legists and theologians, 
while in society at large its presence was liturgical and ceremonial, with little 
(if any) role for intellectual or analytic endeavour.
History, the other discipline which has shaped traditional Islamic history, 
is obviously an important subject of relevance to this field. At its best it too 
is a solid and demanding enterprise. But, being mostly an art rather than 
a science, it is apt to vary greatly in how it understands its subject matter. 
The superficiality or otherwise of its understanding will directly reflect 
the superficiality or otherwise of the author’s mind and life-experience, 
or of the tradition in which that mind has been schooled. A tradition of 
due complexity is carried forward by good minds in its service. But it will 
withstand, at least for some time, the absence of good minds to carry it 
forward. On the other hand, a tradition of study which is devoid of a rich 
vision of life will not benefit from the availability of good minds. These are 
likely to be infected with the mediocrity of the tradition, and so forfeit their 
potential. Or they will turn to other pastures of intellectual sustenance.
In this respect history is at one with the other arts. A novel or a play, a 
work of paint or music, will be only as shallow or profound as the vision of 
life of its author. And we can all, in our different ways and with our different 
tastes, tell the difference between a glib and a rich specimen in any of these 
fields though we may differ in our choices and the criteria for our choices.
There have been good minds at work in modern historical studies of 
Islam, just as there are bound to be good (and bad) minds at work in any 
field of knowledge. But the tradition of knowledge-gathering in which a 
good mind is schooled may do either justice or injustice to that mind. It may 
give it a wide scope to exercise and grow its talents. Or it may direct it into 
a tunnel. And by doing so it may shrink the possibilities of what may be an 
originally fine intellect and imagination. It would do so by failing to afford 
the scope a good mind needs in order to flower. At bottom this is the fault of 
the tradition of scholarship in question. But in the end it is both the scholar 
and the scholarship which, depending on the degree of their identification 
with the tradition, come to suffer from its faults.
Islamic Studies has long been hamstrung, in its domain of historical 
research (so I would argue), by a remarkably restricted understanding of 
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what history can and should be. It looks upon history as a narration of 
events, people and dynasties, along with their (“Islamic”) principles and 
practices. But the history of a people must take account of the broadest 
complexities of human nature, both as they are reflected in people, and 
when people become “a people”. In short, the best insights of the better part 
of psychology and anthropology, of history analysis, and even of philosophy 
in so far as it alone raises questions about the relation of mind to world, 
are essential at the core, and not merely at the margins of history. But such 
humane breadth – essential to the idea of humanities – is seldom to be 
encountered in works of Islamic history.
In Europe, history went through a process of self-consciousness, 
thanks to a long tradition of thinkers – Vico, Hegel, Benedetto Croce, 
R. G. Collingwood, E. H. Carr, Fernand Braudel (the list can be long). 
However, very little of this reflexivity ever percolated into Islamic Studies. 
Its boundaries, it would seem, have long been the boundaries of a ghetto.
The first question any historian must ask is what one is to take as the unit 
of their study. For their “subject” is not quite out there waiting to be studied. 
But this question has rarely been asked of “Islam”. Marshall Hodgson was 
an exception.1 He took an informed decision to pick not “Islam” as his unit 
of study but rather the civilisation associated with Islam. This begged the 
question as to what kind of an entity a “civilisation” was; what justification 
there might be in treating the “Islamic” (or, in Hodgson’s proposed 
terminology, “Islamicate”) civilisation as an entity in its own right; and 
what role Islam may be seen to have had in the life of this entity, seen as a 
civilisation.
It will be apparent from this that Hodgson was, in a word, a “reflexive” 
historian, consciously defining and postulating the object of his study rather 
than taking it for granted. One may disagree with his postulates; but one 
cannot criticise him for unawareness of their necessity.
The need to define adjectival uses of the term “Islamic”, whether to 
define the societies concerned, or sections of it, is a need that may be shirked 
only at the price of intellectual confusion. It was one of the merits of Oleg 
Grabar’s work on Islamic art, quite apart from whatever may be judged by 
a specialist to be the merits of his scholarship that he asked, and attempted 
uncively to define, in what sense one might possibly think of Islamic art as 
Islamic.2 One can only wonder whether his readiness to probe this question 
owed itself to his background not in Islamic Studies but in the history of 
art, and of Islamic art as an area within it. It is reasonable to believe that 
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it was this better chartered territory and a better defined discipline which 
accounts for this conceptual self-awareness in his work.
In general, we find an important difference in the work of those scholars 
in Islamic Studies who bother and try to illuminate their object of study 
through resort to theoretical concepts and of those who do not do so. 
The career of Prophet Muhammad acquires a more than factual interest 
in Montgomery Watt’s hands because of his attempt to understand it as 
a composite of socio-economic circumstances as well as religious vision.3 
Similarly, his treatment of early Islam has the potential to interest students of 
history more generally because of the concepts he borrows from Durkheim 
and Weber. Again, his attempt to understand religion as such in theoretical 
terms, however rudimentary, gives the subject an interest beyond that of a 
believer. Watt’s scholarship may look inadequate in the light of up-to-date 
knowledge. (Not being a specialist, I cannot comment.) His forays into 
sociology and psychology certainly have something of a fragmentary, even 
amateurish flavour. But none of this detracts from the pioneering quality 
of his endeavour in its time, and hence, its historically exemplary character.
Examples such as these show that Islamic Studies cannot be written off 
wholesale. They show that there have been exceptions to the rule under 
criticism here. But what this says, and what I hold, is that they are indeed 
exceptions to the rule.
Let us address a category of intrinsic importance to the study of Islam: 
the category, namely, of religion. Few scholars in not only Islamic Studies 
but so-called religious studies appear to realise or admit that “religion” 
is indeed a category; that as such, it is posited or constructed rather than 
found; and that it therefore requires assessment, at any given moment, of its 
usefulness or suitability in the light of our knowledge and outlook.
This does not mean that it is an empty category, or that to question it 
intellectually is to deny the role of faith or spiritual insight in the dimension 
of life associated with it. In any case, I see no necessary conflict between 
spiritual sensitivity and intellectual scepticism, and would even assert that 
the former is deep and honest only when in companionship with the latter. 
At any rate, in scholarly study, category analysis is indispensable.
When it is lacking, the least of the results is the lack of a typology – that 
is, a failure to distinguish between types of religious thought and experience. 
How, for instance, might we distinguish the kind of experience present in 
the Qur’an from the kind of speculation characteristic of theology (kalâm)?
What, again, is meant by “mysticism” or “esotericism”?
There is a tradition of scholarship in modern Islamic Studies devoted to 
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Sufism, “esoteric philosophy”, “theosophy” and the like. The subject-matter 
covered by these (to my mind vague) labels is, as it happens, remarkably rich. 
But the manner in which it is treated in this tradition is not by way of inquiry 
but with a view to celebration and exaltation. One would look in vain, in 
this tradition, for philosophical critique or argumentation, psychological 
analysis, or attempts to locate the phenomena concerned in a more general 
anthropology. The scholars who write in this vein are apt to look upon such 
options with indifference if not disdain.
I regularly encountered indifference to the idea of such inquiry in 
personal conversations with Annemarie Schimmel, who loved Sufism, knew 
enormous swathes of its poetic texts by heart, and had less than zero interest 
in what she would summarily dismiss as “philosophical” or “intellectual” 
intrusions into a domain to which “love”, and “love” alone, held the key. 
This reflects a very different kind of investment in the subject from (say) 
that of Reynold Nicholson – whose attitude to mysticism is better described 
as an intellectual (literary) interest rather than investment in it.
In this outlook there is no room for sceptical evaluation or even critical 
appreciation where the term “critical” is taken seriously. There is no means, 
therefore, for suspending judgement about metaphysical claims and 
abstaining without a priori acceptance or rejection, from taking the claims 
of ancient masters at their face value. There is room aplenty for questions, 
but scarcely for questioning the texts. What is thus possible is not inquiry 
but learning – learning of a certain sort, designed to foster appreciation 
and nurture allegiance. As a result the preferred student is the one inclined 
towards discipleship rather than independent judgement; one who is 
engaged on a quest rather than cultivation of the mind.
I should add that I have little tolerance for the opposite kind of mind 
to that of an acolyte – a mind bent on scepticism as a sport, taking delight 
in debunking. Critical inquiry belongs to a very different kind of outlook 
from that associated with the kind of criticism which takes pride in its 
aggressiveness. Criticism in this sense (the word is ambiguous) is a sign 
not of intellectual cultivation but of intellectual vandalism. The two are 
as apart as chalk and cheese. Moreover, I believe that love for a subject, a 
wish to be inspired by it, and to pursue learning with passion, are qualities 
not only valuable but essential to true intellectual accomplishment. One is 
a dubious student of music who is deaf to its pleasures. Likewise, I doubt 
whether the study of religion, not only by a student whose mind is closed to 
seeing anything good in it but also by one who is religiously unmusical (to 
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use an expression from Max Weber) is likely to eventuate in a contribution 
to human knowledge in this field.
It does not take much of an argument, however, to apply the same idea to 
the mind closed in an opposite direction. But there is more to it than that, of 
a specific sort, in the area we are considering here.
There are three activities of the mind here which it is useful to 
distinguish. There is first of all the doctrine and symbolism, for example, 
running from Yahya al-Suhrawardi, through Ibn-al-Arabi, to Mulla Sadra. 
To link these names like this is to see at once both what united them and 
what distinguished them, so that if we speak of them as constituting a 
“tradition” we must do so by understanding “tradition” in a looser and more 
historically contextualising sense than those scholars nowadays who think 
of it as a harmonious whole given for all from times immemorial.
The point I wish to make here is that such a tradition can only legitimately 
continue as it is, without the injection of meta-level philosophical or 
theoretical considerations I have mentioned above, as long as the cultural 
or intellectual ethos in which it is excluded remains essentially unaltered.
The fact is, however, that with the altered paradigm of the modern 
sciences, both natural and human – a reflection, in turn of a profoundly 
changed world – the old paradigm, with its assumptions about being 
and knowledge, cannot be maintained, except at the price of intellectual 
ghettoisation, without a fresh inquiry, at a meta-level, by means of categories 
from the combined domains of modern philosophy, psychology and 
anthropology. It may well be that we might find some of these categories 
inadequate when confronted with this subject-matter. If so, it would be a 
stroke of good luck, contributing as it might to new horizons both in the 
tradition and within the sphere of modern knowledge.
The approach to mysticism or esotericism by scholars in modern 
universities which I have outlined above differs from both these phenomena. 
It eschews modern categories. But it is also at a great remove from the very 
subject-matter it eulogises. It is far more inspiring as well as instructive to 
read from Jalal-al-din Rumi’s mathnawi, even in translation, than to read 
Schimmel on Rumi’s “symbolism”. Modern studies of mysticism in the 
style I have characterised above are hybrid phenomena. It is not intellectual 
enough, yet it is informed by genuine scholarship. It is not of a piece – being 
situated in a very different time and place – with the mystical or gnostic 
doctrine and practice of historical times, yet pays allegiance to it. It is a kind 
of academic neo-mysticism.
How might such a curious hybrid, coy of intellectual challenge, yet 
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learned, come about in religious studies? Part of the answer is unintentionally 
apparent in the name “religious studies”. Designed to study religion, it has 
a tendency to be religious. Both aspects fall short of their ideal prototypes. 
Genuine religious participation is unaware, or only notionally aware of itself 
as religious. And religious enthusiasm, whatever form or name it takes, acts 
as a brake on objective inquiry.
The half-way house that religious studies tends to be in cases such as 
the one we have just considered is reflected, among other things, in the 
lack of theoretical self-awareness in the field. The only major “theory” it 
has adopted is phenomenology. In the pioneering work of Micae Eliade, 
phenomenology takes the form of the so-called “history of religions”. One 
of the criteria for a successful history of a subject is that the subject must be 
a sufficiently coherent and comprehensive unit. Religion is an inseparable 
facet of social existence. To abstract it from social and psychological realities 
is to substitute something unreal for these realities. That is precisely what we 
find in the accounts of religious phenomena in Eliade or his associates, like 
Henri Corbin. Louis Massignon was different. He was a religious visionary 
with feet planted firmly in history. His subject, appropriately, was a single 
life (Mansûr al-Hallâj). In Massignon’s pages Hallâj lives as a real historical 
figure. His demographic and sociological milieu is painstakingly recorded. 
Unlike Corbin’s figures, he is a flesh and blood character. His spirituality 
is nowhere compromised or underplayed. Quite the contrary: it breathes 
through the entire work. Massignon’s study, then, is a work of genuine 
scholarship. Its animating spirit is that of a spiritual humanism. Once again, 
the exception draws our attention to the rule.
Phenomenology, founded by Husserl, is a philosophy, hence subject to 
philosophical critique and assessment. In religious studies its philosophical 
status is hardly ever inspected – for graduates in religious studies are not 
required to have philosophical training, and professional philosophers 
like to keep to themselves. (Matters are different in theology.) In practice, 
phenomenology in religious studies serves as a code name for something 
like non-judgemental descriptivism. But what is the point of describing? 
A re-statement of religious phenomena in (say) Marxist or Freudian terms, 
whether valid or not, has a self-evident significance. But if the idea is to 
avoid such trans-location, deplored as a way of explaining away the object 
while professing to explain it, why re-state at all? Why not simply stop at 
editing and publishing the texts concerned?
These are methodological and epistemological questions which remain, 
in this field, infrequently and insufficiently explored.
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If, then, we were to jettison religious studies and re-allocate its subject 
matter – epistemologically and methodologically – by linking it to the 
conceptual frameworks, we may well serve to re-invent it into a more 
comprehensive human narrative. The effort is worth making.
For lack of this, our Judaeo-Christian-Islamic heritage remains effectively 
dissociated from the Greco-Roman as well as modern scientific heritages. 
The world of secular scholarship today has yet to take due measure of the 
phenomenon of prophecy in Hebraic and Arabic history. The insufficient 
attention hitherto given to this major influence in the history of culture 
is due to the twofold dissociation in modern culture, hence also academic 
culture, of the religious from the humanistic, and of Islamic Studies from 
Judaeo-Christian Studies.
One cannot do justice to prophecy in Islam without reference to Hebrew 
prophecy, Christian messianism and other related phenomena as parts of 
a single phenomenon. This underlines another major problem in Islamic 
Studies as a field: the artificial isolation of its field from other Mediterranean 
and Near Eastern cultures and faiths. It can be said that Islamic Studies is at 
once too disparate and too narrow a field, in terms of both time and space.
Take, for instance, philosophy. It goes without saying that knowledge of 
an Avicenna or Averroes is deficient without due knowledge of Aristotle and 
late Hellenistic philosophies. But it is less often realised that our perspectives 
on these great Muslim thinkers are also the poorer without knowledge of 
Kant and those who came after him, down to Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
their successors. After Kant’s repudiation of metaphysics, and subsequent 
elaborations on this “Copernican revolution”, metaphysics, once the “queen 
of the sciences”, ceases to be business as usual. One may choose to discard it 
or to re-assess it (and perhaps, more valiantly, attempt to re-instate it). But 
what one may not do, if one cares for intellectual integrity, is to resume today 
from the day before yesterday as though there had never been a yesterday. 
An ancient world-view cannot be resumed in a later age as though there had 
not been an intervening age, an age which did not simply follow the earlier 
era, but owed its being to its confrontation with the latter.
Yet we have scholars of gnostic Islam who proceed as if metaphysics were 
as epistemologically secure today as it was before the advent of intellectual 
modernity. Or, similarly, to ignore its extra-philosophical roots. It is, in 
fact, hard to imagine an Avicenna or Averroes returning to the world of 
today and not taking the keenest interest in modern physics, biology, 
philosophy and the human sciences. Knowing what we do about them, the 
comprehensiveness of their interest in all things human, and their credo, 
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expressed by their intellectual forebear al-Kindi, that knowledge should 
be welcome no matter from where it comes, it is hard to think of them as 
discounting these modern sciences in their understanding of being.
Arabic or Persian philosophers stand a better chance, then, of being 
understood by historians of philosophy than by historians of Islam. The 
history of Islam may be better understood if the history of mentalities is 
joined to the history of events and ideas in Islamic contexts. The origins of 
Islam are still insufficiently understood. It is safe to say that whatever further 
research may be needed for this purpose, research alone will not suffice; that 
prophecy, revelation or book, crucial to belief as well as in history, demand 
attention. Moreover, these are best addressed in a comparative (Judaeo-
Christian-Islamic) light.
What is true of the classical age of Islam is also true of its modern age. 
The only adequate basis for understanding modernity is a comparative one. 
Just as the problems of the developing world may be properly understood 
only in a global perspective, so too do the nature of modernity, its effects 
on conditions of life and the shape of the human mind, its impact on old 
traditions and religious views of the world, call for a comparative perspective 
in which alone the specificities of the Muslim world may be understood 
without artificial isolation from world history.
These perceptions and a growing sense of intellectual isolation drove me 
away from Islamic Studies and to other fields of the humanities and sciences 
in the decades which followed my higher education.
Towards the end of the 1980s I took up a position as the Dean of the 
Institute of Ismaili Studies in London. With this position came a privileged 
opportunity to relate my intellectual background to the practical imperatives 
of cultural and educational development in a community with a strong 
attachment to its faith balanced by a philosophy of productive adaptation 
to the modern world. With this position my questions about the nature of 
Islamic Studies took on a more practical, urgent and outwardly responsible 
aspect.
Intellectual life, however, requires the tonic of shared ideas and 
conversation. To Mohammed Arkoun, who lamented the state of Islamic 
Studies as much as I did, and for overlapping reasons, I owe the conversations 
which nourished my renewed interest and endeavour. And although my 
intellectual formation and temperament were different from his, and 
although my personal background, unlike his, was shaped by strong spiritual 
commitments, on the intellectual front he remained a constant interlocutor. 
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This was especially so when we became colleagues on the Board of Governors 
of this organisation.
In the following section I offer a summary sketch of Arkoun’s thought as 
I understand it. I do so neutrally, without interjecting my own opinions or 
reactions. In the last section I offer the rudiments of an evaluation.
II (i)
In our day it is no longer possible to speak of Islam except by enclosing it in 
quotation marks. This remark of Arkoun’s can be taken as an indication of his 
entire approach to Islam.4 It signals what he himself was often to call a need 
for problematisation. Where most people who speak of Islam assume that 
“Islam” represents something definite – for example, a set of usul (principles) 
and arkân (rites); or “submission to the will of God” – Arkoun, relying on 
the ear rather than on definition, had it trained on usage. Individuals and 
groups employ the word “Islam” variably, depending on their interests and 
their passions. The connection is, by nature, un-conscious. (I hyphenate this 
word both to imply active barricading of consciousness and to distinguish it 
from the Freudian unconscious.) Arkoun thought it the duty of a scholar of 
Islam, confronted by a specific instance of “Islam”, whether in a political or 
religious connection, to probe the subsoil of interests, passions or longings 
which fuel its appeal. Needless to say, the same rule would apply to any other 
terminology functioning as social rhetoric.
(ii)
Arkoun’s approach thus involves a rejection of taking Muslim rhetoric 
about Islam at face value. To this extent his approach belongs to what the 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. But so do 
Marxist and Freudian styles of interpretation. Arkoun’s approach differs 
from these. For this reason, this broad category defined by Ricoeur must be 
narrowed to enable his method to be characterised more specifically.
In a nutshell, Arkoun’s approach is that of critical deconstruction. The 
cradle for this idea is postmodernism. Key terminology from postmodern 
jargon pervades Arkoun’s writing. Examples include l’imaginaire (translated 
unattractively in English as “imaginary”, as a noun); “deconstruction”; 
“logocentrism”; “archaeology” of knowledge; and “mimetic rivalry”.
A principal/formative influence on postmodern thought is Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche’s repudiation of metaphysics was more total than Kant’s. 
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While Kant retains notions of reality and truth, though with significant 
philosophical caveats, Nietzsche actively eschews them. It is only after 
Nietzsche that it becomes possible to speak of knowledge as “produced” 
rather than obtained. Though it would be simplistic to equate Nietzsche’s 
position with those of postmodernism, its focus on the uses rather than 
references of discourse can easily be traced to him. Famously, or infamously, 
to Nietzsche we owe the idea of a claim to truth as a bid for power. In the 
Nietzschean way of thinking, knowledge, truth and the other constants 
of traditional metaphysics are seen as, ultimately, tools or masquerades of 
power.
This whole picture of the world – too tendentious to be called a theory, 
and too unsystematic to be called a philosophy – informs Arkoun’s work. 
His theoretical framework was not original. Where he stood out was in his 
application of it to the study of Islam, in which there was (and remains) a 
dearth of theoretical perspectives.
The two pillars of Arkoun’s analysis are history and anthropology. History 
is all-determining. This follows naturally from the rejection of metaphysics, 
which also opens the door to anthropology. The two methods should ideally 
coalesce into an anthropological history, or historical anthropology. Such a 
project would differ profoundly from “positivist” scholarship of traditional 
Orientalists. I believe it is an accurate statement of Arkoun’s view of the 
prevailing tradition of Islamic history to say that it subscribes to the cult of 
facts. Obsessed by chronology, fastidiously philological, it offers no light on 
the forces at work in the contemporary Muslim world because, halting at the 
surface of the texts, it fails to penetrate to the historical forces contemporary 
to the texts. The result is what Arkoun frequently called “dead” history.
It would be wrong to conclude that Arkoun thought little of Orientalist 
scholarship. On the contrary he considered its achievements both impressive 
and indispensable. He was never unsure of his identity as a scholar of 
Islam. He thought and wrote as a scholar. His historical ideas were, just 
like Orientalist scholarship, textually based. But to this he joined a keen 
curiosity and natural flair for anthropology, in whose theories he was deeply 
interested.
Historians and anthropologists are traditionally dispassionate, 
maintaining a principled adherence to detailed observation and inquiry. 
But Arkoun thought and wrote with passion, a passion which frequently 
boiled over in vehemence. His was the passion of a campaigner, albeit an 
intellectual campaigner who disdained conventional politics as much as he 
disdained the edifice of the modern state.
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In this, his campaigning zeal, he stood in the old tradition of the 
“committed” intellectual who is concerned to expose the mask of reason 
which legitimises vested interests. Although he detested Marxism, he was 
at home with the concept of ideology first promulgated, in its modern 
form, in Hegelian and Marxian thought, and elaborated in the sociology of 
knowledge.
In the postmodern climate of thought the old notion of ideology took a 
new turn under the influence of men like Nietzsche and Heidegger. Arkoun 
was not concerned with defining or evaluating the notion. This was probably 
for the best, as his strength lay not in philosophical revision or analysis, but 
in applying this and other such concepts to the hitherto untouched field of 
Islamic history. Doing so brought additional issues to light, necessitating 
other theoretical concepts, to some of which Arkoun was to give his own 
twist or spin so as to help illuminate the history of Islam. In the process he 
touched on important issues still deserving continued attention.
The critique of ideology is an unmasking enterprise. It attacks 
mystification. An especially interesting analysis in Arkoun’s work is to be 
found in the argument that religion theologises mundane events. In the 
process it turns social actors into theological categories. Thus, Arkoun 
was known to speak of Muhammad bin Abdullah in distinction from 
Muhammad the Prophet – not in any way to belittle the latter, but to 
emphasise that prophecy was an interpretation, drawn from the universe of 
symbols already present in the Hebrew bible and more generally in the Near-
Eastern milieu, of the strivings and ideals of a social actor. Similarly, the men 
around the Prophet, whose interests led them to support or opposition, or 
into hedging their bets, are to be encountered in a theologised form in the 
discourse of the Qur’an, as mû’minûn (the faithful), mûshriqûn (polytheists) 
and mûnâfiqûn (hypocrites, with guile in their hearts).
This is one of the most interesting and original ideas to emerge from 
Arkoun’s theoretical interest, applied to the materials of Islam. Just as Marx 
is said to have stood Hegel on his head, so Arkoun makes theology stand on 
its head. When theology, which takes itself to be foundational, is made to 
stand on its head, it shows up its real foundation which, in Arkoun’s view, is 
society: the sphere where men organise themselves to pursue their interests 
and ideals, and in the process form alliances, wage warfare, and not least, 
manufacture and uphold ideologies.
There is, in fact, a double movement involved. In the first instance, social 
realities are transmuted into theological imaginaire. Deconstructive analysis 
seeks to return theology’s celestial escapades to its earthly roots. It is, in 
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other words, the re-tracing of a process from its end-point to its origin. It is, 
we might say, like the return of evaporated water, condensing as rain, to the 
earth where it rose.
Whatever we might say in defence or criticism of this scheme, it is 
quite evident, when one thinks about it, that religious discourse frequently 
mystifies the facts of history. Its claim to unveil a higher reality appears all 
too often to go hand in hand with an apparent determination to veil naked 
human interests, whether for power, status or possession. If one were to look 
for a core in deconstructive analysis which would remain persuasive when 
the rest of its principles were rejected, whether as being reductive or on some 
other such grounds, it would be an appeal to the humanity of the figures and 
motivations which are reflected (and disguised) in religious ideologies.
It is in this sense that the prophet of Islam (like other prophets, messiahs, 
saints or whatever) is to be regarded primarily as a social actor, and only 
secondarily (though not, as we shall see, reductively) in the light of a 
religious interpretation, as a prophet.
(iii)
The above, I believe, is an accurate distillation of Arkoun’s position in this 
regard. To distil it in these terms pushes to the fore a question which may 
otherwise be lost from view. Put simply, it is: can a believer, wishing to 
continue to believe, accept Arkoun’s approach? Put differently: are belief 
and deconstruction compatible? We may join this to a further question: 
can a believer make use of – that is to say, profit from – Arkoun’s ideas? 
However, since this second question presupposes an affirmative answer to 
the first, we may coalesce the two and deal with them as one.
Broadly, a reflective believer has two options in the face of what Paul 
Ricoeur calls “hermeneutics of suspicion”. He may hold that faith can well 
survive and even gain from such a confrontation. Or he may assert that it 
has value for an intellectual, but that it is imperative that ordinary men and 
women be shielded from it.
Both these expedients have in fact been proposed. The first has been 
argued, in another context, by Paul Ricoeur.5 The second was the characteristic 
position of classical philosophers, living in Muslim communities, Jewish 
communities or Christian communities – men like Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
and Ibn Maimûn (Maimonides).
I include classical philosophers like al-Fârâbî or Ibn Rushd even though, 
quite clearly, they have nothing to do with modern critics of ideology, 
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because their position on matters such as God’s knowledge or the eternity 
of the world was at strong variance with that of religious orthodoxy.
Their position, however, which was essentially that of Platonic political 
philosophy, was founded on an emphatic distinction between knowledge 
due to an elite (al-khâṣṣ) and to the rank and file (al-‘amm). Neither could 
be practical or acceptable today. In parenthesis, it is also worth noting that 
Arkoun, with his strong distaste for the notion of an elite, was nothing if 
not hostile to Platonic political philosophy or the metaphysics allegedly 
connected to it.
As for the first of the options stated above, it is doubtful whether it 
can be upheld, beyond the private conscience of a solitary philosopher in a 
community of faith, by the community at large.
One may, of course, reject all deconstructive analysis altogether. But 
a theologian who does so would need to reckon with the prima facie 
credibility of the insights from historical sociology. He would also need to 
show why an alternative view, appealing, say, to a “beyond” (however this is 
understood), is rationally more satisfactory.
If it can be shown that Arkoun’s argument misses something essential, it 
would, in a word, be reductive. Is it so? What place, if any, does the outlook 
of faith have in his thinking?
The question of the reality (or otherwise) of religious belief is a question 
of utmost importance in human self-understanding. Modern systems of 
thought do not always seem to grant this importance. Arkoun is among 
those who do. The following remarks make this clear:
It is necessary to accept as objects of history, psychological analysis 
and historical anthropology what the ‘believing’ reading calls God, 
prophetic function, the revealed and revealing Word, the sacred, 
retribution, prayer, trust in God and so on. Historians have already 
used all this religious vocabulary; but they have presented it in a 
scientific culture based on a prejudice in favour of rationality which 
has long been that of Aristotelian categorization continued [in] the 
Enlightenment whose strategies, argumentation and themes aimed 
precisely at the substitution of its ‘scientific’ sovereignty to that of 
religious reason ...6
The criticism of the Enlightenment here is not incidental. It was a 
cornerstone of Arkoun’s thought. Like many postmodern authors, he saw 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment as an ideology. To his mind it deserves 
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the same deconstructive treatment as religious ideologies. In common with 
other postmodern authors, Arkoun did not accept the existence of any such 
thing as objective reason. There were only “reasons”: discourses of one kind 
or another.
Adjectival qualifications of reason, which are a commonplace today, 
occur in Arkoun’s writing. Examples are allusion to “religious reason” or 
“Islamic reason”. Needless to say, before postmodernism, such expressions 
would have been rejected as linguistic errors or barbarisms.
The title of one of his books, Pour une critique de la raison Islamique, 
illustrates this usage. The Kantian echo in the title is however ironic, for 
Kant, although he took reason to be humanely anchored, would have 
recoiled at any suggestion that it was socially constructed. But for Arkoun 
that is precisely what reason is. Hence, the Enlightenment’s appeal to Reason 
as a universal ideal is, in his view, deceptive. The ideal is but an ideological 
extension of modern Europe’s belief in its entitlement to world mastery.
The Enlightenment is not what it saw itself as: the summit of human 
rationality. What it saw as objective reason was in fact a particular projection 
of reason, which effectively flattered the self-image of an ascendant Europe. 
Its pretension to universal rationality was a fraud.
It would follow that a rejection of religion in the name of reason is a 
suspect position. This was one of Arkoun’s emphatic themes. Teaching and 
writing in the French context, he was aware of the militant face that modern 
secularism can take. To Arkoun militant secularism is a mirror image of 
religious militancy. It is a war of dogma with dogma. Both the contemporary 
so-called revival of religion and the attack on it by secular reason are, in his 
view, positions fit only to be combated and overcome.
The task of scholarship cannot stop here, however, for, the even-
handedness implied in this position requires acknowledgement of the 
believer’s outlook and sensibilities. But if such an acknowledgement were 
to be combined with a critique of religion as ideology, what is needed is a 
conception of religious faith as somehow distinct from the ideological use 
of religious symbols.
Since Arkoun’s theoretical positions are a part of his reflections on Islam, 
it is best to look at these for clues to his perspective on faith. The most 
convenient for this purpose are his reflections on the Qur’an.
(iv)
The Qur’an is a book. Its being –  or rather, having become – a book is 
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for Arkoun the first epistemological obstacle to a true appreciation of 
the phenomenon called “revelation”. For the book, or rather the corpus 
(muṣḥaf) is a kind of packaging, a fixation, of an oral discourse which by its 
nature was open-ended and spontaneous. The passage from the primary to 
the secondary, from the spoken to the written, was for Arkoun a problematic 
development. Speech is open-ended. A corpus is bounded. The Qur’an as 
speech or recitation is one thing; as a muṣḥaf it became, in Arkoun’s telling 
words, an “official closed corpus”.
The collection authorised by the Caliph Uthman bin Affan (644–
656) had far-reaching effects. It led, in succeeding decades and centuries, 
to the rise of a “functional solidarity” between state, jurist-theologians, 
state bureaucracy and the written word.7 Even so, the Qur’an was not 
one-dimensional. Its content became a prolific source for exegesis and 
commentary, theological doctrine and, not least, religious jurisprudence 
and law (fiqh and shari‘a).
At the same time the “mythical” idea of the Qur’an, present in the original 
discourse, remained the living source of a rich imaginaire. The mythical 
aspect visualised a descent of the divine word from a heavenly archetype, 
the umm-al-kitâb (“Mother of the Book”), relayed to humanity through 
an inspired messenger. But this imaginaire was exploited to legitimise 
true belief (literally, orthodoxy). Given the numerous groups competing 
for material and spiritual supremacy, the imaginaire crystallised into 
competing orthodoxies, such as Sunni, Shi‘i or Khariji, each subdivided into 
groups with competing and exclusive claims to truth. By their very nature, 
these standardised orthodoxies could not accommodate the practically 
infinite diversity, unavoidable in a complex civilisation, of temperaments, 
intellectual styles, literary traditions and lifestyles. There was thus a standing 
employment open to “managers of the sacred” whose task was to define true 
belief and hunt down heresies.
It is obvious that this description also applies (with suitable adaptations) 
to the other “Societies of the Book” (Jews and Christians). Each group (or 
sub-group) defined itself through “mimetic rivalry” with the other. One 
of the implications of this view is the need for a common approach to the 
socio-religious milieu of the Mediterranean world in which the “Societies 
of the Book” were shaped. Their impact on the modern world and the 
consequences of the impact on them by the conditions of the modern world 
likewise deserve a common approach.
In this scheme, the history of Islam might be viewed as a passage from 
the “Qur’anic Fact” to the “Islamic Fact”.8 This implies a departure from a 
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discourse which nourishes faith to a discourse which feeds ideology. The 
former is to be found in the rich reservoir of myth, metaphor and symbol 
in Qur’anic and Biblical texts. These literary modes, namely symbolic 
evocations of God, the heavens, the heavenly book, angels, the Last Day, 
and so on, ensure an open space of meaning, potentially internalised by the 
believer. Transcendence understood in these terms is to be contrasted with 
transcendentalisation, or sacralisation, of ideas and institutions meant to 
immunise them from questioning or challenge. Whereas the “Qur’anic fact”, 
like all mytho-poetic discourse, opens a space for thought and imagination, 
its codification into the “Islamic fact” tends to abolish this openness.
The distinction between the phenomenon of the Qur’an and the 
phenomenon of Islam is part of Arkoun’s general view of the revelation. 
It calls to mind the approach of modern Muslim reformers (like Fazlur 
Rahman and Mohammad Iqbal) who were inclined to see Islamic history 
in many ways as a falling away from the Qur’an – a loss, over the centuries, 
of the dynamism of the original revelation. But Arkoun thought little of 
reformists. In any case, his “Qur’an” is not the muṣḥaf or book. And unlike 
authors who take the idea of God’s word as a given, Arkoun (who was partial 
to epistemology rather than ontology) focussed on the linguistic features of 
the revelation, insisting that the idea of the “word of God” be problematised 
rather than assumed.
(v)
Over time, however, Arkoun’s reading of the Qur’an became more critical 
– we might even say, more ambivalent. Although he retained his view of 
Qur’anic discourse as meaningful for a believer as opposed to an ideologue 
he was more inclined, in the latest phase of his scholarly work, to find in it the 
seeds of what would amount, in stark terms, to ideology. This development 
in Arkoun’s thought coincided with an interest in a section of the Qur’an, 
namely Sura 9, which poses a great challenge to modern Muslims who are 
eager to dissociate Islam from the barbaric acts of violence which are carried 
out in its name nowadays. Sura 9 contains a call to arms against the “enemies 
of God” (labelled as polytheists) combined with a promise of mercy and 
reconciliation to those who relent.
Although it would be far-fetched to find sanction for contemporary acts 
of violence or terror in the so-called “verses of the sword” in this section of 
the Qur’an (or others like it) – all one needs to appreciate this is a sense of 
historical context – they can hardly be passed over in silence. However, to 
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do otherwise takes courage in the current climate. It is to Arkoun’s credit 
that he showed courage by tackling these issues head-on.
Arkoun’s analysis went further than simply declaring that context 
determines meaning. If this is all that mattered, the idea of asbâb al-nuzl, 
“occasions for the revelation”, standard in the writings of classical exegetes, 
would be sufficient for modern enlightened approaches to scripture. But, 
can anyone honestly hold that after the profound changes and advances 
in our understanding of human knowledge ushered in with the rise of the 
modern world and the modern mind, these few rule-of-thumb platitudes – 
platitudes like taking account of context; interpreting anew with the times; 
symbolic interpretation – are the only harvest at hand? If so, it is a pretty 
meagre harvest. Anyone who is acquainted with modern philosophy and 
the human and natural sciences – indeed, anyone acquainted with the way 
Christian theology has attempted, sometimes with superficial enthusiasm, 
at other times with more discrimination, to deepen its thinking in the light 
of modern knowledge – cannot but be struck by the slender intellectuality 
of these maxims. Islamic theology today needs to go far, far beyond these 
easy incantations.
It cannot be said that Arkoun went far in his anthropological investigation 
of these issues (theology was not his chosen field) but he did make a start.
Shunning apologetics, Arkoun defines the context of the verses in 
question as the decisive victory of a party (here, the prophet and his 
immediate supporters) over its erstwhile opponents. A decisive victory 
empowers the victor to demand surrender of its enemies on the victor’s 
terms. This is the concrete context which must be seen, to begin with, in full 
clarity (so Arkoun argues) without letting theological sentiments mystify it 
into something intangible or sublime. It is the “immanent” (socio-political-
historical) dimension of revelatory discourse.9 The tone, themes and length 
of the sura indicate a process of “institutionalisation” of the “word of God 
in human concrete history” after the final re-conquest of Mecca.10 The 
terms in which this is understood are inextricably religious and worldly. The 
theme of tauba (“repentance”) from which Sura 9 takes its name is “religious 
in principle, but political in fact”.11 It is part of a “mythical-historical 
consciousness” guiding socio-political action while elevating it to the plane 
of religious meaning.
So far, Arkoun’s exegesis would seem reductive, with religion being 
seen essentially as a mystification of down-to-earth events. But he does not 
stop here. What needs to be recognised is a certain “disproportionality 
between the initial contingency” of the socio-military-political events and 
38 the construction of belief
the “inexhaustible dynamism of the mythical-historical consciousness that 
draws nourishment of it”.12 While it is hard now to be sure whether Arkoun 
would have agreed with our use here of Paul Ricoeur’s excellent words from 
another context, we could say, in Ricoeur’s terms, that the language of the 
text carries a “surplus of meaning”. A certain similarity to this notion is to 
be seen in the kind of time Arkoun sees at work in the Qur’an. With its 
emphatic concern with the history of salvation, Qur’anic time is basically 
“existential”. “Every instant is filled with the presence of God”, a presence 
“reactivated in the ‘heart’ of every believer as he performs his daily religious 
practices, meditation, rememorisation (dhikr) of the History of Salvation 
and liturgical recitation of the revealed Word”.13
This existential meaningfulness is precisely what is lacking in political 
invocations of the Qur’an by contemporary Islamists. In Arkoun’s words: 
“Today, Qur’anic time is pulverised into a mass of social and ideological 
times whose common characteristic is that they empty historicity of the truth 
gained from experience of the divine.”14 It follows that a true restoration of 
the existential dimension of the revelation requires not a “re-interpretation” 
of verses, nor research into the “occasions of revelation” (asbâb al-nuzûl), 
but a reconstitution of the categories in which we might understand the 
very phenomenon of revelation. Such a reconstitution may well provide 
a new, humanist basis for a foundation for Muslim thought and practice 
today.
III
It is time now for an assessment. Given the constraints in the length of 
this article, I must content myself with very brief – perhaps even laconic 
– observations. Besides the circumstantial need for brevity, this may also 
be excused by the fact that like the work of some scholars but unlike many 
others that one could think of, Arkoun’s work at his death was in process, 
and hence remains unfinished, preventing rounded assessment.
Still a few things can be said. His work was an intellectual campaign. It 
has all the merits and drawbacks of an intellectual campaign. We misjudge 
it if we see it in any other terms.
His campaign, moreover, was by the nature of the case essentially 
adversarial. It was deconstructionist, not constructionist. It should be noted 
that I don’t say that it was not constructive, for, in the right circumstances, 
destruction can be constructive. Arkoun was intensely troubled by what 
he saw as the intellectually retrograde and mendacious potential in both 
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religious and secular ideologies. He saw the former having a stranglehold on 
Muslim minds today. Of the latter he saw recurring evidence in the attitudes 
to the Muslim world in Western media and politics. Yet in attacking the 
Western attitudes he was never defensive. Stubbornly, he refused to hail the 
achievements of Islam in the past, because he viewed the habit of Muslim 
modernists – who acclaim the Islamic past as the pinnacle of human 
achievement, and lament the present condition of Muslims as being due to a 
failure to follow true Islam – as part of the same mendacity and self-delusion 
which were responsible for failings in Muslim society.
He did not deny the genuine achievements in learning, invention and 
thought in classical Muslim history. But he saw them as existing alongside 
failures, like the disappearance there of independent philosophy after Ibn 
Rushd, in contrast to its blossoming, after the scientific revolution, in 
Europe. He acknowledged the more mythopoetic tradition of thought 
commonly called “esoteric philosophy” as worthy of interest, but insisted 
that before anything else it should be rigorously named and defined rather 
than merely celebrated.
By the same token he was forthright in his praise of the achievements 
of Western modernity. He had no sympathy whatsoever for wholesale 
comparison or contrast between “Islam” and the “West”, no matter which of 
this pair of ultimately fictitious wholes was glorified and which was vilified. 
And even as he paid due tribute to the attainments of the historical Muslim 
world, he was careful not to call them “Muslim” or “Islamic”, knowing that 
it is a form of special pleading to attribute them to religion; that not a few 
of the contributions came from Jews, Christians, “heretics” and humanists 
(like Miskwayhi, the subject of his doctoral thesis); and that the very notion 
of the Muslim or Islamic world, even in history, was problematic. With this 
last point in mind, he often advocated a more circumspect expression, like 
the “Islamic context” in place of (say) “Muslim” or “Islamic” civilisation.
In all this he was properly a historian who, in the best tradition of 
modern scholarship, sees his role as one of adjudicating rather than taking 
sides. Perhaps paradoxically, he was unlike a modern liberal historian in 
inveighing against what he took to be false, manipulative, cynical or self-
aggrandising in Islamic discourse. This made him a polemicist. It remains 
open to question whether his work would have had a superior quality if he 
had been less strident or didactic – if, that is, he had been more of the scholar 
he had been and less of the controversialist he increasingly became. Perhaps, 
in the end, a writer who takes pains not to raise his voice even when he 
holds very strong judgements on what he writes about is more likely to earn 
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a hearing than one who, raising his voice, proclaims them in every statement 
he makes.
It hardly needs saying that Arkoun belonged to the second category of 
scholars. As time went on, one noticed a disproportionate time spent, in his 
addresses or writings, in bewailing what scholars of Islam were failing to do, 
than on doing himself, in content or detail, what they were leaving undone.
But then again, to take issue with his partisan fervour may be moot. 
Indeed, it may beg the question, for he rejected the very principle, central to 
the doctrine of liberal scholarship, of neutral objectivity. He defined the role 
of a scholar differently from that in the liberal tradition. And although one 
may oppose his definition, it cannot be shown to be false by simply opposing 
it. In any case, one need not go along wholly with Arkoun to agree that so-
called “disinterested” knowledge is, even as an ideal, an imperfectly realised 
thing. This may not be a conclusive argument. But once the debate is raised 
it becomes, by liberal doctrine’s own commitments, inescapable.
In any case, the criticisms of traditional Islamic Studies I have made in 
the first section of this paper do not presuppose acceptance of Arkoun’s 
particular position. What the criticisms do is to put traditional Islamic 
Studies into question. Arkoun came to these questions in his own way. 
He answered them in his own terms. To a scholar unsympathetic to either 
Arkoun’s questions or to the questions more generally, one can only say: the 
questions have been raised. Once they have been raised, to pass over them 
in silence is wrong.
Not least of Arkoun’s contribution, then, is that he asked questions – big, 
important, urgent questions. He had his own answers to them. Whether 
they come to be accepted and, if so, how widely, is another matter.
Less question-begging were two other, perhaps inter-connected flaws 
(to my mind) in his work. I have already mentioned one of these by 
referring to the influence of postmodernism in his work. This influence is 
in fact exclusive enough to amount to affiliation to the school of thought 
in question. Postmodern thinking takes certain ideas so much for granted 
that they are effectively taken to be facts. I have in mind the idea that truth 
is a synonym for socially constructed claims and beliefs; that these represent 
the interests, in particular the will to power, of the social agents concerned; 
that as the will to power leads to conflicts and inequalities, truth-claims are 
a “site for contestation”; and that the essential task of critical scholarship is 
to deconstruct all this.
On these doctrines all I can say here, without offering reasons (for 
this would take us too far afield), is that I personally find these doctrines 
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repugnant. I find them dogmatic; and when seen in the long perspective of 
Western philosophy from the Ancient Greeks to today (not to mention the 
philosophies of other continents), I find them parochial, in terms of both 
time and place.
Linked to postmodernism – perhaps, in fact, warp and woof with it – is its 
barbarous idiom. The postmodern mind worships theory; the domination 
of theory in academic humanities and social sciences today is a phenomenon 
deserving of analysis in its own right. It is, again, a highly parochial affair, the 
self-vindicating code of a coterie of scholars and commentators who talk to 
themselves rather than to the broad history of letters.
Even a cursory glance at Arkoun’s writing shows its well-nigh 
impenetrable character. Yet there is genuine illumination to be found, at 
least at points where his theoretical concerns are in contact with the data of 
Islamic history. It is a paradox that Arkoun, who believed passionately in the 
intellectual’s social mission, wrote in a manner inaccessible to all but scholars 
acquainted with a specific kind of scholarship. In any event, he remained a 
professional scholar, rarely straying (at least in his books) from his chosen 
specialism. He wrote for a specialist audience. His interlocutors, in print and 
formal exchanges, were from the specialist academic world. But he remained 
dissatisfied with their evident lack of understanding or appreciation (there 
were exceptions, though in his view, they were few and far between). While 
being faithful to the canons of academic scholarship, and while continuing 
to write in terms which spoke to a minority of scholars of Islam, those with a 
taste or capacity for theory, he yearned for a wider influence of his work. He 
was always pleased when his work struck a chord with individuals, especially 
in the Muslim world, some of whom became his eager admirers.
It is reasonable to hold that Arkoun’s thought has a potentially far greater 
scope than what is visible in his writing thanks to the straitjacket of theory 
and idiom by which it is bound. Perhaps it is a task well worth attempting, 
by existing or future students of his work, to emancipate his insights from 
the cradle in which they were formed, and develop them in new directions.
Development is what Arkoun’s work deserves. He left many ideas 
nascent or undefined. This was less due to lack of time or opportunity – 
he had a long career – than due to two other factors. He was continually 
building on his ideas, though the basic themes remained steady. And he was 
not a systematic thinker. He did not develop his ideas in a logical step-by-
step way. His intelligence worked by way of flashes of insight and theoretical 
conceptualisations. It will take someone familiar with the actualities of 
Islamic history to see how and to what degree his concepts endure the test 
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of data; and someone with philosophical or logical acumen to evaluate the 
logic of his theories.
One aspect of his work which requires careful thought is the one 
mentioned in the foregoing pages: the degree of its suitability or otherwise 
for an intellectually grounded understanding of the nature of faith. 
Although I have mentioned Arkoun’s positive stand on the place of belief in 
human societies, it remains an embryonic idea. He did not develop it to any 
degree comparable to that of his other ideas. This was probably due, in part, 
to his not being a philosopher of religion. His partial contemporary, Paul 
Ricoeur, who had a philosophically developed view of religion (within the 
framework of hermeneutic phenomenology), is in this respect a contrasting 
example.
Arkoun seemed convinced that radical criticism of the kind he offered 
was valuable to believers as well as scholars. But it is not clear that the two 
mindsets are similar enough to find this approach altogether congenial. 
The fundamental question is an old one. It was first raised by Plato in his 
discussion of the respective claims of myth and philosophy: the question of 
lasting relevance. It is not always raised clearly or explicitly. But it has not 
vanished, nor been resolved.
I may illustrate the importance of this question, as far as scholarship is 
concerned, with the aid of a remarkable recent book by Aaron T. Hughes.15 
This is not the place to discuss his basic premises about truth and knowledge. 
What is clearly laudable about his work is his refusal to side with the scholarly 
apologetics and anodyne defences of “Islam” (the quotation marks deserve 
notice) which only too many scholars of Islam are nowadays prepared to 
champion under the banner of “expertise”. Hughes’ forthright insistence 
that there is, and ought to be, a firm dividing line between scholarship and 
apologetics was, if anything, overdue in this field.
What position must someone speaking from within a religious 
community take in this matter, however? Hughes is prepared to make an 
exception for “theologians”. “Theologians” here may be understood to mean 
religious leaders or preachers who speak to or on behalf their communities. 
Every reflective practitioner of “theology” in this sense will appreciate 
the difference between scholarly pursuit of knowledge and the kind of 
partisanship demanded by “theology”. But this is not a finally satisfactory 
position. The difference being drawn by Hughes raises important questions 
in its own right.
Does the difference mean, for instance, that commitment to a faith 
excuses (or even necessitates) intellectual compromises, not to mention 
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duplicity? Are there two “truths”, or two approaches to a common truth? This 
question is seldom examined in modern terms, let alone answered. Whatever 
the answers – which could conceivably involve a renewed consideration of 
what Aristotle called “rhetoric” or, more generally, the relation between 
knowledge and politics – the question, surely, is of continuing importance 
in an age when the religious and secular have become embattled notions.
Arkoun did not elaborate on this issue. But his thought certainly has 
implications for it, if only because unlike secularists, atheists and positivists, 
he is never condescending towards expressions of belief.
Arkoun’s rejection of modern disbelief gave him an impartiality and 
equidistance which makes him potentially of interest to believers. Just as, 
in his view, rational enlightenment remains “unthought” (and perhaps 
epistemologically unthinkable) in terms of dogmatic religion, so belief 
remains poorly understood and even unthought (and perhaps unthinkable) 
in dogmatically secularist cultures.
To repeat, it is as much for the questions that Arkoun raised as for his 
conclusions that we are indebted to him. In the field of Islam and religion 
more generally, there are (as ever) intolerant dogmatists, liberal apologists 
and intolerant adversaries of religion. Arkoun stood apart from all of 
these. There are believers whose point of view is confined to their own 
communities. Others favour religious dialogue, but, all too frequently, in 
intellectually academic terms. Again, Arkoun was a man apart. The ground 
on which he stood was not that of religion or anti-religion. He might not 
have fully defined the alternative ground – what he called, without enlarging 
on it, “emergent reason” – on which he wished to stand. He was critical too 
of what in modern times passes as humanism. But at this point one must 
turn from his books to the person he was. Those who, like myself, knew him 
personally will remember him as a man of intellect as well as humanity; a 
man capable, despite first impressions (not always easily offset), of tender 
feelings; and a man at times movingly alive to the life histories of those he 
knew, to whom he was ever generous in friendship and affection.
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The Authenticity of Sacred Texts
R. Stephen Humphreys
The central problem in the study of the beginnings and early development 
of Islam is authenticity – that is, in what sense are the texts on which we 
rely that which they claim to be? Do they in fact embody the actual 
words produced during Islam’s first decades? Insofar as they depart from 
original statements, do they nevertheless reflect on some level the ways of 
thinking, the social and moral ethos of Islam’s beginnings? Does every text 
need to retain its primitive shape to claim some level of authenticity, to 
give meaningful testimony about the persons and events that it purports 
to represent? This is a problem that confronts both medieval and modern 
Muslim writers as well as non-Muslims, though of course each of these three 
groups approaches the problem within a distinct frame of reference and has 
a very different stake in its outcome. 
In Western scholarship, this problem was first posed in a systematic way 
more than century ago, in Ignaz Goldziher’s famous monograph on the 
hadith.1 It was picked up by a number of his formidable contemporaries, 
in particular Julius Wellhausen,2 Leone Caetani,3 and (in a somewhat 
erratic and idiosyncratic manner) Henri Lammens.4 Their solutions to 
the problem were provisional at best, as they themselves recognised, but 
were not developed or revised in any systematic way until Joseph Schacht’s 
groundbreaking Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence,5 the implications 
of which have yet to be exhausted or even fully understood. 
A quarter of a century later, an even more radical challenge was launched 
by John Wansbrough, Michael Cook and Patricia Crone. They were inspired 
by Schacht’s arguments, but they went even further, in effect declaring 
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null and void everything that had been written about the whole period of 
Muhammad’s prophetic career and the early Arab-Muslim conquests (in 
effect, the six decades from 600 to 661). On a different level, the work of 
Albrecht Noth and Lawrence Conrad6 suggested that most Arabic historical 
writing from the late eighth and throughout the ninth century could be 
reduced to a body of free-floating topoi and motifs, few of which could be 
securely attached to any real persons or events. That is, Noth argued, the 
same stories were told over and over again, but with differing locales and 
casts of characters. 
These challenges to the early Islamic textual tradition could be neither 
ignored nor easily assimilated, and they have provoked a burgeoning and 
very sophisticated set of responses. Leading names would include Lawrence 
Conrad, Michael Lecker, Fred M. Donner,7 Chase F. Robinson, Robert 
Hoyland,8 Harald Motzki,9 Gregor Schoeler, Stefan Leder, Alfred de 
Prémare, Josef Van Ess and (quite recently) Suleiman Mourad.10 There is as 
yet no consensus, and probably never will be, but it is fair to say that the way 
scholars (Muslim as well as Western) think about this textual tradition has 
changed forever. We are far more aware of the problems and possibilities of 
the Arabic texts than we used to be. We have also learned that it will not do 
to examine them in isolation from the other linguistic-cultural traditions of 
West Asia during the seventh to ninth centuries; Arab-Muslim writing must 
be situated and interpreted within a broad context: Syriac first of all, but 
also Greek, Coptic, Armenian, Georgian and even Latin.
However, our discussions of texts from or about early Islam have 
been confused and unnecessarily complicated by the fact that the term 
“authenticity” is very freely used but almost never adequately defined. 
“Authenticity” is what we seek and devoutly long for in these texts, but we 
mean many different and perhaps contradictory things by it. Within the 
discourse on early Islam, whether scholarly or apologetic, authenticity is 
more an ad hoc notion than a rigorously articulated concept. We think we 
know what we mean, in a rough and ready way, and so we do not ask whether 
that is in fact the case. However, when we look at the ordinary, everyday uses 
of the terms “authenticity” or “authentic”, we will quickly see how slippery 
these words really are. “She has an authentic East Texas accent” – that is, 
she is in fact a woman from Dallas, or perhaps she speaks just like a woman 
from Dallas even though she grew up in Boston. “That novel is an authentic 
work of genius” – not just a skilfully contrived tale, but rather a story that 
communicates human experience in a powerful, convincing and enduring 
manner. “An authentic performance of Handel’s Messiah” – presumably, 
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a performance which we believe would sound much like those staged by 
the composer himself 250 years ago, in spite of the enormous difference 
between the instruments and vocal styles of his time and ours. An authentic 
diamond necklace is made from real diamonds, but what shall we say about 
an “authentic replica” of a necklace worn by the Duchess of Windsor? We 
mean, I suppose, that it is meant to look like one she would have worn, 
though she would not have been fooled. In short, authenticity might refer 
either to reality, or to the illusion of reality, or to the recollection (real or 
imagined) of reality. More broadly, authenticity seems to mean something 
like “conforming to a certain defined pattern, adhering to an ideal type”.
In light of these remarks, we should not be surprised to learn that the 
notion of authenticity may have different meanings – more properly, ranges 
of meaning – when it is applied to different classes of texts. Taxonomies 
are always problematic, fuzzy at the edges and contestable, whether we are 
talking about texts or turtles. However, for the purposes of this discussion, 
I will proceed from the premise that both Muslim and non-Muslim 
constructions of early Islam rest on five categories of texts. Each of these 
serves different purposes in Muslim discourse; each opens a different window 
onto the beginnings and early development of Islam. They should reinforce 
one another, and they sometimes overlap, but they are very different in 
their putative authorship, in intended purpose, in literary and rhetorical 
construction, in manner of transmission, in the uses to which they were 
put. In order of the level of religious authority they carry, and the degree to 
which they embody and reveal the divine purpose, they are as follows:
1. prophetic revelation (the Qur’an), 
2. the teaching by word and example of Muhammad (hadith),
3. narratives which recount the events of the Prophet’s life (sira),
4. narratives which recount the words and deeds of his successors and 
followers after his death (ta’rikh, akhbar), and finally 
5. poetry (shi’r) from his lifetime and the decades immediately there-
after. 
In this paper I will focus on the first three categories, since they embody by 
far the most sensitive religious issues. Moreover, the historical akhbar that 
address the early caliphate and the first conquests – that is, the three decades 
following the death of Muhammad – retain many of the core characteristics 
of the sira narratives and pose very similar methodological problems. Only 
with the reign of Mu’awiya after 661, and even more with the rise of the 
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Marwanids, do we see a gradual shift to a markedly different narrative 
register. As for poetry, though forgery and suspicion of forgery abound, 
much of it is widely regarded among modern scholars as archaic – that is, 
actually composed during the period to which it is attributed. However, 
poetry is normally imbedded in prose texts as a witness to or commentary 
upon events and persons already presented there. Only in the Umayyad era 
(most famously in the persons of al-Akhtal, Farazdaq and Jarir) does poetry 
begin to constitute an independent witness to the ideological currents and 
factional quarrels which beset Muslim society. 
It will immediately be apparent that authenticity must mean quite 
different things for each category (namely, the Qur’an, hadith and sira). 
If, for example, the Qur’an is held to be God’s own eternal and uncreated 
speech, transmitted verbatim by His chosen prophet, as Sunni dogma 
ultimately declared it to be, then each and every aya must contain precisely 
the words voiced by Muhammad in a state of inspiration, neither more nor 
less. On the other hand, a narrative (khabar) about the Battle of Qadisiyya 
faces a more forgiving standard. Here, authenticity is a very fluid concept. 
It might refer to an issue of substance: that is, whether the khabar reports 
more or less accurately an event that really did happen. Or it might refer 
to the khabar as a text: whether it actually does transmit verbatim or at 
least paraphrase the statements made by its purported original narrator, no 
matter if he was a scrupulous truth-teller, a bold-faced liar or a spinner of 
fables. Moreover, such a khabar need not have a fixed verbal form; there 
is some room for editorial intervention in the course of transmission. It 
is even permissible to have contradictory akhbar about one and the same 
incident, since different reporters will have had different information. In 
terms of sanctity and doctrinal significance, the hadith and sira represent 
an intermediate status between the Qur’an and post-prophetic history, but 
as we shall see, the hadith is subject to a far more rigorous level of scrutiny 
than the sira. 
This simple typology of sacred or quasi-sacred texts is clear and appealing, 
but it reflects the frame of reference developed among Muslim scholars of 
the ninth century and later. As such it has an obvious problem – it begs 
the question, and in fact many questions. To begin with, it presupposes that 
all these texts are stable (though not necessarily fixed) from the time they 
were composed and put into circulation. It presupposes also that we can 
determine with some certainty which texts actually do originate in the time 
and place that they claim to represent, and which represent later iterations or 
fabrications. Finally, it presupposes that the earliest generations of Muslims 
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regarded a given text in the same way as did their successors in the ninth and 
tenth centuries, and assigned to it the same level of sanctity and value. All 
these presuppositions are demonstrably false. 
The texts which emerged out of early Islam evolved continuously until 
well into the ninth century, when they were more or less crystallised. (In 
saying this I make a substantial but not complete exception for the text of 
the Qur’an.) This fluidity has made it extremely difficult for scholars to date 
the texts that have come down to us, to isolate archaic elements within them 
and track the strata of editorial reshapings and interpolations. If scholars had 
developed precise, agreed-upon criteria – the equivalent of well-established 
archaeological pottery sequences – there would be a lot more consensus 
than we now observe, but such criteria are still a work in progress.
The problem is complicated by the fact that early Muslims engaged in 
intense and even vitriolic debate about everything, and that the nature of 
this debate changed markedly over time. To name only a few points at issue: 
the precise text of the Qur’an and how it was recorded and transmitted; 
the sources of religious authority within the Community after the death 
of Muhammad; and the political significance of certain critical events (for 
example, the “election” of Abu Bakr, the revolt against ‘Uthman, the battles 
of Siffin and Karbala’). Was some limited degree of variation in the text 
of revelation to be tolerated or not? Who if anyone had final authority to 
establish a Qur’anic text ne varietur? Did the authority to teach and guide the 
Community after Muhammad rest with the caliphs, with charismatic imams 
in the lineage of ‘Ali, with the consensus of learned and pious Muslims, or 
with the Prophet himself through his recorded statements? Were the actual 
rulers of the Community its lawful heads, and in what arenas (if any) did 
they have the right to demand obedience from the Muslims? If so, by what 
criteria, and what authority should they wield over the specifically religious 
beliefs and practices of Muslims? These debates were of course never settled 
(apart from the need for a fixed text of the Qur’an), but by the mid to late 
ninth century they were at least flowing in regular channels. In contrast to 
the chaotic arguments of the first two hundred years, there had come to be 
a well-defined, indeed stubbornly durable discourse on each major point of 
contention.
All of this tells us that we need to re-examine the concept of Qur’anic 
authenticity as it applies to the different classes of early Islamic texts, this 
time from a historical perspective – for, like all objects of human action, 
texts are constantly being recreated or at least reimagined.
We begin, as one must, with the Qur’an. For historians (though of 
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course not for the believer) one issue should be perfectly irrelevant: a 
historian need not ask whether the Qur’an is authentic in the sense of being 
literally God’s own speech. That is a question first of faith and secondly of 
theology. In historical thought, the concept of authenticity refers to other 
problems. One is obvious: whether the Qur’an in its present form is wholly 
constituted of statements proclaimed by Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah in Mecca 
and Medina between 610 and 632. Do we have the words, and only the 
words, pronounced by Muhammad himself ? How confident can we be that 
his proclamations were accurately collected and transmitted? Are textual 
variants (such as those apparently preserved in the Yemeni fragments) merely 
testimony to the fallibility of human memory and the rather haphazard way 
the primitive texts were first recorded? Or do they signal a real fluidity and 
instability in this text? In either case, did such variants substantially affect 
the way the Qur’an was taught and understood during the first two or three 
generations of Islam? Whatever our answer to these questions, I would 
argue that we can properly affirm that the Qur’an is fully “authentic”, at 
least in the sense that it contains the earliest memories and records of what 
Muhammad had presented as revelation. That is, we can still rely on it to tell 
us what Islam looked like as it first emerged in the first half of the seventh 
century.
This conclusion would not be affected by the argument proposed 
most recently by Christoph Luxenberg 11 that the Qur’an was at bottom 
an assemblage of materials already quite familiar among the oasis settlers 
of West Arabia – apocalyptic imagery and ritual texts derived more or less 
directly from Syriac prototypes, Christian preaching and Jewish midrash, 
combined with some scattered pronouncements of Muhammad himself. 
From this perspective the Qur’an would be primarily a repository of the 
religious currents criss-crossing early seventh-century Arabia; only the 
contingencies of time and place would have made it a powerful, even 
transformative religious vision. However, if the established canonical text 
goes back to the time of Muhammad and his earliest followers, then however 
it came into being, it would still be fully authentic in this sense: that it is a 
true witness to the beginnings of Islam. 
It is worth remarking that neither of these ways of seeing the Qur’an is 
peculiarly modern; both go back to at least the early eighth century. By then, 
Muslims were insisting that the Qur’an was precisely and literally God’s 
word revealed through His chosen prophet Muhammad. Among Christian 
observers, in contrast, the Qur’an was presented as a farrago of recycled 
Jewish and Christian teaching, with some peculiar distortions added to 
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the mix. We can trace these perspectives further back into the late seventh 
century. The famous inscription in the Qubbat al-Sakhra (692) explicitly 
links Muhammad with a new dispensation, with several passages that are 
citations or a very close paraphrase of Qur’anic verses as we know them. 
On the other side, Christian writers like Sebeos of Armenia (c. 660) and 
John Bar Penkaye (c. 690) portray Muhammad as drawing freely on Jewish 
and Christian teachings, though they do not explicitly ascribe a book or 
scripture to him.
Now, suppose we adopt Wansbrough’s argument – whatever we might 
be able to say about Muhammad (very little, in fact), the Qur’an as we now 
have it certainly does not date back to him. It would have taken its present 
form as much as two centuries later. Is there some meaningful sense in which 
we could claim authenticity for the text? I would say that there is, though 
no Muslim (and few non-Muslims) would find it at all satisfying. Under 
this hypothesis, the Qur’an could not stand as a record of Muhammad’s 
prophetic speech, but it would be an unambiguously authentic record of 
what Muslims of the late eighth and early ninth centuries had established 
and accepted as the revelation brought by him. As such, it would continue 
to be the foundational text of all later Muslim religious thought and 
practice. Scholarship based on the premise of a “late Qur’an” would have to 
ask how such a long, complex text was moulded out of disparate elements, 
and (far more importantly) how Muslims had been persuaded to accept this 
text as the revelation vouchsafed to Muhammad two centuries earlier. On 
the other hand, our understanding of how the Muslims of the ninth and 
later centuries interpreted and used the Qur’an would – at least in principle 
– hardly be affected. One might compare this (admittedly hypothetical) 
situation to the one confronted by historians of Christianity. For students 
of the first and second Christian centuries, it is crucial to ask when and how 
the Gospels were composed and put into circulation. For students of the 
third and later centuries, the Gospels are a fact; the point is what they meant 
to those who read them. 
Hadith and sira pose a radically different set of problems; here the 
concept of authenticity cannot mean what it does with the Qur’an. Both 
hadith and sira are sacred texts, albeit in different ways and on different 
levels, but they represent human speech rather than wahy or tanzil – namely 
the speech of Muhammad himself, and the speech of those who observed 
and recorded his career. As such, their contents are sacred, but their words 
per se are much less so. Sanctity and religious authority inhere in what they 
say, not how they say it. 
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Moreover, hadith and sira are far more fluid than the Qur’an in both 
content and language, and they have been far more subject to challenge by 
both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. The Qur’an became a closed corpus 
very early on – at the death of Muhammad, in the ‘Uthmanic compilation, or 
in the Marwanid recension, depending on how one reconstructs the history 
of the text. Once it was fixed in content and language, its status as divine 
speech meant that no one could alter it via emendation, inserted glosses, 
the harmonisation of contradictory passages or the deletion of repetitions. 
In contrast, neither hadith nor sira have ever constituted a genuinely closed 
corpus, though great efforts were certainly expended by al-Bukhari, Muslim 
and other scholars in the late ninth century to place hadith in precisely this 
category. 
On the other hand, though they appear to overlap in subject matter 
(the words and acts of Muhammad), the two genres of text are really very 
different in character and purpose. Some of the same anecdotes and dicta 
do find a place in both, but they serve quite different functions. Put simply 
(perhaps too simply), hadith constitutes formal doctrine: it is meant to yield 
principles of belief (‘aqida) or rules of conduct (ahkam). In terms of formal 
structure, hadith is fragmented into disjunct statements and anecdotes, 
and these are typically decontextualised from particulars of time and place 
– “Once the Prophet was seated in the marketplace, when a certain man 
approached him and said…”. Sira, in contrast, provides a historical context, a 
Sitz im Leben, for the Qur’an and hadith – texts which, taken by themselves, 
are quite devoid of concrete references to time and place. (A colleague of 
mine once commented that for the life of Jesus, we have a context but no 
text; for the life of Muhammad, we have a text but no context: a neat if 
aphoristic way of putting the matter.) By grounding these sometimes gnomic 
texts in the life and struggles of the Prophet, sira makes them intelligible 
and meaningful to those striving to follow in the path the Prophet laid 
down. More broadly, sira portrays the world in which he lived and which 
he strove to bring into obedience to God. Its fundamental purpose is to 
inspire reverence and emulation; or, to paraphrase Bolingbroke, it is religion 
teaching by examples. It might have suggested models of action to both later 
Muslim rulers and their opponents, but it never constituted a formal source 
for kalam and fiqh. 
In view of these fundamental distinctions in structure and purpose, 
it is obvious that hadith and sira have each posed very distinct issues of 
authenticity, both for medieval Muslims and for modern Muslim and 
non-Muslim scholars. In regard to sira, there was always something new to 
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say about the Prophet’s life and career, and the criteria for admitting new 
material into the sira were generous, to say the least. Medieval Muslim 
scholars did not bar new material, as long as it was reasonably consonant 
(doctrinally as well as factually) with what had already been accepted. In this 
sense, the corpus of sira was open-ended. Indeed, from the tenth century 
on, a great deal of new material, albeit mostly of the dala’il al-nubuwwa 
genre, was continually added to the foundational narratives laid down in the 
century and a half between Ibn Ishaq (d. 767) and al-Tabari (d. 923). 
In the early sira compilations, scholars focused on recovering the facts 
of Muhammad’s life, and on establishing the asbab al-nuzul through which 
these facts were linked to the highly allusive statements of the Qur’an. In the 
eyes of these scholars, such narratives could be very plastic in structure and 
rhetoric without forfeiting a claim to authenticity. They needed only to be 
what they claimed to be – statements about the Prophet’s words and actions 
which could be reliably attributed to the reporter who first put them into 
circulation. Moreover, this first reporter did not need to be an eyewitness 
or contemporary of the events in question; he could well be a collector-
compiler from a much later generation. Recall that much of the material in 
Ibn Ishaq is reported without explicit attribution, or simply on the authority 
of “one whose testimony I do not doubt”.
These fluid criteria for admitting material into the corpus of sira mean 
that modern scholars cannot always be certain on just what grounds a 
particular item was thought worthy of inclusion. For example, when Ibn 
Ishaq states, without citing any source, that a certain aya of the Qur’an was 
revealed on the occasion of such-and-such an event, we cannot really know 
whether this statement represents an opinion of the earliest Muslims, or an 
opinion widely held among his own contemporaries, or just an idea of Ibn 
Ishaq’s own.
For the early compilers of sira narratives, then, authenticity meant 
the exclusion of forgeries (that is, statements falsely attributed to a given 
reporter) and narratives wilfully distorted in the course of transmission. 
Authenticity did not necessarily imply that a story was factually accurate, 
though it goes without saying that the compilers tried to exclude material 
they regarded as unreliable or mendacious. Likewise, a rigorously fixed 
text was of no importance; a story could be told in various ways and still 
constitute authentic testimony. Conflicting versions of an event were the 
inevitable result of the frailties of human perception and memory. This 
inclusive criterion of authenticity was acceptable because sira did not lay 
down binding precedents or generate authoritative doctrine or rules of 
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conduct. Its purpose – serious enough in its own right – was to provide 
a compelling myth of origins for the Community of Believers, and to 
encourage reverence for the Prophet and his unique place in human history. 
What then should authenticity mean for modern students of sira? 
Surely we have something more in mind than did these early Muslim 
scholars, even if we share their concern to identify forgeries and spurious 
lines of transmission. The meaning of authenticity depends on what we are 
trying to achieve. If we are seeking a “historical Muhammad” in the manner 
of a historical Abraham Lincoln or Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, this goal poses 
specific kinds of problems. We have a rich fund of material to work with 
– our medieval Muslim predecessors saw to that – but this material only 
began to crystallise in something like its present form roughly a century and 
a half after the death of Muhammad. However archaic some of it may be, 
it has been heavily redacted to fit the religious expectations and political 
concerns, the linguistic and literary models, and the scholarly criteria, of a 
late eighth-century audience, with further redaction and reshaping as we 
move into the generations succeeding Ibn Ishaq. We will all have our own 
instincts about what adheres closely to the testimony of early witnesses and 
what is a late forgery, about what reflects actual events and what is legend. 
But I am not convinced that we have developed reliable and uniform criteria 
for sorting all this out. Just about the only text in Ibn Ishaq that (almost) 
everyone agrees has been transmitted in its primitive form is the so-called 
Constitution of Medina, and it is so utterly different in language, content 
and formal characteristics from everything else in his compilation that it 
cannot be used as a template for other sira texts. A hallmark of good science 
is that experiments and the results they yield can be replicated. Modern 
students of sira have not yet worked out how to do this; our arguments and 
conclusions overlap to some extent, but they do not concur across the board. 
Most modern scholars would agree that “authenticity” in sira does not 
require that a given narrative be told just as it originally was. Paraphrasing, 
abridging and blending originally separate narratives, and emphasising 
elements that speak to the compiler’s own concerns are all legitimate aspects 
of transmission. We can only insist that the transmitter not alter a story so as 
to change its meaning or invent things that never happened. But even as we 
agree on this self-evident point, we seem unable to apply it to specific cases 
in any consistent manner. 
Early sira materials contain much that is miraculous (albeit not so 
much as later increments do – such as the siras influenced by the model 
of Dala’il al-Khayrat, that is, miraculous signs of prophethood) and this 
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fact creates another set of problems for modern readers, especially non-
Muslims. However, things that appear fantastic or legendary to a modern 
consciousness would not have seemed so among the people of early Islamic 
times. For them, miraculous events were an integral and even indispensable 
element in the life and work of any prophet. For that reason we need to 
take such stories seriously and not dismiss them out of hand. They may of 
course be inventions intended to assimilate Muhammad to earlier prophets 
or to the Syrian and Egyptian holy men of his era, but they may just as well 
reflect the way his followers experienced his presence, however we may wish 
to explain that experience. The problem is whether we can develop usable 
criteria for testing miracle stories and legend-like narratives, and thereby 
determine whether they embody some element of contemporary experience 
or are merely conventional topoi. Without such criteria, these stories are 
opaque and unusable; a stumbling block to our efforts to understand the 
changing thought-world of early Islam. 
In seeking for the “historical Muhammad”, therefore, we are forced to take 
a minimalist approach. Rather than expanding the story, we find ourselves 
reducing it to its barest structural elements. Ibn Ishaq and his successors 
have given us a well-honed plot line, which we are constrained to follow 
because we have no other. They have done this by selecting akhbar which 
focus on what they regarded as the crisis points of Muhammad’s life and the 
earliest community: the call to prophethood, the resistance and hostility of 
the dominant lineages of Quraysh to him and his message, the Hijra and 
the founding of the new umma, the three great battles which secured the 
future of this umma, the struggle with the Jewish clans in Yathrib, and so 
on. However, the stories and poetry which coalesced around these crisis 
points may well be much later inventions or at best epic elaborations of the 
primitive accounts. The fact that a given event really did happen does not 
guarantee that the stories told about that event are truthful in any sense. 
As a result, most modern scholarship on the life of Muhammad is simply 
a process of thinning out this material; of deciding which of its elements 
might reflect a factual reality rather than an imagined past. 
More important, perhaps, is that these crisis points represent a specifically 
Muslim way of remembering and reconstructing Muhammad’s life. We 
might expect that his Qurashi opponents in Mecca or the Jews of Yathrib 
would have chosen quite a different set of crisis points. Likewise, there were 
certainly alternative Muslim grand narratives about Muhammad’s life that 
have simply disappeared. We can discern traces of such competing narratives 
in accounts of the succession to Muhammad – the Ghadir Khumm story in 
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its fervent Shi‘i and anodyne Sunni versions, the acclamation of Abu Bakr, 
the odd and very ambivalent role ascribed to ‘Ali in the days following the 
Prophet’s death, and so on. And of course the competing narratives which 
portray slightly later moments – such as the caliphate of ‘Uthman and the 
‘Ali-Mu’awiya conflict – demonstrate just how bitter these debates over the 
past could be.
Perhaps, then, we cannot reconstruct a verifiably documented historical 
Muhammad, but only a hypothetical (albeit plausible) one. We cannot paint 
a portrait from life, so to speak, but instead must fashion an image based 
on uncertain and often contradictory second-hand memories. If that is so, 
the criteria of authenticity that guided the early collectors and editors of 
sira, even as modified to fit the methods of modern textual criticism, will 
not quite work for us. We know what an authentic report about the life 
of Muhammad would be according to these criteria, and there may well be 
many such reports in the mass of material that has come down to us, but we 
cannot be certain precisely which ones they are. Objective authenticity in 
this sense is real and meaningful, but finding it is like chasing shadows at 
twilight.
This conclusion does not mean that authenticity of a different kind is 
unattainable, however. On the simplest and most obvious level, the sira texts 
are incontestably authentic statements of how Muslims in the late eighth 
and ninth centuries had come to think about the (multiple) meanings of 
Muhammad’s life for their own society. Moreover, this era’s construction of 
Muhammad continues to have powerful resonance, since it has provided 
a durable template for Muslim thought and feeling about the Prophet 
throughout the last twelve centuries. That is, it is in the simplest and most 
literal sense an authentic witness to the ways in which contemporary 
Muslims think about who they are and how they ought to direct their lives. 
(The power and durability – indeed, the unassailable sanctity – of this 
ninth-century template are also formidable obstacles to any serious effort 
among Muslim scholars to re-study Muhammad’s life. But that is a question 
for another paper.) 
From this perspective, the very fact that the sira narratives are full of both 
subtle and blatant contradictions, of puzzling gaps, of topoi skipping from 
one report to the next, is not a problem. On the contrary, these anomalies 
are direct testimony to the religious and ideological tensions of this period. 
Sira texts embody the memory (properly, the many cross-cutting memories) 
which Muslims constructed of their beginnings. Those memories were to 
some degree grounded in the actual events, persons, conflicts and ideas of 
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Muhammad’s time, but they were also constructed memories of an imagined 
past – a past that was not conceived all at once, but rather had been built up 
layer upon layer as Muslims in each generation tried to make sense of what 
was happening to them, and to preserve (or revitalise) the ties between their 
own lives and the sacred origins of the umma. 
When we look at sira texts in this manner, as continuously generated and 
reshaped through time, we need to think about authenticity in a third sense. 
Sira texts are neither a direct record of Muhammad’s time nor (an equally 
simplistic view) a snapshot of the several decades when they crystallised in 
a stable and semi-definitive form – c. 760–840. Rather, sira texts embody 
the long process by which they came into being. The metaphors of an 
archaeological dig or geological strata come to mind, and these can be very 
useful if one explores them seriously. In the sira, as in an archaeological site 
or a complex geological formation, there are many layers. However, these 
layers do not appear in any simple chronological sequence. In a geological 
formation, strata are twisted and inverted; archaic strata wind up on top of 
recent ones, and old rocks are transformed by the very processes that create 
new ones. Likewise in archaeology, recent construction penetrates and 
disturbs the earliest layers, while elements of the earliest settlements remain 
imbedded in and shape the new ones in the most unexpected ways.
In this context, authenticity means bearing reliable witness to the multiple 
layers imbedded in the sira corpus. A report (khabar) would be authentic 
insofar as it was generated as part of one of those layers. The question is 
whether these layers can be identified and recovered. We know they must 
exist, but is there any method of analysis by which we can discern them with 
some degree of consistency and confidence? In attempting this we confront 
two problems. First, there is the need to deconstruct the existing texts – 
to unpeel accretions, restore redacted passages to a more primitive form, 
weed out partisan or sectarian interpolations, and so on. Second, and even 
more challenging, the layers imbedded in the sira narratives are not clearly 
separated; it is not a matter of red, yellow, blue and orange stripes. On the 
contrary: these layers bleed into and contaminate one another. 
Deconstruction – in the present context, the effort to recover 
progressively earlier forms of the sira material – is an exceedingly delicate 
task, and the further back we try to go, the less confidence we can claim 
for our results. However, if we regard sira not as an isolated literary genre, 
but rather as part of a highly integrated cultural discourse, we might 
discover certain characteristics – of grammar, vocabulary, rhetoric, ways of 
constructing an argument, topics of debate, and so on – that would allow 
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us to situate such deconstructed texts in concrete times and places. We 
could thereby claim, at some level of probability, that they were authentic 
representations of a given phase in the development of sira. To be precise, 
our reconstructed texts could not claim to recover the actual originals, but 
we could plausibly argue that they constituted a reasonable facsimile of 
those originals. To return to an example from the beginning of this paper, 
the situation would be much the same as an “authentic performance” of 
Handel’s Messiah in contemporary London.
One would begin this endeavour with the mid and late ninth century, 
because we possess a rich body of contemporary evidence (not only literary 
texts, but also coins and inscriptions) with which to reconstruct the religio-
political discourse of those decades. Because we also have a stable and highly 
developed sira literature from this period, we can see sira texts in their 
full cultural contexts and determine just how they functioned within the 
broader discourse. Obviously the evidence (or at least reliable contemporary 
evidence) for the shape of religio-political debate as well as the broader 
cultural milieu becomes progressively thinner as we move back in time into 
the early Abbasid, late Marwanid and early Marwanid periods. Thus our 
efforts to recover earlier versions of now-existing sira texts will inevitably 
become more and more provisional and hypothetical. But once we have 
defined how sira texts fit into the cultural discourse of the ninth century, we 
should be able to apply the same method to earlier periods and thereby work 
our way as far back (perhaps even to the age of ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I) 
as we have some reliable independent evidence to guide us. 
We turn at last to hadith. It is a very different matter from sira, although 
a great many of the above remarks apply. To begin with, hadith quickly came 
to have (no later than the third quarter of the eighth century) a distinctive 
purpose of its own. Hadith does not exist primarily to exalt the Prophet, 
although of course it does that by its very nature. Nor does it portray the 
origins of the umma in a broad historical sense, though it certainly does 
claim to articulate and fix the pure, original doctrines and practices of Islam. 
The fundamental purpose of hadith is to give concrete, detailed guidance 
to Muslims, to tell them how they should lead their lives, how they should 
think and act. In a technical legal sense, it is a material source (asl) in fiqh; as 
such it lays down authoritative cases and binding directives. Because hadith 
is imbedded in a systematic scholarly discourse, and because so much is at 
stake, authenticity must be far more rigorously defined than with sira. Or to 
follow the argument of al-Shafi‘i, if Muhammad’s words were divinely guided, 
though not divinely inspired in the full sense, then these words possessed a 
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tremendous weight and sanctity; the flexibility (not to say laxness) allowed 
in sira was not permissible here. Moreover, two competing objectives had to 
be met: scholars should strive to recover the Prophet’s dicta as completely 
as possible – ideally, the totality of the guidance he had provided to his 
followers – even as these dicta had to be rigorously winnowed and sifted 
in order to rid the corpus of anything spurious or doubtful. While hadith 
scholars in the late eighth and early ninth centuries focused on the mandate 
to collect as much as possible, those of the late ninth century stressed the 
need to fix an indisputably reliable corpus. Later on, as hadith became 
widely used for general moral guidance, practical standards were loosened a 
bit – sometimes more than a bit – even as the critical methods of specialists 
became ever more rigorous.
Ideally, hadith should have become a closed corpus constituted of 
precise, unvarying texts, solidly attested all the way back to the Prophet’s 
Companions who first reported his words. In reality that was never possible, 
and medieval hadith scholars reluctantly recognised this fact. There were too 
many uncertainties about lines of transmission, too much human fallibility, 
too much disagreement as to which hadith actually met the criteria for 
reliability that they struggled so hard to establish. Even to them, the origins 
of hadith collection were murky and hard to document convincingly. 
(Obviously these doubts have blossomed into full-blown scepticism among 
most, though not all, modern non-Muslim scholars of the subject.) In 
the end, the study and criticism of hadith represented an informed “best 
guess” about what the Prophet had actually said and what he had meant. 
Even with these reservations, however, medieval and most modern Muslim 
scholars did build up a body of material which they believed they could use 
with confidence. In the long run, a well-defined corpus of reliable hadith, 
along with more apocryphal dicta that were useful as general doctrinal and 
moral guidance for ordinary believers, was confirmed by almost universal 
consensus, and this corpus remains normative down to the present. For the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims over the last eleven hundred years, the 
reliable hadith collections (the “Six Books”) unquestionably represent the 
actual words and actions of the Prophet – or at least as close to those words 
as it is humanly possible to get.
For non-Muslim scholars the matter is rather different. There is, to 
begin with, no consensus among them as to the authenticity of the hadith 
literature, or even as to what “authenticity” might mean. Some, following 
the implications of Joseph Schacht, would deny any demonstrable historical 
connection between hadith and the actual teachings of Muhammad. For 
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these scholars, hadith is at bottom an invention of the mid-eighth century: 
the statements of early pietists and proto-jurists retrojected back onto the 
Companions and ultimately the Prophet himself. Since this interpretation 
posits a radical disjuncture between the life of Muhammad and the historical 
umma, it makes the question of authenticity almost meaningless unless one 
wishes to restrict this concept to the discourse of the late eighth century and 
later. That is, following Goldziher’s analysis, we could say that hadith is an 
authentic statement of the ideas and values of this period, and of how these 
ideas and values were understood to be part of the true original essence of 
Islam. An interesting consequence of this perspective is that all hadith are 
equal – that every hadith is an authentic statement of the doctrine held by 
one group or another. The only issue is to discover which group it should be 
attached to. 
Schacht’s approach has not gone uncontested. More recently, some 
scholars (most notably Harald Motzki 12) have argued that there is in fact 
an authentically archaic core in this material, and that we can determine at 
least some elements of it. Without being able to claim that any given words 
were indeed the words spoken by Muhammad himself, we can re-establish 
a meaningful connection between the hadith compiled in the late eighth 
century and the doctrines and practices of the earliest Muslims. In effect, 
this approach claims an authenticity of substance (though not necessarily 
strict verbatim authenticity) for at least some parts of the hadith corpus. As 
a matter of historical logic, this claim seems more satisfying than the almost 
Pyrrhonean scepticism of some of Schacht’s followers, but still the argument 
must be rigorously articulated on a case-by-case basis.
In spite of these fundamental disagreements, most non-Muslim scholars 
would concur on a few points. First, all of the classical hadith collections, 
even the revered Sahihayn of al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, contain 
a considerable quantity of spurious material. By the criteria of ordinary 
textual criticism (as opposed to the criteria of faith), a great many hadith 
cannot possibly date from Muhammad’s time. Second, even those hadith 
which might faithfully reflect the Prophet’s teaching should be considered 
paraphrases rather than verbatim reproductions of his actual statements. The 
frame stories are too stylised, the diction too “modern”, to represent actual 
encounters between Muhammad and his followers. Third, Muslim scholars 
should summon the courage to revisit the canonical corpus of hadith, either 
to validate it or to try to build a new, more reliable corpus on the basis of 
modern critical methods. This would admittedly pose very serious problems 
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for any number of long-established theological and legal doctrines, but it 
would be a crucial step towards rethinking Islam.
The preceding discussion demonstrates how fluid a concept authenticity 
really is. Indeed, this concept is only meaningful and usable when it is 
deployed in a precisely defined literary-historical context. Only rarely can 
it mean that we have direct, unmediated access to words actually produced 
by the supposed original speaker. At the same time, authenticity is not a 
vacuous term. The statements we find in our texts were in fact spoken by 
someone, and most often they represent a decades- or centuries-long process 
of statement and restatement, of transmission, revision and redaction. For 
the contemporary scholar – Muslim as well as non-Muslim – the search for 
authenticity thus lies less in an often vain struggle to recover an original 
form of words than in the effort to uncover and elucidate the process by 
which the words we actually possess took shape and came down to us. In 
this search we will never attain anything like irrefutable certainty. However, 
a carefully articulated understanding of authenticity’s many meanings will 
do much to guide our analysis. Such an understanding might also provide 
some common ground, or at least points of constructive debate, for scholars 
of very different religious and intellectual perspectives as they examine the 
sacred texts of early Islam. 
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Constructing Islam in the “Classical” Period: 
Maqalat Literature  
and the Seventy-Two Sects1
Josef van Ess
“Le mahométisme est divisé en plus de soixante et dix sects.” 
(“Mohammedanism is divided into more than seventy sects.”) This is what 
we are told under the entry “Philosophie des Sarrasins” in the Encyclopédie, a 
document of the French Enlightenment edited by Denis Diderot and Jean de 
Rond d’Alembert shortly before the French Revolution. Islam was presented 
here by way of a Muslim source – a prophetic hadith to be exact. However, 
the French reader was not informed of this. He was left alone with his 
associations, and he must have thought that Islam was torn by innumerable 
schisms, especially in contrast to Europe which had meanwhile entered 
the Age of Reason. This was the way Europeans liked to see themselves at 
that time: as heirs of the siècle des Lumières, living in the light as it were, 
unlike the Muslims living in darkness. But religious wars had been rare in 
the Islamic world, and most of the few “sects” mentioned in the article by 
name were in reality juridical schools: the Hanafites, the Malikites, the 
Shafi’ites. In their French incarnation they were all misspelled; the author 
of the article “Philosophie des Sarrasins”, the Chevalier de Jaucourt, seems 
not to have been sufficiently familiar with the topic. He relied on a German 
source, for he spelled Shafi’ites with sch-, a peculiarity found only in German 
orthography, and he dared not change it because he did not know how the 
names sounded in Arabic.
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As a matter of fact, Martin Crusius, a Protestant theologian from the 
university of Tuebingen, had already written in his Turcograeciae libri octo 
(1587) – which witnessed to his good, though provincial relations with 
Orthodox Christianity and the Patriarchate in Constantinople – “Superstitio 
Mohametana est in septuaginta duas principales sectas divisa, quarum una 
sola in Paradisum dux est, reliquae vero in inferos”. (“The Mohammedan 
superstition is divided into seventy-two principal sects, of which one 
alone leads into Paradise and the others indeed to hell”.) This is not exactly 
what the Chevalier later said. We now have seventy-two sects instead of 
seventy, and the Shafi’ites are not mentioned; instead, the Turcograeciae libri 
octo confront us with the somewhat disturbing affirmation that all seventy-
two will go to hell except for one. This was the discourse of people who 
believed in a Realm of Evil; paradise only belonged to those who followed 
the correct path or doctrine. The underlying dictum of the Prophet is the 
same, but the conclusion is different.2
If there is “orthodoxy”, why then the great number of aberrations? Let us 
first have recourse to philology: the word which stands for Latin secta in the 
Arabic original, firqa, simply means “group” and is not necessarily pejorative. 
It seems that the Muslims realised early on that their Islam was not a plain 
phenomenon which looked alike everywhere, but rather consisted of a 
plurality of nuclei and communities. On the one hand, they behaved like 
a chosen people who had been given a new and ultimate revelation; this is 
why some influential groups among them called themselves ahl al-janna.3 
On the other hand, by their military success and the rapid expansion of 
their movement, they acquired new and various identities in the highly 
cultured areas of the Ancient World which they had conquered. What held 
them together were two things: 1. an ethnic criterion – they were all Arabs, 
and Muhammad was the Prophet sent to the Arabs, and 2. a symbolic act, 
namely their peculiar and unmistakable way of praying. Over the centuries, 
their expression for “all of us” or “the Muslims as such, irrespective of their 
different denominations” was ahl al-salat or ahl al-qibla.4 In contrast to 
this, the Qur’an did not yet serve as an entity. The text of the Scripture 
was not yet fully available, and there was no single, reliable version. During 
the campaigns under the first caliphs, the soldiers sometimes only had a 
few verses which could be recited,5 and there were certainly not enough 
qurra’ to accompany them and to serve as their imam. As far as doctrine 
was concerned, they had to construct their identity, and later generations 
would admit that the ensuing constructs had not always been the same. The 
Muslims prayed in their Islamic way, but they had not yet defined where 
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this should be done. Masjid did not yet mean “mosque” but simply “a place 
fit for prostration”. Sometimes the Muslims even prayed in churches, as 
Suliman Bashear has described.6
The diversity could seem disconcerting and frightening. Firqa was 
very close to furqa, meaning “schism, dissension”. In fact, the numbers 
seventy or seventy-two, which marked the breadth of the split inside the 
community, had been taken, by analogy, from a paradigmatic event which 
was widely known in salvation history: the erection of the Tower of Babel 
which humanity had failed to complete.7 Speech had been confused ever 
since, and the languages which had sprung up had been connected, in early 
exegesis, with the peoples mentioned in the preceding chapter of the book 
of Genesis. These “nations” of the Ancient World, each of which spoke its 
own idiom, had been counted as seventy or, following the Church fathers, 
as seventy-two. Both numbers were symbolic, denoting plenitude and 
perfection, and seventy-two occupied (as six times twelve) a special rank 
in the sexagesimal system. In Arabic, the “peoples” had been translated as 
milal, and under the influence of Ancient Syriac, the word milla had become 
equivocal; in the Qur’an it could also mean “creed, religion”.8 This created 
a new situation. As long as one had talked about a multitude of languages, 
this could be accepted, without emotion, as a mere fact of life. The diversity 
of religious doctrines, however, aroused strong feelings, for not only did it 
provoke misunderstandings but also polemics and strife. It is true that the 
Christians believed that the linguistic confusion was not irreversible, thanks 
to their experience of Pentecost. But the Muslims noticed that the miracle 
had not resulted in harmony; instead of finding a common language, the 
Christian churches had continued quarrelling.9 In contrast to languages, 
creeds and denominations multiplied. They throve on an inherent claim of 
“truth”; this made them dangerous. Two reactions were possible: one could 
accept religious diversity as an inexplicable decree of God’s will (today we 
would call this tolerance). Or one could view it as a product of Satan to be 
fought because it obscured the “truth”, a truth which could only be one. In 
both cases it seemed advisable to learn more about the various factions. This 
is the origin of what was once termed “heresiography”, originally a kind of 
“Listenwissenschaft”,10 which under favourable circumstances could develop 
into doxography – a compilation of philosophical doctrines.
Early Muslims seem to have reacted more with realism and resignation 
than with interfactional aggression. Mu’awiya is said to have asked ‘Abid b. 
Sharya, the old wise man from the Yaman,11 about the tabalbul of mankind 
– their lack of “dialogue” as we might say today – and their “babylonisation” 
66 the construction of belief
because of the confusion of languages or ideologies.12 And the preachers of 
his time, the qussās, began to talk in a typological way about the division 
of the Children of Israel into seventy groups13. What they wanted to say 
was that hoping for union and harmony had already deceived the Jews 
and the Christians; it had turned out to be an illusion which had emerged 
everywhere in salvation history. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that Islam 
was special. What was happening was simply that the Muslims made their 
own mistakes due to their military strength and their rapid expansion. The 
third caliph was murdered, and it was said that ‘Uthman had been killed by 
the “Egyptians”. In the same way, the followers of ‘Ali who had not supported 
him were the “Kufans” (ahl Kufa). They were not yet known as Shi‘i – this 
term appeared later. The regional differences were the focus of the trauma.
This is at least how our first witness explained the situation, when 
he spoke about the dramatic event in terms of firaq. Maymun b. Mihran 
was an Umayyad bureaucrat who lived in Upper Mesopotamia and died 
around 734.14 After this political disaster, which to him was a kind of 
“Urkatastrophe” – similar to the First World War – Mihran says we 
encounter firstly the adherents of ‘Uthman, who consisted of the people 
from Syria and Basra, secondly the adherents of ‘Ali, who were from Kufa, 
and lastly the Murji’ites, who had not wanted to side with either. The latter 
group is not explicitly located because, according to Mihran, the Murji’ites 
had been on a campaign and when they returned to Medina where ‘Uthman 
had been assassinated, they saw that the old unity had ceased to exist.15 From 
what we know about the community of the original “believers”, we might 
assume that they were Yemenites rather than Medinans, for the Hijazis (at 
least those who were wealthy enough) had not joined the campaigns but 
had stayed at home to enjoy or administer the revenues of the unexpected 
expansion.16 The fitna had brought the underlying tensions to the surface. 
Before the fitna, Maymun diagnosed only one faction: the Kharijites, the 
first great challenge of the community. However, they had dispersed and 
therefore remained locally undefined.
Apart from these four groups, Mihran identifies a fifth group which he 
names the fi’at al-islam, using a new key, as it were: religious rather than 
geographical. We are reminded of our modern Islamists, but in fact we 
do not find this term again during the entire Middle Ages. What we find 
instead is an expression similar in meaning though not yet used by Maymun: 
al-firqa al-najiya. Maymun leaves no doubt that, like a firqa najiya, his fi’at 
al-islam followed the right path. They may appear similar to the Murji’ites, 
but there is one notable difference: whereas the Murji’ites took a negative 
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stance and “doubted” (that is, they did not side with anyone), the ahl al-
islam declared their solidarity with ‘Uthman as well as ‘Ali. They left the 
matter of guilt open and avoided any discussion. What they wanted was 
jama’a, to live in harmony, almost as in a modern democracy. However, we 
do not know for sure how they understood their jama’a: as “concord” (that 
is, an abstract ideal), or as “majority” (the concrete demographic realisation 
of this ideal, in the sense of al-sawad al-a’zam as one would later say in 
Iraq and especially in Central Asia).17 Behind the term jama’a, we discover 
Mu’awiya’s policy and the ideology of the Umayyads. In an empire no longer 
ruled from what had become the periphery (Medina) but from an old 
power centre (Damascus), it was expedient to promote concord under the 
pretension of representing the majority of the Muslims. The year in which 
Mu’awiya hoped to assemble the adherents of both ‘Uthman and ‘Ali behind 
him (by having bribed Hasan b. Ali) was aptly called ‘am al-jama’a.18
Maymun had belonged to the circle of ‘Umar b. ‘Abdal’aziz. But in his 
old age he knew that the plan for jama’a had not worked. It is true that, 
among the factions or “sects”, Maymun did not yet mention the Qadarites 
who emerged under Hisham (and in the army at that), but we can guess 
that politically and religiously the concord did not reach far beyond Syria. 
Mu’awiya was said to have equated the jama’a with the firqa al-najiya, but in 
the context of the same apocryphal saying of the Prophet which predicted 
the split of the community. This allowed for the question of how a group that 
goes to Paradise could be the majority when seventy or seventy-two other 
groups existed alongside it. Mu’awiya had allegedly solved the contradiction 
by adding one more prediction of the Prophet: “There will arise people in 
my community in whom there is a frenzy as if from rabies” (“Yatajara bihim 
kama yatajara l-kalab”).19
This was a clear allusion to the Kharijites. Although few in number, they 
had split endlessly. They were the seventy-two then; the rest was the jama’a. 
But this interpretation could not be retained, for the Shi‘ites also split, and 
when the Qadarite doctrine was taken over by the Mu’tazilites they also 
founded numerous individual schools. This was not necessarily a negative 
experience. The development could be seen as an example of plurality, a 
plurality that was tolerated because it was not fostered by the government 
(which meanwhile had become Abbasid).
One could say, of course, that such diversity is based merely on 
theology; that it is useless and misleading, just idle talk, kalam. Outside 
the intellectual world, theology was widely considered a rather dubious art 
discredited by the Christians. In Christianity, theology was protected by 
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an institution, and some churches were on uneasy terms with one another 
because of their differing views on the subject. In contrast, Islam treated 
theology as a matter of the market – people could simply boycott it. But 
they also had the freedom to choose the variety they preferred, at least 
in the big towns. The “schools”, many of which were rather like debating 
clubs (and not only so among the Mu’tazilites), advertised themselves by 
issuing an ‘aqida (creed).20 A considerable number of these texts (symbola or 
Bekenntnisschriften) still exist, especially for the second and third centuries 
ah. They were carefully preserved and documented, but none of them lasted 
forever as the Christian dogma did, which is still recited in every divine 
service. One of our oldest theological treatises, Dirar b. ‘Amr’s K. al-Tahrish 
(which has recently been discovered in Yemen), deals with these schools 
as a fact of the author’s world. Dirar wrote his treatise because somebody 
had complained about the ikhtilaf (the difference of opinions), and as a 
matter of fact, Dirar himself was unhappy with the situation. He quotes the 
saying “bada’a ghariban wa-saya’udu ghariban” (“[true] Islam is a stranger 
in this world”). But he does not deny that the phenomenon exists. Rather, 
he undertakes to simplify matters by showing that certain groups which 
had different names were nevertheless identical and merely distributed 
regionally. For instance, the Murji’a was known as “Jahmiyya” in Khorasan, 
“Ghaylaniyya” in Syria, “Shamiriyya” in Basra and “Waddahiyya” in Kufa, 
without any notable doctrinal difference.21 Even Abu al-Qasim al-Ka’bi, the 
first great Mu’tazili heresiographer, who lived a century after Dirar, did not 
yet deal with religious reality in terms of true and false. Rather, he collected 
the opinions and doctrines out of professional curiosity; he noted where his 
earlier Mu’tazili colleagues cultivated their idiosyncrasies and “stood apart” 
(tafarradu) from them,22 but did not attack them for their differences. These 
idiosyncrasies did not become heresies or “objects of abomination” (fada’ih) 
until a century later, in ´Abdalqahir al-Baghdadi’s Farq bayna l-firaq.
The understanding of the lists depended on how Islam was construed. 
The Mu’tazilites knew the hadith about the seventy-two sects; it is quoted 
in a heresiographical work probably composed by Ja’far b. Harb.23 But they 
did not use the hadith as a guideline, nor did they talk in terms of jama’a 
or the firqa al-najiya. This was done elsewhere, not so much in Iraq as Iran, 
among the disciples of ‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak (d. 797). We also notice the 
consequences of this phenomenon in some early texts of Iranian origin, 
such as Khushaysh b. Asram’s (d. 867) K. al-Istiqama, parts of which were 
later included in Malati’s K. al-Tanbih wal-radd. Khushaysh is one of the 
first authors to count the sects in order to get seventy-two of them; he then 
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refutes them with a flood of Qur’anic quotations in the name of the firqa 
al-najiya.24 The author who brings this method to perfection is Abu Muti’ 
Makhul al-Nasafi (d. 930), an Iranian contemporary of Abu l-Qasim al-
Ka’bi. He managed, in his K. al-Radd ‘ala ahl al-bida to arrange the seventy-
two sects so as to illustrate an underlying “orthodox” ‘aqida. Each sect was 
then connected with only one heresy, so that rejecting these seventy-two 
aberrations amounted to defining the true creed. The sects themselves, their 
names as well as their doctrines, were a product of the author’s imagination 
rather than of a living reality, but whoever had read Nasafi’s book or taken 
an introductory course on its basis knew henceforth how to understand 
Islam.25 The text did not help in learning about events outside Central 
Asia, but it was apt as a cicerone to the virtual world of orthodox belief, 
and as such enjoyed an enormous reputation. Its nomenclature survived 
for a millennium, both in Iran and in India, and was included in modern 
encyclopedias such as Dehkhuda’s Lughatname.26
The region where K. al-Radd ‘ala ahl al-bida had emerged, the town of 
Nakhshab (or Nasaf as it was known by the Arabs), was in certain ways a 
backwater, devoid of historical information about the wide range of Islam. 
This was different in Iraq, where Abu l-Qasim al-Ka’bi had studied, who 
came from the same area. Instead of learning the seventy-two sects by heart, 
the students there were taught how to engage in disputations. This produced 
a kind of academic literature characterised by the term maqalat. The genre 
is best represented by Ash’ari’s Maqalat al-islamiyyin. Note the expression 
islamiyyin, which has nothing to do with Maymun b. Mihran’s fi’at al-islam, 
but means “the Muslims in their entirety”, the ahl al-salat; this is why the 
title continues with wa-khtilaf al-musallin. 
Maqalat books did not aim at a creed. They were the leftovers of prior 
and perhaps forgotten speculations; theological ideas of the past that 
it was helpful to know (and perhaps better to avoid) when discussing 
matters with a rival of one’s own school. The theologians, known as 
mutakallimun, acquired their name from their attempts to push their ideas 
through by way of dialectics (kalam, derived from takallama). Today we 
would speak of “dialogue” in this respect, but in Ash’ari’s time, the way of 
achieving kalam was not by loose dialogue but by more or less disciplined 
disputation (munazara). In order to prepare for this intellectual exercise, 
the participants seem to have memorised the arguments and positions they 
might expect from the opponent. During the public exercise, the “talk 
show” as it were, it was also expedient to keep in mind all the errors which 
had been committed in the past. The goal of the endeavour consisted, of 
70 the construction of belief
course, in attaining the truth, but in contrast to the ‘aqa’id, the maqalat had 
a historical dimension, and the participants were perhaps still aware of the 
fact that even when victorious they had not yet reached a result that would 
withstand all criticism.
This was another way of construing Islam, equally as successful as the 
former. In its own way, it lasted as long as Abu Muti’ al-Nasafi’s approach, 
especially due to the work of Shahrastani. Shahrastani intended to be 
objective, as had Ash’ari. Neither kept to their promise consistently, but 
this was as at least what the literary genre demanded. Shahrastani could not 
explicitly state his personal conviction anyway – he was an Isma‘ili who had 
managed to pose as an Ash’arite.27 Nevertheless, his presentation was taken 
up by countries from Iraq to Spain, and especially by Egypt. Most people 
did not realise his non-orthodox connection; they liked the way he merged 
Islamic denominations with pagan schools, especially of Greek philosophy. 
The Isma‘ilis had been doing this for generations.
In addition to that, however, Shahrastani had something else to offer that 
seems unusual – at least to us, if not so much so to his contemporaries. When 
organising his material, he used a system derived from the practice of Iranian 
bureaucracy. He describes the system in the last of his five introductions, 
and Daniel Gimaret was the first to furnish us with an astute interpretation 
of the relevant passage.28 Shahrastani was familiar with the hisab diwani 
in Iran – that is, the way the revenue was administered and calculated in 
the chanceries – and he distributed the denominations in the same way. A 
feature of the “construction” was its reference to bureaucracy. At all times, 
bureaucracies produced classifications; classification was the only way to 
grasp the confusing plenitude of living reality. The Christians owed their 
name “Christ people” in contrast to the ordinary Jews.29 Sasanid practice 
of the same kind seems to survive in the way the Muslims categorised the 
dualist “sects”, for when enumerating the Manicheans, the Mazdakites, and 
so on, they usually forgot the Zoroastrians – probably because the Muslims 
had taken over a system which dated from the time when Mazdaism was the 
dominant religion in pre-Islamic Iran and had defined who was a heretic 
and who was not.30 In the second half of the third century ah, a certain 
Misma’i, a nephew of the Mu’tazili theologian and heresiographer Zurqan, 
produced the book K. Ma’rifat ma yahtaju l-muluk ila ma’rifatihi fi usul al-
din wa-aqawil firaq al-umma, a kind of manual for the government which 
contained, besides a catechism, a survey of the Islamic denominations.31 
Our best example is Khwarazmi with his Mafatih al-‘ulum, for in his 
endeavour to serve the needs of secretarial organisation he made use of the 
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tradition of the seventy-two sects.32 The list he incorporated into his manual 
corresponds to the list we find in a contemporary Isma‘ili text, the Bab al-
shaytan from Abu Tammam’s K. al-Shajara (recently edited by Paul Walker 
and Wilferd Madelung). The list can perhaps be retraced to Abu Zayd al-
Balkhi, another contemporary of Abu l-Qasim al-Ka’bi and Abu Muti’ al-
Nasafi. Shahrastani, however, did not take it up; perhaps he did not know it.
In these administrative manuals the system showed its useful side. It 
did not aim at coercion; it aimed at tax-paying. Even when a firqa pushed 
its doctrine or its social behaviour to the point at which it transgressed the 
borderline between sectarianism and unbelief, the officials in the chanceries 
mainly thought about money; they made “the sectarians” pay jizya instead 
of kharaj. The adherents of the Muqanna’, a man who had been persecuted as 
a rebel and an unbeliever, were not extinguished; they were found centuries 
later as peasants living in the mountains of Central Asia paying the jizya just 
as the Zoroastrians had, and travellers such as Muqaddasi boasted of having 
visited them.33 The Nusayris, again peasants but also retailers in remote 
places, survived in Syria.34 Today, due to their denominational ‘asabiyya, they 
lead the government. There are, of course, groups and communities who 
were less fortunate, and I abstain from making further statements about the 
modern period. But in general, and up to the nineteenth century, divergent 
religious convictions were, in spite of all criticism and polemics, ultimately 
treated as maqalat. Generally speaking, with regard to religion, the Islamic 
world remained more peaceful than Europe before the Enlightenment.
What I have discussed until this point are simply virtual realities; when 
we say “Islam” we use a construct. This is true for the past as well as for 
the present. These constructs have expanded enormously due to ideological 
pollution and the media’s influence. On the other hand, constructs are 
fragile; they can lose their persuasiveness from one moment to the next. 
We know this from our economy and from our politics. As historians, 
our dilemma is that we are constantly dealing with constructs (all of our 
written sources are constructs), yet we want to know the reality. We should 
never pretend to have discovered it; we are able only to present constructs 
ourselves. But we can develop theories that help to explain these constructs. 
Is there any theory that explains what I have described in this paper? I have 
not elaborated any theories myself, but one in contemporary religious 
studies seems to fit: denominationalism. 
This is how I imagine early Islam. Islam did not present itself as a 
union then, and neither does it do so today. Religion always exists in small 
communities. When you walk through a North American town, it seems as 
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though you find a church at every second corner, but Christian belief may 
be presented differently from church to church. Similarly, when we want 
to interpret the situation in early Kufa according to our heresiographical 
sources, we find all kinds of people trying to explain Islam to themselves 
under certain assumptions, everybody in his own way, and probably in his 
own mosque. None of them lacked a community, for without an audience 
their ideas would not have been recorded. The reports were collected and 
publicised as a catalogue of idiosyncrasies. This is how the talk about ikhtilaf 
came up, with or without resentment concerning the phenomenon. At 
the end of this process we get a literary genre, heresiography, or rather a 
whole gamut of genres: maqalat literature, creeds, administrative manuals, 
polemical pamphlets, and so on. Each of these points to the plurality of 
Islam (though not to its pluralism, since pluralism was not yet the habit 
of the age). There was, however, no institution which endeavoured to 
stand for them all (no “Church”), and on the fringe there was syncretism, 
transculturation and liminality.35 People noticed the differences either with 
curiosity or with exasperation. Specialists prepared lists of groups: “sects” or 
“heresies”. However elaborate the lists, they did not last forever, and became 
obsolete after some time. In contrast, the phenomenon itself survived; a 
man like Muqaddasi took plurality for granted. Even today, Moroccan Islam 
differs from the Saudi or Iranian variety, and there is no indication that this 
will change.
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Modern Discourses of Superiority:  
Muslims and Christians in Contact
Stefan Wild
In order to honour a globally acknowledged scholar of Mohammed Arkoun’s 
standing, it is tempting to take a cue from one of his major and most recent 
study, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought.1 I freely admit that 
I have succumbed to this temptation. One of the most important chapters 
in Arkoun’s book deals with authority and power in Islamic thought. My 
paper is an attempt to analyse an aspect of the power structure inherent 
in inter-religious polemics. Part one will deal with Christian and Muslim 
discourses of superiority. I will compare the role of reason in and for 
religion as seen by Pope Benedict XVI and the nineteenth-century Egyptian 
reformist, Muhammad ‘Abduh. In part two, I will attempt to point to subtle 
but significant changes of attitude in inter-religious dialogues between 
Muslims and Christians in modern times. Here we find first attempts to 
transcend the discourse of superiority and to overcome what has been called 
“exclusivism”. How does the introduction of the “religious Other” into 
theological discourse affect the construction of belief ? There are not many 
theologians or intellectuals on either side of the Christian–Muslim divide 
who deal with these questions. And it has to be admitted that the ideas and 
proposals that I will discuss may at present interest only a small minority of 
believers. Nevertheless, the “theology of the religious Other” in a globalised, 
multicultural and multi-religious world is a new concept that may provide 
a possibility for overcoming the fairly worn-out discourses of superiority.
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1. Discourses of Superiority: Pope Benedict XVI,  
Muhammad ‘Abduh and the Role of Reason in Religion
Christianity and Islam claim to have privileged, if not exclusive, access to 
transcendental truth.2 Without this claim, and the concomitant claim that 
this truth is of crucial importance for the well-being of the individual and his 
or her community both in this world and the hereafter, these religions would 
lose their meaning. Religious belief as seen from the inside is, therefore, to 
some extent irreducible, incommensurable and beyond rational comparative 
evaluation. In multi-religious societies, however, no religion can enforce 
any longer what it considers its superior and exclusive claim to truth. As 
globalisation spreads religions across the world, the multi-religious factor 
in many societies will most probably become more visible. The staunchest 
atheist will have to live beside the most pious religious literalist, be they 
Christian or Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu. The constant confrontation with 
a multitude of religious possibilities may in the long run blunt the edges of 
exclusivism. One aspect of religious reality, overlooked at times, is that the 
average individual did not and does not choose a religion, but was born into 
a religion. History and geography are in this respect often as important as 
or even more important than theological doctrine and individual choice.3
Early and medieval Muslim societies enjoyed a living experience of 
pluralism that was stronger than that in parallel Christian societies.4 Under 
Muslim rule, several communities (Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians) could 
exist side by side – at least in principle. They had scriptures in different 
languages that were nevertheless acknowledged to contain similar messages. 
Three important Sunni legal schools taught that even non-Arab pagans had 
a protected status under Islam.5 Under medieval Christian rule, however, 
the fact that Jewish scripture was also part of Christian scripture usually 
did nothing to alleviate the mostly deplorable reality of Jewish life under 
Christian rule. For Muslims under medieval Christian rule, prospects were 
even dimmer. 
The inter-religious competition over whose religion was the true one, 
has marked religious and social life through the ages wherever different 
religions have come into contact. Christianity and Islam are to this day 
caught up in these discourses of superiority, and are linked to or maybe even 
trapped in this competition. This rivalry shows itself in missionary activities, 
in Christian tabshīr and Muslim da‘wa. Many theologians on both sides, 
true to their universalist claims, agree that giving up tabshīr or da‘wa would 
betray their most cherished values. For mainstream theology, proselytising 
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as a principle is in both cases not negotiable. The missionary competition 
between Muslims and Christians in many parts of the world, notably on the 
African continent, is very much alive. In Europe, where conversions between 
Islam and Christianity are a growing phenomenon, this competition is 
widely seen as an unsolved religious problem. In the course of history, blood 
has been shed by the adherents of both religions in order to prove their 
point – less on the Muslim side than on the Christian side, at least until the 
advent of modernity. One cannot overlook the fact that just as much blood 
has been shed within Christianity and less blood within Islam to make 
“religious truth” prevail and “heresy” or “error” disappear. Nor should one 
forget that militant anti-religious movements and regimes have produced 
no fewer victims among the religious either. In Central Europe, the concept 
of the freedom of religion, including the right to change one’s religion or to 
profess no religion at all, has been successfully implemented, by and large, 
even where there is a Christian state religion. In countries dominated by a 
Muslim majority, the issue of this type of full religious freedom is often seen 
either as marginal or as artificial. The Muslim diaspora, however, disagree. 
The most important Muslim organisations in Germany accept the principle 
of full freedom of religion, without reservation. 
In any case, religious truth in Christianity and Islam was and is still 
tied up with the idea that there is only one true religion and that all other 
religions are wrong. “Exclusivism” consists of the idea that only one religion, 
Christianity or Islam, is true or even that only one particular brand of 
Christianity (such as Roman Catholicism) or of Islam (such as Sunni Islam) 
is true. “Inclusivism” means that while there may be elements of truth in other 
religions, only one religion possesses truth in a singular and unsurpassable 
way. Inclusivism, however, while seeming generous, may actually co-opt 
other faiths without their leave.6 Finally, “pluralism” theologically allows 
for different religious accesses to truth. For unsophisticated mainstream 
Christianity and Islam, missing the true religion and adhering to a wrong 
one is punishable, if not already in this world then certainly in the world to 
come. 
Within Christianity and Islam, the conviction that the religious “Other” 
will be eternally punished and burn in hell was for a long time the dominant 
paradigm, and it is still fairly widespread. Conversely, many Christians 
and Muslims are convinced that on the strength of their beliefs and their 
behaviour they stand a fairly good chance of entering paradise, even if they 
can never be completely sure of eternal salvation and bliss. This stance is not 
mitigated by the fact that in the eyes neither of Christians nor of Muslims is 
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the other religion completely false. But in spite of large areas of overlapping, 
Christianity and Islam encapsulate a particularly strong antithesis between 
true and false religion. Many Christians still fear Islam; many Muslims 
still fear Christianity. My thesis is that in modern religious discourse and 
in its construction of belief, the opposition between a completely true 
and a partially false religion is gradually being replaced by the opposition 
between a culturally superior religion and a culturally inferior one. Thereby, 
hegemonic aspects are introduced: which religion is the more vibrant, the 
more modern, or the more successful in converting others? Such aspects 
tend to be superimposed on the question of mere truth. Mohammed 
Arkoun has already pointed out the way an “Islamic reason” and a “Western 
secularised reason” oppose each other.7 He argued for an anti-hegemonic 
critique of both. Islam is feared in many parts of Europe because it contests 
the hegemony of the Christian Churches and/or of secularism. Christianity 
and secularism are feared in many parts of the Muslim world because they 
are perceived as hegemonic doctrines. It is often, therefore, not so much the 
truth of competing religions that is at stake today, but their attractiveness, 
their vitality and their power. Numerous Muslim scholars consider a 
powerful Islam inextricably linked to an Islamic state. They act as though 
even the fundamental rituals of Islam are not “practices Muslims must 
undertake because they are an irreducible part of being a believer, but rather 
because they are socially useful in inculcating the habits and the discipline 
that assist in the project of striving for an Islamic state”.8 On the other hand, 
a diaspora situation leads many Muslims, silently or openly, to renounce the 
idea of a universal Islamic state. 
What I mean by “discourse of superiority” is best explained by a 
comparison that may seem far-fetched: that of Muhammad ‘Abduh and 
Pope Benedict XVI, and how both construct the role of reason in their 
religions.
Pope Benedict XVI, in his famous lecture in Regensburg of 12 September 
2006 on “belief and reason” (Glaube und Vernunft), discusses the role 
of reason in Islam. He quotes a public religious discussion between the 
Byzantine emperor Manuel II and a learned Muslim in 1391. Among other 
issues, this dialogue deals with jihad, and the Pope quotes Manuel II with 
the words, “Show me what Muhammad taught as new and you will find only 
evil and inhumanity – such as Muhammad’s command to spread the faith 
which he preached by the sword.” Muslim troops at the time stood not far 
from Constantinople. Even if the Pope called this quotation “unacceptably 
gruff in form”, the damage was done. According to the Pope, Islam taught 
79modern discourses of superiority: muslims and christians in contact 
that religion should be spread by the sword. This is why, in his view, the 
religion of Islam cannot be said to be built on reason. Christian theology, on 
the other hand, teaches that “not to act with the logos” (that is, with reason) 
is incompatible with God’s essence. And the Pope links this position with 
the fact “that Christianity, in spite of its origin and in spite of important 
developments in the Orient, received its historically decisive imprint in 
Europe”.9
In Islam, and to a lesser extent in parts of Protestantism, Pope Benedict 
tells us, this amalgamation of revelation and Greek reason is weak or 
absent. Pope Benedict compared (Catholic) Christianity with Islam (and 
Protestantism), and few people were surprised when he found (Catholic) 
Christianity to be superior. The question of how revealed religion relates to 
human reason is, of course, one of the oldest questions of philosophy and 
theology in both cultures. And the kind of comparison that the Pope uses 
has a long polemical history on both sides.
We find analogous statements of comparison in many modern Muslim 
treatises dealing with Islam – of course, invariably in favour of Islam. Islam, 
in this view, is superior to all other religions, and in particular to Christianity. 
A main argument is that Islam is the most “reasonable” of all religions, and 
that it is in particular more reasonable than Christianity. This is already 
manifest in Muhammad ‘Abduh’s (1849–1905) well-known apologetic 
polemic against Christianity, “Islam and Christianity, in relation to science 
and culture”.10 Farah Antun (1874–1922), a Greek Orthodox Christian and 
Egyptian nationalist, had espoused Ernest Renan’s (1823–92) idea that Islam 
as such was inimical to science and reason, and had written about it in the 
learned Egyptian journal al-Jami‘ah. Renan had based this view on a mainly 
racist anti-Arabic paradigm of history. Muhammad ‘Abduh, and after him 
numerous Muslim scholars, rose to defend Islam. Many of them claimed 
and claim that the tension between reason and belief so often invoked in 
different Christian theologies simply does not exist in Islam. And the 
argument was reversed: Christianity, according to ‘Abduh, rests on belief in 
the irrational. ‘Abduh did admit a possible divergence of religion and reason 
in Islam. But according to him, any potential conflict was easily resolved: 
“The adherents to the Islamic faith – except for a negligible few – agree that 
if reason and (religious) tradition conflict one should follow reason.”11 
So according to an overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars, the 
central tenets of Islam are “more reasonable” than those of Christianity. 
Here ‘Abduh probably underrated or downplayed the number of the 
“negligible few” dissenters. In any case, for him reason was embodied in the 
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first place in the natural sciences. But reason also had to reign in metaphysics. 
The unity of God is a more reasonable proposition than the dogma of the 
Trinity; the dogma that God’s son had died on the cross defies human 
reason. Furthermore, ‘Abduh criticised the fact that Christian doctrine is 
based on Christ’s miracles and that it teaches its adherents to keep aloof 
from worldly things – both stances contradict reason. So we find that Pope 
Benedict XVI and Muhammad ‘Abduh – more than a hundred years apart 
– take contradictory but symmetrical positions. Each finds his own religion 
superior because it can be shown to be more “reasonable”. 
In both cases, the main addressee is not the “religious Other”. When 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, the mufti of Egypt, wrote his treatise, there were 
very few non-Muslims who read him. One of these must have been Ignaz 
Goldziher (1850–1921), secretary of the Israelitish community of Budapest, 
and the foremost European authority on Islam at the time. Goldziher’s 
relation to Judaism was problematic, and his view of Christianity even more 
sceptical. He had met ‘Abduh personally in Cairo in 1873–74. He wrote 
very much in Abduh’s line of thought: 
During these weeks, I so much assimilated the Mohammedan spirit, 
that in the end I was convinced that I was myself a Mohammedan. 
I found that this was the only religion, which even in its official 
doctrinal shape and formulation could satisfy philosophical brains. 
My ideal was to elevate Judaism to a similar level. Islam, I learnt 
by experience, was the only religion, in which superstition and 
pagan rudiments are not countered by rationalism but by orthodox 
doctrine.12 
But Muhammad ‘Abduh’s message addressed neither a European public 
nor the Coptic reader in Egypt. The implied recipient was the enlightened 
Muslim intellectual inside and outside Egypt, who spoke Arabic. This type 
of discourse is normally in the first place self-assertive: it addresses the 
community of co-believers, and it is designed to strengthen their belief and 
their cohesion. This, in my opinion, is also true for Pope Benedict’s lecture. 
However, with the latter – more than a hundred years after Muhammad 
‘Abduh’s death – globalism had struck, and the more polemical parts of a 
lecture delivered in the provincial German town of Regensburg reached a 
Muslim public worldwide within hours. We all know the consequences: 
Muslims reacted with a remarkable Open Letter to the Pope (signed by thirty-
eight Muslim scholars, dated 13 October 2006), and a second letter called 
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A Common Word Between Us and You, signed by 138 Muslim scholars and 
directed not only to the Pope but also to twenty-two Orthodox patriarchs, 
archbishops and metropolitans; to four Protestant and Anglican bishops; 
to the Secretary General of the World Council of Churches; and to the 
“leaders of all Christian Churches” (13 October 2007 = ‘Id al-Fitr 1428).
There are numerous other discursive devices to “prove” religious 
superiority. Let me add one other instance. Religious superiority is often 
invoked by claiming to have a better, meaning superior, idea of who or what 
God really is. This is often expressed in endless discussions – mostly amongst 
Christians, I think – of whether Muslims, Christians and Jews believe in the 
same God or not. Post-Holocaust Christian theology in Europe was eager to 
emphasise the dependence of Christianity on Judaism, the relative autarchy 
of the Jewish religion, and the privileged closeness of Christianity to Judaism. 
In this vein, the German Jesuit, Felix Körner, argued that whereas Christians 
and Muslims cannot be said to believe in the same God, it is appropriate to 
say that Christians and Jews do.13 The aspect of superiority is clearly visible: 
Jews and Christians have the better, the “truer” image of God, which they 
share, and which Islam prevents Muslims from attaining. 
2. Beyond Superiority and Exclusivism: the “Religious Other”
Whereas in Islam and Christianity there are and have always been strong 
currents that insist on the superior character of their own truths, in modern 
times, there are growing tendencies to assure the “religious Other” of a 
partial overlapping of truths and to stress this partial agreement in a gesture 
of inclusivism. Differences are not denied but recalibrated. This also has a 
dialectic of its own: it is admitted that the teachings of the “other religion”, 
the wrong one, are not completely false, especially if interpreted in the light 
of the tenets of the speaker’s religion. This often works in a retroactive way. 
Christianity could not but accept parts of Judaism; Islam could not but 
share parts of Judaism and Christianity. But Christianity for a long time 
accepted Jewish scripture only if it was interpreted in a Christological way. 
Similarly, many contemporary Muslim religious scholars judge the validity 
of Christian and Jewish scripture by the measure of their compatibility with 
the Qur’an and hadith. 
This official inclusivist emphasis on a partial inter-religious agreement 
usually serves a dialogical aim. A good example is the concept of an 
“Abrahamic tradition”. The construction of an Abrahamic unity between 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism was foreshadowed by the Qur’anic concept 
82 the construction of belief
of the “religion of Ibrahim” (millat Ibrahim, for example, sura 2:130) as well 
as by the concept of Ibrahim as a hanif Muslim (for example, sura 3:65–
70). Ibrahim’s monotheist religion was in a way an Islam before the term 
existed. Ibrahim’s religion existed before the Qur’an had been revealed and 
before the Prophet Muhammad was born. This had its legal consequences 
in the concept of dhimma (covenant of protection) in Islam. It was taken 
up or reinvented much later, mainly by Christians and was, as far as I know, 
only unfolded as a possible starting point for dialogue between Muslims, 
Christians and Jews in the twentieth century. Names like Louis Massignon 
(1883–1962) and Youakim Mubarac (1924–95) come to mind. The best-
known modern proponent of the construction of an “Abrahamic” bond 
between the monotheist religions is possibly Pope John XXIII in Vatican II 
with his famous statement on Abraham in Nostra Aetate: 
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the 
one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, 
the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take 
pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, 
just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in 
linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge 
Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honour Mary, 
His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In 
addition, they await the Day of Judgement, when God will render 
their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. 
Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through 
prayer, almsgiving and fasting. 
Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities 
have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges 
all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding 
and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of 
all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and 
freedom.14
In this statement, the Pope acknowledged for the first time that the free 
choice of religion was a fundamental human right – even in the Roman 
Catholic Church. There was salvation outside the Church; there was even 
salvation outside Christianity. 
There is a certain analogy between this “Abrahamic tradition” and 
what in modern Muslim terminology are often called the three “heavenly 
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religions” (al-adyan al-samawiyya), a term that stresses the similarities more 
than the differences between the three monotheist religions. I must confess 
that I do not know how old this term is, but it seems to me to be fairly 
modern.
A further element of constructing an inter-religious monotheist bond 
was and is the fight against a common enemy. This enemy was, for a certain 
period, militant communism. After the downfall of state-controlled 
socialism, the perceived ideological positions of the common enemy were 
mainly agnosticism, materialism and atheism. To this triad, secularism very 
often has to be added. While it has to be admitted that a common enemy 
can be a powerful element in forging a unified front, it is less clear whether 
a pluralist approach to religion will gain anything by marginalising and 
vilifying these positions. Be this as it may, it is pleasing to see that at a time 
when dialogue has become a byword for tolerance and peace, there are 
specialised learned journals from both sides of the religious divide that deal 
exclusively with questions of Muslim–Christian dialogue: Islamochristiana 
(Rome) and the Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies 
(Amman) are just two examples. The “religious Other” – a term which 
would have been incomprehensible a hundred years ago – is on its way to 
becoming part of Christian and Muslim theology. 
There are many theological initiatives from both sides to transcend 
the discourse of superiority and to replace or at least complement it with 
a different approach.15 I will not go into the obvious similarities between 
Muslim tasawwuf and Christian mysticism. That would be too vast a 
subject. Instead, I have selected four of the lesser-known attempts to bridge 
the inter-religious gap:
1. The anima naturaliter Christiana and the fitra, that is, the concept of 
Islam as encompassing all monotheist religions.
2. The concept of an “anonymous Christian” in Vatican II theology, and 
the muslim / mu’min difference in modernist Muslim exegesis.
3. The call for a Christian recognition of Muhammad as a prophet.
4. The self-view of Muslims as an umma wasat (“a moderate 
community”) and Muslim pluralism.
i. The anima naturaliter Christiana and the fitra
Church father Tertullianus (d. after 220 ce) developed the doctrine of a 
“naturally Christian soul” (anima naturaliter Christiana). According to 
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Tertullianus, some pagans show by their behaviour that deep in their hearts 
they believe in God’s unity, in the immortality of the soul and in the existence 
of evil spirits. They share, therefore, major Christian tenets. Their soul is, as 
it were, naturally Christian, independent of their professed religion. In the 
Middle Ages in Europe, some saw in the Roman pagan poet Vergilius (d. 19 
bc) an example of just such a “naturally Christian soul”. This concept was 
taken much further in the twentieth century by Karl Rahner’s development 
of the idea of an “anonymous Christian” (see point 2).
I see in the Islamic concept of fitra a certain analogy with Tertullianus’s 
“naturally Christian soul”. According to a well-known hadith, every human 
being is born in the fitra: the inborn religious predisposition of every child. 
Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 ce) explains: 
I saw that the Christian children grow up in Christianity, and that 
the Jewish children grow up in Judaism and that the Muslim children 
grow up in Islam. Every child is born in the fitra, then his parents 
make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian. And my innermost 
feeling reached out to find the truth of the original fitra.16
Such texts imply that every child’s predisposition or inborn nature is 
Muslim; every child has an anima naturaliter Islamica, so to speak. It is only 
the environment, that is, the parents, who imbue it with a deviant belief.
ii. The Concept of an “Anonymous Christian” in Vatican II Theology,  
and the Muslim / mu’min Difference in Modernist Muslim Exegesis
The concept of an “anonymous Christian” was developed by the German 
Jesuit, Karl Rahner (1904–84). All salvation is through Christ. However, 
people who have never heard the Gospel or even rejected it might still 
be saved through Christ, and could therefore be called “anonymous 
Christians”, Rahner suggested. This concept became part of the declarations 
of the Vatican II (1964), which stated:
Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who through no fault 
of their own do not know the gospel of Christ of his Church, yet 
sincerely seek God and, moved by grace, strive by their deeds to do 
His will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience 
(Lumen Gentium).17
This inclusivism is at present a widespread inter-religious position in 
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Europe. Non-Christians “can have the salvific grace of God, through Christ, 
although they may never have heard of the Christian revelation”, nor of the 
cross, the Trinity, incarnation or resurrection. 
This doctrine came under fire from two directions. Firstly, there was the 
traditional Catholic view, protesting that “biblical Christianity is true and 
other religions are not”. After Vatican II, some groups even separated from 
the Catholic Church, and often gave this very inclusivism as one of their 
reasons. Secondly, there was the liberal voice from inside and outside the 
Catholic Church that found this idea possibly well-meant but paternalistic 
in the extreme. Hans Küng stated, “It would be impossible to find anywhere 
in the world a sincere Jew, Muslim or atheist who would not regard the 
assertion that he is an ‘anonymous Christian’ as presumptuous.”18 John 
Hick agreed with him by criticising Karl Rahner’s notion of an “anonymous 
Christian” as “an honorary status granted unilaterally to people who have 
not expressed any desire for it”. 
The Syrian scholar, Mohamad Shahrour (b. 1938) developed an idea 
somewhat analogous to Karl Rahner’s concept, in his book al-Islam wa-l-
iman.19 This book – famous in the eyes of some Muslims, notorious in the eyes 
of others – distinguishes between the notions of islam and iman, of Muslim 
and mu’min. He vigorously contests the widely accepted position that the 
word islam in the Qur’anic text more or less equals iman. For Mohamad 
Shahrour, these are two radically different concepts: islam designates the 
universal religion of mankind in which Muslims, Christians, Jews and other 
peoples of good faith are united. All mankind of good will is muslim, all are 
members of this all-embracing one religion (din) called Islam. This is true not 
only for Jews and Christians, but also valid for most (or all?) other religions, 
such as Buddhism and Hinduism.20 Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” seems 
close to Shahrour’s concept of being Muslim without realising it. It would 
be possible to speak of an “anonymous Muslim”, though Shahrour never 
does so. Still, the reasoning behind Rahner’s and Shahrour’s concepts is 
rather similar: many Christians limit paradise to Christians only; all others 
go to hell. In the same way, most Muslims confine paradise to their own 
religion while all others are condemned to the eternal fire. In reality, for 
Shahrour, all people of good will who follow their natural universal religion 
have to be called “Muslims” and therefore can enter paradise.21 On the 
other hand, what people call “Islam” today should, according to Shahrour’s 
understanding of the Qur’anic text, be called “Iman”. The “five pillars of 
Islam”, in the sense of the five religious duties of the followers of the Prophet 
Muhammad, should be called the “five pillars of Iman”, and the specificity 
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of him who was heretofore called a Muslim is guaranteed in that he is a 
Mu’min. Islam consists of the belief in God and in the Day of Judgement 
and thus comes close to the concept of an Abrahamic monotheism. 
An early predecessor of Shahrour was al-Ghazali. In his book The Decisive 
Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Clandestine Apostasy22 he speaks of 
non-Muslims who can be excused for not adopting Islam:
Those whom the call i.e. to Islam, SW has not reached are of three 
kinds. The first kind are those who have never heard the name of 
Muhammad, they are excused; the second kind are those who have 
heard his name and his virtue and his miracles and who live close to 
the Muslim land and have contact with them, they are the unbelievers 
and the heretics; and there is a third group between them. They have 
heard the name Muhammad and have not heard of his qualities and 
traits, but they have from their earliest youth heard that a treacherous 
liar named Muhammad claimed to be a prophet. Those belong in my 
view to the first kind. Because they have heard his name and at the 
same time the opposite of his qualities and that does not motivate 
them to further enquiries. That means that most Christians from the 
Rum and of the land of the Turks will be covered by God’s mercy.23
The first and the third group can in the hereafter expect God’s mercy without 
professing Islam.
Shahrour’s method was criticised by many – the best-known and most 
competent among his critics was probably the Egyptian, Nasr Hamid Abu 
Zayd (b. 1943).24 Nevertheless, Shahrour can serve as an example for a bold 
revisionism. He certainly is one of a new brand of Muslim intellectuals in 
the public sphere who have led to a “collapse of earlier, hierarchical notions 
of religious authority based on claims to the mastery of fixed bodies of 
religious texts”.25
iii. The Call for a Christian Recognition of Muhammad as a Prophet
There is a long-standing complaint among Muslim theologians that 
Christianity did not and does not acknowledge the prophethood of 
Muhammad, while the Qur’an does recognise the prophethood of Jesus. 
In recent times, some Protestant theologians have argued that Christians 
should acknowledge Muhammad’s prophethood. One of them is the 
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German theologian Reinhard Leuze in his book Christianity and Islam.26 
Another, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, wrote:
I myself – after studying the history of the Islamic and the Christian 
movements and having friends in both groups – am not able to think 
of any reason that one might reasonably have for denying that God 
has played in human history a role in and through the Qur’an, in the 
Muslim case, comparable to the role of Christ in the Christian case 
in and through Christ.27
The most famous proponent of such a view, however, seems to be the 
controversial Swiss Catholic theologian, Hans Küng (b.1928), whose 
authority to teach Catholic theology was revoked by the Vatican. Since 
1995 he has been President of the Foundation for a Global Ethic (“Stiftung 
Weltethos”). He wrote:
If the Catholic Church after the declaration on the non-Christian 
religions in Vatican II (1964) … ‘also sees the Muslims with great 
respect who pray to the one and only God … who spoke to mankind’ 
– then the same Church – and all Christian Churches – should … 
see the one person with great respect whose name is not mentioned 
in that declaration out of embarrassment, although he and he alone 
led the Muslims to worship this one God and although God spoke 
through him, Muhammad the Prophet.28
We all know that Hans Küng does not represent Catholic mainstream 
theology – but I find it difficult to contradict him. 
iv. The Self-View of Muslims as an umma wasat (“a Moderate Community”) 
and Muslim Pluralism
A complete pluralism is reached when some modern Muslim exegetes offer 
a new interpretation of Qur’anic verses, such as 2:143 and 5:66 that describe 
righteous Muslims as constituting a “moderate community” (umma 
wasat) and righteous Jews and Christians as a “balanced community” 
(umma muqtasida). “Taken together, these verses clearly suggest that it 
is subscription to some common standard of righteousness and ethical 
conduct that determines the salvific nature of a religious community 
and not the denominational label it chooses to wear”.29 The Indonesian 
scholar Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) used to stress in his exegesis the 
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importance of sura 2:62: “Surely they that believe, and those of Jewry, and 
the Christians, and those Sabeans, whoso believes in God and the Last Day, 
and works righteousness – their wage awaits them with their Lord, and no 
fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow.”30 In his view, this and other 
Qur’anic verses show that all non-Muslims who believe in God could be 
recompensed by paradise. He was convinced that not only Jews, Christians 
and the mysterious “Sabeans”, but also Hindus, Buddhists and adherents of 
other religions would find grace with God. He thus comes close to Mohamad 
Shahrour’s interpretation of the Qur’anic word “Mu’min”.31 This in some 
way reflects the reality of Indonesian society. Hamka (Haji Abdulmalik 
ibn Abdulkarim Amrullah, d. 1981), also an Indonesian exegete, emphasises 
in his commentary that religious sectarianism, exclusion of other religious 
groups and attitudes of superiority are far removed from the original aim of 
religion to attain truth. Those who believe that only they possess the truth 
and that all others err, will only create strife and will not achieve any good for 
others. Sura 2:62 aims above all for a peaceful coexistence of all religions.32 
Sura 2:62 has for some time been interpreted in a fairly inclusivist or 
even pluralist way. The Bombay-born scholar Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872–
1953) commented on this verse in his translation The Holy Qur’an. Text, 
Translation and Commentary (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers: Lahore, 
1938):
The point of the verse is that Islam does not teach an exclusivist 
doctrine, and it is not meant exclusively for one people… Even the 
modern organized Christian churches, though they have been, 
consciously or unconsciously, influenced by the ‘Zeitgeist’, including 
the historical fact of Islam, yet cling to the idea of Vicarious 
Atonement which means that all who do not believe in it or who 
lived previously to the death of Christ are at a disadvantage spiritually 
before the throne of Allah. The attitude of Islam is entirely different. 
Islam existed before the preaching of Muhammad on this earth… 
Its teaching (submission to Allah’s will) has been and will be the 
teaching of Religion for all time and for all peoples.33
The official Saudi Qur’an text, along with an English version, was prepared 
by the King Fahd Complex in Medina in 1990. It used Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s 
translation as well as his commentary with the fairly inclusivist exegesis of 
sura 2:62. However, the revised edition of the Qur’an, printed in Medina 
by the same King Fahd Complex in 2009, chose two translators from 
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Medina and radically changed the explicative commentary. In a staunchly 
traditionalist and exclusivist note to sura 2:62, the reader was warned that 
this verse had been abrogated. 
A well-known Catholic theologian, Christian W. Troll, comes to a 
sceptical judgement on the overall merits of Yusuf Ali’s stance versus Judaism 
and Christianity, in spite of the latter’s inclusivist tendency: 
What many readers may well object to is that Yusuf Ali repeatedly 
attributes the fact that Christians did or do not accept key teachings 
of Islam proposed to them to morally reprehensible motives on their 
part. Little room is made for honest dissent. In this respect, Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali’s notes remain pre-modern in a negative sense.34
Finally, the South African Muslim Farid Esack is determined “to find a 
space in my own theology for those who are not Muslim, yet are deeply 
committed to seeing the grace and compassion of an All-loving Creator 
expressed in the righteous and caring works of ordinary men and women”. 
He also criticises some Muslim movements as “anti-everyone-other-than-
ourselves”.35 My impression is that, in general, contemporary Muslim 
commentators who write in Arabic are much less inclined to admit that Jews 
and Christians have a chance of salvation than those who write in Turkish, 
Persian or Indonesian. In the eyes of many Arab mainstream exegetes, the 
link between the exclusive superiority of Islam, on the one hand, and the 
certitude that non-Muslims are doomed to eternal damnation, on the other, 
is obvious. There is also a link between a militant exegesis and takfir (charge 
of unbelief ). The comparatively inclusivist position of Muhammad ‘Abduh 
and Rashid Rida toward sura 2:62 was and is, in the eyes of the Academy of 
Islamic research of al-Azhar, a “deformation” for which only “some heretics” 
can be responsible.36 
Let me close this paper with a prediction: new Muslim approaches toward 
their religion and toward the religions of others will come mainly from 
Islam in the periphery (India, Indonesia or Malaysia) or from the Muslim 
diaspora. They will probably not come from Cairo or Rabat, let alone from 
Mecca or Medina. The person in whose honour we have assembled here and 
the institution that hosts us both seem to confirm this point.
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The Political, Social and Technological 
Construction of Understanding:  
An Essay in Analysis of the Disruptive
Mark Sedgwick 
Understandings of religions, like many other understandings, can be analysed 
in terms of their production and in terms of their reception. The analysis 
of the production of understandings of Islam is relatively well advanced. 
Scholars working in the ancient Muslim tradition have been studying the 
relevant texts for centuries, and scholars working in the contemporary 
Western tradition have been studying many of the relevant texts, histories 
and biographies since the nineteenth century. The study of the reception 
of understandings of Islam is far less advanced. Its contrast with the study 
of understandings of Christianity in Europe is striking. The study of the 
work and biography of the Protestant theologians of the Reformation, for 
example, was really the enterprise of the nineteenth century; modern studies 
generally focus not on the production of Protestantism but on its reception.
This essay examines the reception of one particular understanding of 
Islam: that typified by the name of Muhammad ‘Abduh. At one point in 
the nineteenth century, this understanding of Islam appeared to be in the 
ascendant in Egypt. Today, this is no longer the case. Similar understandings 
persist and have become more sophisticated but are not in the ascendant. 
Taking a historical approach and focusing on political, social and 
technological factors, this essay attempts to explain why.
This essay’s inspiration is the work of François Guizot, now remembered 
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principally as a nineteenth-century French prime minister, but also one of 
Europe’s greatest historians. Guizot’s work was an inspiration not only for 
European thinkers such as Karl Marx,1 but also for ‘Abduh, and it is strange 
that so little attention is paid to it today.
In his Histoire Générale de la Civilisation en Europe, published in 
1838, Guizot challenged the then standard focus on political history by 
demonstrating the interrelation between three varieties of history: the 
political, the intellectual – which he saw as being partly determined by 
the political but also as helping to determine the political – and the social, 
which he saw as both determining and being determined by the other two. 
Marx and his followers emphasised the impact of the social (and especially 
of the social’s economic element) on the political and the intellectual. 
This essay retains both Guizot’s emphasis on the political as an 
independent variable and a somewhat Marxist emphasis on the economic 
element of the social. It does not, however, understand class in purely 
economic terms. Instead, class is understood in the broader sense of a social 
group defined both “horizontally” (by economic and occupational factors) 
and “vertically” (by social and cultural criteria). Among others, Mattei 
Dogan has argued for this approach, pointing out that most societies are 
structured in this way:
A country in which there were only vertical cleavages would lose its 
unity. If a large number of horizontal cleavages were superimposed 
without counterbalancing vertical cleavages, the society would 
experience social unrest. The fabric of a well-established democracy 
is formed by the weave of cleavages.2
Dogan was especially interested in well-established democracies, but his 
argument holds true for other types of polity.
In addition to looking at the political and socio-economic aspects of the 
reception of ‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam, this essay will look at a further 
variable that neither Guizot nor Marx saw as having much independent 
importance, but which many recent studies have emphasised in various 
contexts: media of communication.
The Political
The relationship between ‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam and political 
history is relatively easy to explain. Initially, ‘Abduh and his understandings 
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were promoted by the political – by the khedive who appointed ‘Abduh 
to his post as mufti, and by Lord Cromer, who sponsored ‘Abduh after he 
lost the support of the khedive. The khedive’s exact motives for appointing 
‘Abduh are not known, but were probably more political than intellectual: 
an expectation that ‘Abduh would be a reliable and efficient administrator. 
There must also have been, however, an intellectual element, since the 
khedive can hardly have been ignorant of ‘Abduh’s general intellectual 
position. Cromer’s support was certainly also politically motivated, but 
there was evidently an intellectual sympathy between the two men.3
Political patronage did not last. First the khedive turned against ‘Abduh, 
as it was felt that he was too close to Cromer, and then Cromer’s successor, 
Sir Eldon Gorst, sought a rapprochement with the khedive and so turned 
against ‘Abduh’s former associates, who themselves became opponents of 
English influence. After a brief period during which some of those former 
associates and their sympathisers held powerful positions, political power 
promoted other forms of Islam: nationalist, mobilisational, revivalist. 
‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam, then, has not enjoyed political support in 
the Arab world for a century. However, variations on those understandings 
are now beginning to attract some political support in Europe, as well as in 
Tunisia and, perhaps, Syria. 
The political aspect of the story, then, is well known and easily told.4 
The Social
A similar approach to the one taken below was used in a short article in 
MERIP Reports in 1977 by Judith Gran, to explain two very different 
attitudes towards women in Egypt: the “pro-emancipationist” and the 
conservative. Gran proposed that these two attitudes were “associated with 
a particular social class and a particular nationalist ideology”. The “pro-
emancipationist” was “associated with the upper classes and upper-middle 
classes”, with the Hizb al-Umma and the Wafd. “Conservative attitudes”, on 
the other hand, were associated with the lower-middle class, with the Hizb 
al-Watani, the Society of the Muslim Brothers and the Free Officers.5 
Although Gran was careful to use the word “associated” (and needed to, 
since Tala‘t Harb was an opponent of Qasim Amin in so far as questions of 
gender were concerned), she also suggested explanations for the associations 
she had observed. Men of the upper classes and upper-middle classes 
benefitted from Egypt’s trade links with the West, Gran suggested, and as 
such they were especially receptive to Western values; as time passed, the 
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sphere of their wives’ activities expanded. The men of the lower-middle class, 
in contrast, suffered economically from those same links, and became more 
hostile to the West and to Western values. As they moved from household-
based artisanal production to employment outside the home, the sphere of 
their wives’ activities decreased.6
Gran’s economic explanation is interesting but not wholly convincing, 
and may be open to the charge of “crude materialism” made in another 
context by Eric Davis. In the context of studies of radical Islamism, Davis 
has described Gran’s type of approach as “anaemic”:
Ideology is either viewed in terms of crude materialism or in terms of 
psycho-social needs. In one instance, it is a reflection of class interests 
... and in another, a reflection of ... social strains ... This means that 
the internal structure of Islamic radical thought, causes underlying 
its changes over time, its emotive power, and the political constraints 
and advantages it bestows on its adherents are never fully discussed.7
The present essay, however, is limited in its ambitions. It does not aim to 
investigate the ideology or understandings of ‘Abduh or of his heirs, on 
which much work has already been done. It does not aim to investigate 
the emotive power of those understandings, which might be an interesting 
project. It does not examine the relationship between ideology, economic 
interests and psycho-social need. It merely assumes that such a relationship 
exists, and looks at socio-economic factors underlying changes in ideology 
over time by establishing a correlation between changes in classes and 
changes in predominant understandings of Islam.
The Classes that Welcomed Muhammad ‘Abduh
Initially, ‘Abduh’s work appealed to at least two groups, one in Egypt and 
one in Syria. These groups can be seen as a single class and understood as a 
social group defined both vertically and horizontally. Why ‘Abduh’s work 
appealed to these two groups is not difficult to see, but it falls beyond the 
scope of this essay, which is more interested in the fact of the association of 
particular understandings with particular classes, and in the consequences 
(not the causes) of that fact.
One of the groups to which ‘Abduh’s work evidently appealed was 
the group to which he himself belonged, along with his closest associate, 
Sa‘d Zaghlul, and other members of the Muslim Benevolent Society to 
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which both ‘Abduh and Zaghlul devoted much time in the 1890s.8 The 
second group was that for which ‘Abduh initially composed his Risalat al-
tawhid (“The theology of unity”): young men studying at the Sultaniyya, 
an ambitious modern school in Beirut that aimed to rival the European 
and American schools that had recently proved so successful.9 ‘Abduh’s 
understandings may also have appealed to other groups: he was, for example, 
clearly appreciated by that section of the Egyptian general public which 
attended his Azhar lectures. We know little about this public, however, save 
that it was numerous, educated and included Christians.10 This does not give 
us enough to go much further.
The class in Egypt to which ‘Abduh and Zaghlul and their friends on 
the board of the Muslim Benevolent Society belonged was associated more 
with the ṭarbush than the turban. Its typical member was a lawyer or a judge 
– and ‘Abduh had of course been a senior judge in the National Court 
system before becoming mufti. Vertically, it was defined by its familiarity 
with European languages, thought and culture on the one hand, and by its 
attachment to Egypt on the other. Horizontally, it was defined by its growing 
prosperity: this was the small Egyptian professional class that had emerged 
to serve the modern state that had been established during the nineteenth 
century. The social origins of its members were often modest, but their rise 
put them in touch with the highest horizontal levels, as Zaghlul’s marriage 
to Safiyya Fahmi (daughter of Prime Minister Mustafa Fahmi) indicated.
The group found at the Sultaniyya was similar. It was defined vertically 
in exactly the same way that the Egyptian group was: on the one hand, by 
familiarity with European languages, thought and culture. This familiarity 
was one of the main objectives of the Sultaniyya. On the other hand, the 
group was defined by its attachment to the Syrian version of the Ottoman 
order: this, again, was one of the main objectives of the school, and the 
main reason for establishing an alternative to the foreign schools in the 
first place. It was, in ‘Abduh’s own words, the group that, having learned 
modern European science and philosophy, might look at the ignorance of 
the Muslim ‘ulama’ and turn away from Islam, regarding it as “a kind of old 
thawb [garment] in which it is embarrassing to appear”.11 The horizontal 
definition of the group is less clear. The school educated some children of 
the Syrian elite, including seven members of Jerusalem’s Husayni family,12 
but cannot have been a purely elite school, as the children of the elite were 
hardly numerous enough to fill an entire school.
The two groups, then, seem to belong to the same class: the modern but 
patriotic professional upper-middle class. This conclusion is similar to that 
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reached by Gran. In fact, Gran traced the “pro-emancipationist” attitude to 
women via this class, from ‘Abduh to graduates of the American University 
in Cairo during the 1970s.13
The Disruptive Class
The professional upper-middle class is important in any society, save, 
perhaps, in extremely authoritarian states of the sort established in some 
places during the twentieth century, which did not really have such a class. 
It was especially important in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century 
because it was a rising class, increasing in numbers, wealth and power. In 
other words, it was a “disruptive” class. The adjective is borrowed from 
economics, where it is commonly applied to technology; for example, a 
“disruptive technology” is a new invention that dramatically undercuts 
or destroys the market for an existing product.14 Classic examples include 
the railway and the motorcar, which destroyed the stage-coach business 
and made riding horses a leisure activity; the digital watch, which made 
mechanical watches a luxury item; and the personal computer, which 
entirely destroyed the typewriter. A disruptive technology makes waves in 
a way that other technologies do not. Likewise, the new professional upper-
middle class made waves in the late nineteenth-century Egyptian and Arab 
world. Most importantly, it disrupted the ‘ulama’, destroying their former 
semi-monopoly of intellectual life, and taking over many of their sources of 
income and prestige. As a disruptive class, it was in a position that allowed 
it easily to take the initiative. Faced with disruption, established classes (like 
established technologies) are, by definition, on the defensive: weakened, 
and with little room for manoeuvre.
Conceived horizontally, the Egyptian upper-middle class also included, 
in the words of Juan Cole, “government officials, large landowners, foreign 
investors, and large-scale entrepreneurs”.15 Of these, the professional upper-
middle class and the class of foreign investors were the most disruptive. 
Large landowners were important but not disruptive, as they had been 
important since the days of Mehmet ‘Ali Pasha, or perhaps since the 
eighteenth century.16 Foreign investors, though disruptive, were not of 
great importance for Islam. Large-scale entrepreneurs – for whatever reason 
– do not feature in any accounts of the intellectual life of the period, save 
occasionally as donors.
The disruptive class of ‘Abduh’s time was closely allied with the then 
disruptive medium of communications: the newspaper. As the work of Ami 
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Ayalon and others has shown, there was a remarkable overlap between the 
group that had gathered around Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the 1870s and 
the creation of an independent political press in Egypt.17 In later years too, 
the newspaper was important to ‘Abduh: not just Al-Manar, but also Al-
Mu‘ayyad, edited by ‘Abduh’s friend, ‘Ali Yusuf.18 Why a disruptive class is 
often associated with a disruptive medium (today’s such class is associated 
with the new media, including social media) is a question that falls 
beyond the scope of this essay. It does, however, often seem to be the case. 
Newspapers were the perfect medium for the transmission of ‘Abduh’s work 
– they reached other members of his class, and they encouraged relatively 
thoughtful, non-professional reading.
The Rise of the Urban Working Class  
and of the Lower-Middle Class
The professional upper-middle class and the newspaper remained 
important in Egypt after 1921, but neither remained disruptive. The 
early twentieth century saw the emergence of two new disruptive classes 
as the urbanisation of Egypt began. Slightly more than a third of the 
population of Cairo in 1907 had been born elsewhere, presumably in the 
countryside.19 An urban working class, though small in comparison with 
the industrial proletariats of European capitals, was developing. The 1907 
census reported 280 thousand Egyptians engaged in manufacturing; that 
of 1917 reported 420 thousand.20 This presumably reflected the impact of 
British demand during the First World War. At the same time, a lower-
middle class was emerging: school teachers, minor officials and university 
students. Primary-school enrolment increased from 193 thousand in 
1926 to 1.08 million in 1941,21 and numbers of school teachers increased 
accordingly. By 1941, there were nine thousand university students 
in Cairo.22 Although this was not a substantial number in itself, it was 
disruptive in a society that had only recently acquired a modern university. 
Students were especially prominent in later years in the Muslim Brothers, 
comprising a remarkable 24 per cent of those arrested in 1954.23
This lower-middle class was the new disruptive class, sometimes joined 
by the new urban working class: demonstrations and strikes became a 
regular part of Egyptian political life after 1919, and especially from the 
1930s onwards, led by the lower-middle class (including students) which 
was sometimes joined by the small urban working class. Joel Beinin and 
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Zachary Lockman have shown the disruptive impact of these classes on the 
society and politics of the period.24
These new disruptive classes both differed from the professional upper-
middle class horizontally, in terms of their economic position and their 
relationship to political power. They also differed vertically. They were 
familiar with European languages, thought, and culture, but superficially so, 
having in general been educated in Arabic-language schools rather than the 
French- and English-language schools favoured by the upper-middle classes. 
They knew of European culture and thought, but only in outline. 
The work of ‘Abduh and his immediate heirs was evidently not 
particularly attractive to either of these new disruptive classes. The question 
of why this should be, once again, falls beyond the scope of this essay. We 
can deduce that it was the case partly from the fact that the most vocal and 
destructive opposition to ‘Abduh during his final years as mufti had come 
from Himarat Munyati (“Donkey of my desire”),25 a newspaper whose 
readership probably came from precisely these classes. That ‘Abduh’s work 
did not appeal to them can be deduced by looking at the understanding of 
Islam that they clearly did find attractive: that of the Muslim Brothers. The 
Muslim Brothers are sometimes seen as linked to ‘Abduh through Rashid 
Rida, but the analysis of Muhammad Haddad – that Rida’s claim to be 
‘Abduh’s successor served to legitimise him but lacked much real basis – 
is entirely convincing.26 ‘Abduh and the Muslim Brothers had some points 
in common, of course, but the differences between them are surely more 
significant.
Hasan al-Banna was a school teacher, and thus of the lower-middle class. 
The leadership of the mature Society of the Muslim Brothers had a similar 
profile: that of what Richard Mitchell has called “an emergent and self-
conscious Muslim middle class”.27 The Muslim Brothers was not, however, 
just a lower-middle class organisation. Its first members in Ismailia were 
workers, and in later years the Muslim Brothers emphasised that most of its 
members came from the working class.28 The nascent workers’ movement, 
where the Muslim Brothers competed with the Communists, was one of 
the Muslim Brothers’ major fields of activity.29 However, in Cairo it was 
reported to be “the student, the civil servant, the teacher, the clerk and office 
worker” that predominated, as well as “the professional in their Western 
suit”.30 Since the quality of the suits is not described, it is hard to say whether 
their wearers came from the older upper-middle class or the newer lower-
middle class – most sources fail to make a distinction between the two. 
Although there were probably some members of the upper-middle class in 
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the higher ranks of the Muslim Brothers, the lower-middle class seems to 
have been the most important group, just as the urban workers were the 
most important group in the active base. Certainly some members of the 
Muslim Brothers were from rural areas, but though they were of some 
significance numerically, peasants were almost impossible to organise, and 
so were not of major importance.
The Muslim Brothers were not, of course, equally attractive to all: some 
members of the lower-middle and working classes also evidently contented 
themselves with conventional Islamic practice, while others adopted the 
relaxed understanding of religion that modernisation theory would predict.31 
The Muslim Brothers, however, were the new and notable expression of the 
understanding of Islam favoured by the disruptive classes of the period, just 
as the Islam of ‘Abduh had been a new and notable expression in the earlier 
period. In a sense, the Muslim Brothers’ understanding of Islam was in itself 
disruptive. And one of the established features of life it could not help but 
disrupt was the understanding of Islam typified by ‘Abduh. 
During this second period, additional media emerged. Egyptian Radio 
started broadcasting in 1934 and Studio Misr was established in 1936, 
marking the beginning of a major Egyptian film industry. The Muslim 
Brothers themselves may be considered a sort of medium of communication: 
the mass movement is also a communications network. These new media 
are, once again, associated with the new disruptive classes. The case of 
the Muslim Brothers has already been considered. Radio audiences came 
predominantly from the same classes, with the urban working class listening 
to the radio in cafés, and the lower-middle class perhaps even affording to 
buy a radio set for use at home.32 The low price of cinema tickets also placed 
film within the reach of the urban working class.33
The Muslim Brothers’ communications network promoted 
understandings of Islam very different from those proposed by ‘Abduh. 
Unlike the newspaper, the mass movement did not encourage reflection; 
rather, it encouraged conformity. The other two media were probably 
neutral. The black-and-white musical is not a suitable medium for intellectual 
or religious purposes; Egyptian Radio remained under British control until 
1947,34 and its religious broadcasting was presumably conservative.
The changed class and media configurations in Egypt during the first 
half of the twentieth century explain the changed status of ‘Abduh’s 
understanding of Islam during that period. Whatever else happened, 
‘Abduh’s understanding could hardly have maintained its ascendency 
against the rise of the new disruptive classes. Heirs of ‘Abduh such as Taha 
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Husayn and ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq were active in this period, but their voices 
were in competition with new voices: not just the old voices of the ‘ulama’ 
that ‘Abduh’s voice had competed with, but the new and powerful voices of 
the Muslim Brothers.
The Late Twentieth Century
Two further class shifts during the twentieth century may be identified. 
One of these is the period of Arab nationalism typified by the presidency of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser; the other is the period of the Islamic resurgence.
The greatest difference between the period of Arab nationalism and 
the periods that preceded it was political, not social. The Nasserite state 
established a monopoly on information and the public sphere, giving little 
scope for dissenting voices. This was not so much a period in which a new 
disruptive class appeared, then, as one in which earlier socio-economic 
developments reached a political conclusion. The two disruptive classes of 
the early twentieth century finally replaced the dominant classes of ‘Abduh’s 
time, the lower-middle class leading and the urban working class following. 
The urban working class had continued to expand, growing significantly 
during the Second World War in response to the needs of the British war 
effort as well as to the decline in imports,35 though this expansion was in 
some ways temporary: the end of the Second World War brought mass 
unemployment to those whom the war effort had employed.36
The class origin of Nasser’s army officers and senior officials is unclear, 
but this group did not represent a new class. They portrayed themselves as 
lower-middle class – in order to “solidify their populist base”, according 
to Joel Gordon – but may not always have been as lower-middle class as 
they seemed. They were not of the upper-class and upper-middle-class 
backgrounds that had dominated the military academy before 1937, but 
some were the sons of architects, engineers or judges.37 In horizontal terms, 
they formed a new class as they established control over Egypt and began to 
enjoy the fruits of that control, but in vertical terms there was less change. 
Such change was delayed until subsequent generations. Power and prosperity 
did not make the dominant class of Nasser’s Egypt any more interested in 
European thought, unless Soviet ideology can be considered European.
Whatever understanding of Islam was attractive to the urban working 
class of the 1960s, the Nasserite state’s monopoly on information in the 
public sphere meant that the Islam that mattered was that of the section of 
the lower-middle class that had taken power. As is well known, this might 
103the political, social and technological construction of understanding …
almost have been the understandings of the Muslim Brothers, to whom 
many of the Free Officers had once been close. In the event, however, politics 
intervened: the logic of the consolidation of power led to the suppression of 
the Muslim Brothers, and thus to a silence in which the voices of the ‘ulama’ 
unexpectedly re-emerged.
The period of Arab nationalism was a continuation of the first period of 
the twentieth century. The period of the Islamic resurgence that succeeded 
it marked a new discontinuity, and coincided with the emergence of new 
disruptive classes and of a new medium. It coincided also with the weakening 
of the Nasserite state.
The new disruptive classes in Egypt were public-sector employees and 
the urban poor. The urban poor had always existed, but the size of this class 
increased dramatically during the last decades of the twentieth century, as 
the total population of Egypt grew dramatically, driving urbanisation. Cairo 
grew from about three million inhabitants in 1947 to about eight million 
in 1976,38 and then to probably more than fifteen million by the end of the 
century. Some of this increase reflected natural growth, but much – perhaps 
most – came from rural migration. Reliable statistics do not exist, but it is 
clear that many or most of these new Cairenes lived in poverty.
By many measures, Nasser’s industrialisation programme was not a 
success, but it did create a massive new class of public-sector employees, 
to which university students can be added. The nine thousand university 
students of 1941 were in the lower-middle class; the three and a half million 
Egyptians who graduated from universities and technical and vocational 
institutes during the eight years between 1983 and 199139 were in a different 
class, both horizontally and vertically.
As a result of employment guarantees dating from the 1960s, government 
and public sector employment, as well as the tertiary education certificates 
that gave access to them, grew steadily until, during the 1980s and ’90s, 
about a third of Egypt’s labour force was working for the state in one way or 
another.40 As the drain on the state budget of paying the salaries of so many 
unproductive employees grew, inflation was allowed to erode the real value 
of wages, which had never been high, and which fell by some 60 per cent 
between 1981 and 1986, and continued to fall thereafter.41
Horizontally, these two disruptive classes differ: public-sector employees 
and students enjoyed slightly more economic security and social status than 
the urban poor. Vertically, however, they are more uniform, characterised 
by poor education and, probably, an inherited religious practice and piety, 
often of rural origin. That their education was poor is clear. It was the result 
104 the construction of belief
of a dramatic increase in enrolments without commensurate increases 
in funding, and of a shortage of qualified teachers – the pre-existing 
educational system was relatively recent and not without its own problems 
in the first place. The millions of university graduates, let alone the others, 
had in most cases only limited knowledge of their own thought and culture, 
and minimal familiarity with European languages, thought and culture. 
The inherited religious practice and piety are harder to establish, but are 
suggested by casual observation.
Again, the work of ‘Abduh and his successors was not attractive to 
the new disruptive classes, and again, this can be seen by examining what 
understanding of Islam was attractive. The Islam of the Muslim Brothers 
clearly retained some appeal, though of course the Muslim Brothers of 
the 1990s differed in many ways from the Muslim Brothers of the 1930s. 
This time, the most striking development was the spread of public piety. 
Congregations at Friday prayers spread beyond the mosque into the street. 
For women, the hijab became almost universal. The period also saw the rise 
of radical Islamism, but it was the hijab, not the suicide bomb, that became 
the norm.
Like the Muslim Brothers of the earlier period, public piety during this 
period only represents a particular understanding of Islam – that is, it is a 
“proxy” for that understanding, not the essence of that understanding. 
And like the Muslim Brothers themselves, it was not universal. Given 
human diversity, an essence might be hard to find, and no understanding is 
universal. Like the understanding of Islam of the Muslim Brothers, however, 
the understanding of Islam for which public piety is a proxy was disruptive, 
and was hardly compatible with the understanding of Islam typified by 
‘Abduh. 
Two new media are associated with this period. One, appearing towards 
the end of the twentieth century, was satellite television. Its impact was 
delayed. The other, appearing at the beginning of this period, was the cassette 
tape: this, as in Iran, was highly disruptive, circumventing the state’s media 
monopoly, and proving a highly efficient medium for the circulation of 
revivalist preaching. Recorded preaching, like the communications network 
of the mass movement, encourages conformity more than reflection.
The Islamic resurgence in Egypt was part of a global pattern of religious 
resurgence which went beyond the Muslim world. This global religious 
resurgence is a matter for another essay, but it will be noticed in passing that 
it too may have a class basis. In Turkey, it is associated with the emergence 
of new disruptive classes that successfully challenged the established 
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secularist elite; in Israel, it is associated with the end of the dominance of 
the Ashkenazi socialist elite; it may be associated with similar developments 
in India and in the United States.
Conclusion
This essay reveals some fundamental reasons for the continuing limited 
enthusiasm for the understandings of Islam which ‘Abduh’s name typifies; 
understandings which had once been in the ascendant, encouraged by 
the political, the disruptive classes, and the disruptive media of the late 
nineteenth century. This does not mean, of course, that no other factors were 
at work. Lest this essay seem overly deterministic or even simplistic, it should 
be emphasised that its purpose is not to advance a complete explanation of 
the waning of receptivity to ‘Abduh’s variety of understanding, but rather 
to draw attention to certain factors which have had a significant impact on 
Egyptian intellectual history.
Before ‘Abduh, the understandings of the ‘ulama’ reigned almost 
unchallenged. What challenges there were – from the Wahhabis or the 
Senussis, for example – came from the periphery and had little impact and 
no political support in places such as Cairo. The rise of a new professional 
upper-middle class, familiar with nineteenth-century European culture 
and thought, was associated with the ascendency of new understandings of 
Islam. These also received some political support, first from the khedive and 
then from Lord Cromer.
During the first half of the twentieth century, as Cairo’s working class 
and lower-middle class grew, it was the Islam of the Muslim Brothers that 
was ascendant: not universal, but certainly disruptive, as were the classes 
with which it was associated. This understanding did not receive political 
support, but neither did the understanding of ‘Abduh receive the political 
support it had once received. During the second half of the century, political 
changes resulting from the establishment of the Nasserite state suppressed all 
dissenting voices, whether those of the Muslim Brothers or of the remaining 
advocates of the understandings typified by the name of ‘Abduh.
By the end of the twentieth century, it was no longer the industrial 
working class and the lower-middle class that were growing, but the urban 
poor and the class of underpaid public-sector employees. Although there is 
no proxy for the understanding of Islam of these disruptive classes as obvious 
as the Muslim Brothers was for that of the second period, public piety 
seems the best proxy, and again this was disruptive, and again the disruptive 
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understanding was very different from the understandings typified by 
‘Abduh. Public piety was not promoted by the Egyptian state, but it did 
receive some political support in the sense that the state was careful not to 
affront the pious. For example, the state’s failure to intervene in support of 
Nasr Abu Zayd was, in a sense, a form of political support for his opponents.
Whatever the merits of ‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam, an 
understanding that appealed to the newspaper-reading upper-middle class 
of the 1890s could hardly be expected to appeal to the industrial worker 
listening to a member of the lower-middle class at a meeting of the Muslim 
Brothers in 1941, nor to a member of the urban poor listening to a cassette 
tape of a revivalist preacher in 1991.
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Believing and Belonging:  
The Impact of Religion for “Muslim” 
Adolescents in a Pluralistic Society – 
Empirical Findings from Hamburg, Germany
Ursula Günther
Oddly enough, the paradox is one of our most 
valuable spiritual possessions, while uniformity of 
meaning is a sign of weakness. Hence, a religion 
becomes inwardly impoverished when it loses or 
waters down its paradoxes; but their multiplication 
enriches it because only the paradox comes anywhere 
near to comprehending the fullness of life.
C. G. Jung1
Introduction
“Reflexive modernity” or – speaking with Jürgen Habermas – “the post-
secular situation” confronts the individual with a radical plurality of 
meaning, including the challenge of living with the paradox and the end 
of security-providing certainties presented by a central perspective. In 
other words: certainties are replaced by possibilities. Polyphony turns out 
to be the magic word. Unfortunately it does not endow individuals with 
the necessary tools to deal with plurality in terms of decision-making. The 
individual is compelled to engage in negotiations, which are accompanied 
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by a permanent balancing, coordination and integration of conflicting 
interests, loyalties, value and norm systems, and meanings. Processes of 
reflexive questioning are often innovative since any loss of meaning is 
accompanied by the development of new visions and patterns of action. 
The field of religion and religiosity is not excluded from this development – 
quite the contrary. Processes of pluralisation, among other things, give rise 
to the questioning of religious or theological monopolies of interpretation, 
while new perspectives, interpretations and concepts of religious 
worldviews are negotiated and again put up for negotiation according to the 
context they face. These processes can often be interpreted as educational 
(Bildungsprozesse) in the sense of a profound transformation of how one 
perceives the world and the self. 
These challenges of modernity – albeit very condensed – are particularly 
significant for the findings elucidated below. Since the paper is relatively 
short, two perspectives provide a focus: the first aims to clarify the concepts 
of religion and religiosity. This will be embedded in the current debates 
concerning the secularisation thesis and the possibilities offered by the 
individualisation thesis, since it is in this context that the notions of believing 
and belonging have been introduced in the last two decades, namely by 
Grace Davie. However, applying these terms in a “Muslim” context, at least 
with regard to “Muslim” minorities in “non-Muslim” countries – that is, 
the context of the study referred to – necessitates some modifications. The 
second perspective concentrates on the relationship between believing and 
belonging, still considered two major indicators for religiosity. For that 
purpose the adolescents I interviewed and their statements will take centre 
stage. There will also be a brief outline of the research project, accompanied 
by some insights into the particular context of Germany’s “Muslims”, 
illustrated with prominent elements of the discourse.
At this point, the use of the term “Muslim” in quotation marks deserves 
an explanation: I make the emphasis in order to point out that the notion 
“Muslim” provides information neither about a person’s religiosity (let 
alone its degree), nor about their adherence to a particular denomination 
or dogma. “Muslim” includes both practising believers and numerous 
individuals “who make claims upon a culture, a sensitivity, a spirituality, 
in other words an Islamic ethos without confining their thought to the 
dogmatic closure of a single orthodoxy”.2 
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Religious Education among “Muslim” Adolescents:  
Outline of a Research Project
The findings elucidated below relate to an empirical research project 
conducted in Hamburg under the current working title of “Religious 
education among ‘Muslim’ adolescents in the fields of school and mosque”. 
The approach is an interdisciplinary one: theoretical and methodological 
prerequisites established by empirical research in the social sciences (the 
qualitative approach) are applied in order to transform questions that 
originate in religious studies and the sociology of religion into a research 
project located at the nexus of education and Islamic Studies. Keeping in 
mind the ongoing debate about dominant discourses and past and present 
Western hegemonic ambitions, a temptation that neither intellectuals nor 
scholars are entirely proof against, especially where “Other” cultures or 
religions are the subject of their study, post-colonial critique can be deployed 
to adjust perspectives through critically questioning the implicit and explicit 
systems and frames of reference. Gender as a research perspective provides 
an additional analytical framework. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to unfold the entire research project 
as well as the research process in its methodological details. The following 
pointers should suffice for depicting the broader context of the project: on 
the one hand, it is based on thirty-nine interviews with “Muslim” adolescents 
between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four; on the other hand, twenty 
interviews with professionals mainly in the field of education, theology, 
sociology of religion and related areas, both “Muslim” and non-“Muslim”. 
Thirteen of the adolescents are migrants, though only six could recall the 
experience of migration. The others were either infants or toddlers when 
their parents fled or left their country of origin. The rest are regarded to 
have a “family migration background”. The importance of this distinction is 
evident in the following explication. The adolescents represent a wide range 
of cultures of origin, such as Albanian, Afghan, Algerian, Bosnian, Iranian, 
Kurdish, Lebanese, Syrian, Tunisian and Turkish, as well as some of bi-
cultural origin. Their voices are polyphonic. They offer impressive insights 
into religious experiences and approaches to religion. Their religiosity varies 
between rather orthodox readings of Islam, indifference to or outright 
renunciation of religious issues, agnostic positions, and positions detached 
from either orthodoxy or dogmatic readings, or outside the bounds of 
religious institutions. Of particular interest for this paper is the diversity of 
approaches to religion and/or religiosity beyond dogmatic closure. 
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The findings of the interviews are counterbalanced with participant 
observation during Religious Education classes both at school and in the 
mosque. Furthermore, I will consider the broader context on a national 
and international level as reflected in the manifold discourses concerning 
“Muslims” and Islam in Germany/Europe, religion and religiosity in 
the post-secular situation, as well as the impact on educational concepts. 
Interviewees were selected using the method of “theoretical sampling”, 
combined subsequently with the “snowball sampling” method. 
The research project does not aim to present a typology of religiosity or 
of approaches to Islam. It focuses on decisive aspects concerning religious 
education in two fields of education, namely school and mosque, and the 
approaches to religion for young people that result from this constellation. 
The second focus consists of the pedagogical priorities in terms of religious 
education and whether they are innovative or not. Thirdly, the needs 
and desires that the adolescents articulate themselves are of particular 
interest. Though this point comes last, its central importance needs to be 
emphasised: on the one hand, the findings offer a valuable corrective to one-
sided or even wrong assumptions about “Muslims” in Germany, while on 
the other hand the findings illustrate how ideas about Religious Education 
need to take account of the changing situation of the main stakeholders: the 
young people themselves. Therefore it is important to investigate whether or 
not these needs were integrated in the schools’ and mosques’ concepts, and 
why. This is necessary for finding out whether they answer the demands of 
modernity as they are present in Germany while meeting the requirements 
of a pluriform society.3 Furthermore, the research project should provide 
indications concerning the impact of Religious Education by dealing with 
tradition and “orthodoxy”, since for the parents’ generation the religious 
community corresponded to a “place to save the Turkish-Islamic way of life 
in Germany”.4 This is no longer the case for the third or fourth generations, 
such as the interviewed adolescents. They are looking for other approaches 
to religion. This is due to the changing socio-political context as well as their 
migration background and their ways of dealing with this heritage. All these 
elements lead to the issue of changing discourses reflecting a different way of 
searching for meaning in a pluriform society. 
It is evident that the findings of qualitative research are not representative. 
However, they outline tendencies. In our case they provide insights into 
“Muslim” life in Germany. Although the interviewees do not form a 
homogenous group, they have a lot in common: at the very least they have 
to deal with ascriptions and perceptions, and balance conflicting interests, 
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loyalties and multiple forms of belonging in order to find their place in 
German society. 
Religion and Religiosity: Conceptual Remarks
There have been many attempts, theological and sociological, to define the 
term “religion”, and no consensus has been reached. A satisfying definition 
would address the term in its complete plurality, a demand that appears 
impossible to meet. Nonetheless, defining the concepts of religion and 
religiosity must be an indispensable part of any research project, even if 
the definition falls short of full inclusivity. Its suitability will ultimately be 
judged in the light of the data generated. 
Anyone working with current definitions of religion and religiosity 
will have to enter the controversial debate surrounding what is known 
as the secularisation thesis. Detlev Pollack shows that despite massive 
criticism of this thesis, the empirical data for Europe does not contradict 
it. Furthermore, he emphasises that secularisation in terms of a universal 
and global phenomenon due to processes of modernisation has almost 
been disproven.5 However, the shift of religiosity into the private sphere 
does not – at least in Europe – mean a decline in the social significance of 
religion. This phenomenon is addressed in a further development, namely 
the individualisation thesis:
This thesis more or less accepts the theoretical framework of the 
secularization theory by arguing that the social status or religion 
within modernity is determined by processes of industrialization, 
urbanisation, cultural pluralisation, economic growth, rising 
levels of education and functional differentiation, but it describes 
other consequences for the role of religion in modernity. While 
the secularization theory predicts the inevitable stable decline in 
the social significance of religion as a consequence of processes of 
modernization, the religious individualization thesis concedes that 
the traditional churches and church-related behaviours in modern 
societies have been affected by an obvious decline but they contend 
that this does not mean a loss of religiousness of the individual. On 
the contrary, the decline of the established religious institutions goes 
hand in hand with a rise of individual religiosity.6
The individualisation thesis allows us to demonstrate empirically that 
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individual processes of emancipation and a distancing from institutionalised 
forms of religiosity are taking place in connection to religious orientation 
today. This is, among other things, the result of individual decisions in the 
course of the negotiation processes that are part of all pluriform cultural and 
religious orientations, and the broadening of horizons that modernisation 
brings. Simultaneously, this reflexive modernity is invariably accompanied 
by a loss of established certainties. Fixed points of orientation seem 
irretrievably lost, forcing the individual to make decisions. 
Many authors, amongst them again Detlev Pollack, state that the 
secularisation thesis and the individualisation thesis are the most 
appropriate ways of describing the religious changes in Europe.7 One should 
point out here, though, that when experts in the field speak of religious 
changes in Europe, they are usually referring to developments in Christian 
churches. The dimensions of religion and religiosity that Charles Glock 
developed in 1962 and that are still widely applied, refer to Christianity 
as well as the corresponding model of an institutionalised and established 
religion, which also implies a degree of dogmatic rigour.8 We can assume 
that each implicit frame of reference is equally based on a Christian model. 
Comparable studies of “Muslims” are very rare, be they of majority- or 
minority-“Muslim” societies. In those that do exist, such as Germany’s 2008 
Religionsmonitor which was followed by a representative study dedicated to 
“Muslims” in Germany as the second largest religious group in the country, 
religious change is not the focus of attention.9 Needless to say, a focus on 
change would question the dominant discourse about Islam and “Muslims” 
still considered to be a homogenous entity with a high degree of religiosity.10 
Research with regard to religion and “Muslims” usually concentrates on the 
importance of traditional religious settings and formal aspects of religiosity. 
The German Religionsmonitor also refers to the five dimensions of religiosity 
as developed and defined by Glock:
1. The subjective dimension, which describes religious experience.
2. The ideological dimension, corresponding to agreement with specific 
tenets of faith. 
3. The ritual dimension, relating to adherence to certain religious 
practices and strictures. 
4. The intellectual dimension that corresponds to basic knowledge. 
5. The dimension of social consequences that is equivalent to the impact 
of religiosity on social relationships and interactions.
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This approach can be characterised as rather normative and orientated 
towards formal aspects of religiosity, and it has an immediate impact both 
on questionnaires and on expected results. However, it is still the prevailing 
basis for studies of religiosity, regardless of the above-mentioned processes 
of reflexive questioning also observed in religious matters. To what degree 
the proponents of this understanding of religiosity should face the reproach 
of perpetuating rather than productively deconstructing orthodoxies – be 
it consciously or unconsciously – remains to be seen. The importance this 
approach is accorded in empirical research mirrors the implicit frame of 
reference of Western scholars, namely the “Christian Occident”, as well as 
the need for theoretical and conceptual shifts, particularly in the context of 
“Muslim” approaches to religion and religiosity. In other words: the context 
of institutionalised or organised religious communities needs to look more 
closely at individuals claiming to be religious without a particular affiliation 
to a specific religious community, organisation or dogma. And this does 
not necessarily mean that these individuals do not articulate any feeling of 
belonging at all. Such a shift of perspective will reveal that institution is not 
a sine qua non of a sense of belonging. This at least is expressed implicitly by 
many of the adolescents interviewed in the study referred to in this paper. 
Institutionalised or organised religion – particularly in the societal 
context of a religious minority – implies in most cases readings within 
dogmatic closures that claim to represent the majority of the supposed 
adherents. Research projects that adopt this claim of monopoly of definition 
without questioning it risk being one-sided and more descriptive than 
analytical, quite beside the fact that a huge part of the religious reality of 
“Muslims” is not taken into consideration. This is true not only of Germany 
and societies where “Muslims” represent a minority, but also of societies 
where “Muslims” form the majority. An inclusive approach is promising, 
since it both reflects dominant discourses, and broaches the issue of the 
secularisation dilemma and changes of attitudes and approaches responding 
to socio-cultural change. Simultaneously, it tries to explain current trends 
in religiosity and religious consciousness outside the context of organised 
religious communities and therefore outside the bounds of religious 
institutions. 
The challenge to be faced when leaving the institutional or organised 
context of religion or religious communities is to develop a wider 
understanding of religion and religiosity that embraces the two major 
principles of belonging: firstly, belonging to a concrete religion, religious 
institution and community offers elements of prescribed belief and 
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formalised patterns of behaviour. Secondly, and generally neglected 
in research dealing with religious phenomena, a sense of belonging 
without prescribed paradigms and the support of a religious institution 
or community, but with the support of belonging to a particular culture, 
spirituality or ethos, as mentioned above.11 This element of belonging refers 
to individual approaches, forms and realisations of religiosity. 
The adjective “religious” can refer to both religion and religiosity.12 John 
Cumpsty’s broad understanding of religion provides a helpful incentive 
while searching for different approaches, taking into consideration the 
changing elements concerning believing and belonging, since his focus 
leaves open whether religion takes place within or without the bounds of 
religious institutions: 
Religion is the quest for, maintenance or realization of belonging to 
an ultimate-real. The ultimate-real being that to which the individual 
most feels the need to belong in order to secure, give meaning to, or 
otherwise enrich his or her existence.13
Introducing the notion of belonging leads us to a broader understanding of 
religiosity taking into consideration different layers of meaning. Religiosity 
can refer to a fundamental ability:
to arrive at an integrative meaning relation of your own life and the 
world in such a way that both your own personality and the world 
are experienced and interpreted in the awareness of a transcendent 
reality, which we usually refer to as God.14 
Religiosity can also refer to the individual realisation of the way in which 
religious elements are integrated into the life of an individual. This is closely 
related to the development of the personality of an individual and must be 
understood as a dynamic process. This dynamism and flexibility extend to all 
the dimensions of this religiosity that develop over time. Hemel’s approach 
does not follow the rather normative and formal dimensions developed 
by Glock. Instead, he takes into consideration current trends concerning 
religiosity and religious consciousness outside the context of religious 
communities. This leads us to the following dimensions of religiosity that 
can be connected with learning tasks from an educational perspective:
1. Religious sensitivity that ties into the task of religious perception. 
2. Religious content that ties into the task of religious education in the 
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sense of a differentiated religious view. Here, the cognitive level is 
addressed.
3. Religious communication that ties into the ability to express and 
communicate religious content. 
4. Religious expression that ties into the task of finding and assuming 
your individual religious role. 
These four dimensions give no indication of the relevance that religious 
issues have in an individual’s life. He or she may well possess considerable 
religious sensitivity and communicative competence without necessarily 
according religion a central role in his or her life. It is the dimension of the 
religiously motivated life that indicates the individual relevance of religion. 
By raising the question of the difference between religiosity and faith, 
Hemel touches on a crucial, current issue, especially as it is becoming 
increasingly clear that this difference does not lie in content but in 
identification, that is, the expressed sense of belonging to a defined faith 
community. The idea of faith then takes on a dual reference of its own: it refers 
to individual beliefs as well as social belonging. According to Hemel, the 
impact of the context of and the identification with a religious community 
is important for “believing religiosity” (his phrase) or a concrete religiosity, 
without neglecting the individual features of this religiosity. Although the 
notion of religiosity mainly covers the relation to transcendence, it is not 
necessarily linked to a particular religious denomination. Obviously, this 
interpretation can easily apply to religions other than Christianity. However, 
my data proves that some modifications concerning the understanding 
of believing are necessary, particularly bearing in mind the approach of 
the individualisation thesis. The notion of believing should not equate a 
believer’s identification with a concrete religious community. This aspect 
will be covered by the notion of belonging. This is the moment to mention 
Grace Davie, since it was she who coined the phrase “believing without 
belonging” (BWB).15 The necessity of such a modification is evident when 
we are comparing the adolescents beyond dogmatic closure with those who 
strongly identify with a religious community affiliated with a mosque and 
who emphasise the necessity of following all obligations. This is the major 
feature of their self-image of being a “Muslim” or being religious. Most of 
these adolescents were rather shocked by other “Muslim” peers, as well 
as Christians, professing to be religious without practising or respecting 
religious obligations. Many of them even showed tendencies to condemn 
such behaviour. Understanding the notion of believing as Hemel does 
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would mean for the “Muslim” context that a rather orthodox perspective 
is projected onto the “rest”. Furthermore, the understanding of belonging 
should be enlarged, since many adolescents mention the feeling of belonging. 
They do not refer to a particular community or mosque association but to 
the aspect I mentioned earlier, quoting Mohammed Arkoun: they refer 
to a culture, a sensitivity, a spirituality; in other words, an Islamic ethos. 
However, before we shift our attention to the adolescents themselves, we 
should outline the German context in order to conceive of the reality – 
including the one hidden in discourses – that these youths face. 
“Muslims” in Germany
In 2011, about 3.6 million “Muslims” live in Germany, representing 
approximately 4 per cent of the total population. More than 2 million of 
them are of Turkish descent. Of the Germans from “Muslim” families, 
35.5 per cent were born in the country (679 thousand), with the number 
of German converts, many of them through marriage, accounting for an 
estimated additional 100–120 thousand.16 German citizens with a migration 
background from “Muslim” countries, estimated at around 1 million, 
are not counted in official statistics. It is illuminating how statistics on 
“Muslims” in Germany (or other European countries) are generated: they 
are based on immigration statistics which take the country of origin for a 
presumed religious orientation. Numbers of adherents of other religions 
immigrating from “Muslim” countries, naturalised German citizens from 
“Muslim” countries, and conversions to Islam taking place in Germany are 
estimated.17 Thus, descent, not religious practice or belief, is used as the 
statistical reference. Nonetheless, “Muslims” as a group are assumed to be 
unusually religious and observant.
This quotation from a “Muslim” working professional regards the 
realities of “Muslim” life in Germany: 
I think I got the epithet ‘Muslim’ on 9/11. Before that day, I was all 
kinds of things: the Austrian in Germany, the Persian in Bavaria, the 
Bavarian, the Indian in Bavaria, all kinds of things people imagined I 
might be. But I became a Muslim in people’s eyes on 9/11, everybody 
asked me about it afterwards. […] After 9/11 being ‘Muslim’ is more 
important. When I was invited to a conference as an expert of the 
Max-Planck-Institute, I never was perceived in the past as: ‘She is 
telling this because she is “Muslim”’. They never asked me questions 
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like ‘you as “Muslim”, what do you think?’ I don’t like these questions 
since I think which part of my speech did invite you to ask my religion. 
As if as ‘Muslim’ you have to feel different. Yes, I feel things because 
I am ‘Muslim’, or because my parents are ‘Muslims’, or because I have 
the impression Islam is attacked by ‘Muslims’ and non-‘Muslims’ 
and I have to protect it somehow. The impression that you have to 
defend this part of identity, I think this is something many people 
of ‘Muslim’ societies share. That their reactions are not really due to 
the fact that they are ‘Muslims’ but that they are immigrants, and as 
such part of a minority. It is an awareness of minorities. They always 
remind you that you are different, that you don’t belong to them.18 
These words aptly illustrate a sense of discomfort expressed either explicitly 
or implicitly by many interviewees, and not just by young people. This 
discomfort goes hand in hand with a sense of the need to justify themselves 
for having a “Muslim” identity. Two examples show this: firstly, the increasing 
tendency of “Muslim” organisations in Germany to formally distance 
themselves from terrorist actions through public statements; secondly, the 
question of what “the Muslims” think of Germany’s Basic Constitutional 
Law is gaining greater prominence in the public arena. At the same time, 
these words – just like the quotation marks around the word “Muslim” 
– indicate the effect of ascribed identities and labels on the continuities, 
fractures and reconstructions of self-constructed identity. 
The trend in discourses on “Muslims” is also an important indicator 
of opinions in mainstream society. Here, one must bear in mind that, 
however paradoxical it may seem, no matter how detached from reality 
many discourses on “Muslims” may be, they are nonetheless real, even if 
they are located outside the reality of “Muslims”’ lives and often at odds 
with their state of mind and environment. The importance of the social and 
socio-political context as a matrix for self-definition and the reformulation 
of self-images must not be underestimated. If we look more closely at the 
development of the public discourse that labelled those arriving in Germany 
as “Muslims”, we get the following picture: the term “guest worker” 
(Gastarbeiter) was coined after 1955, when religious affiliation was still off 
the radar. In the 1970s, the expression was replaced by “foreign worker” 
(ausländischer Arbeitnehmer) or “foreigner” (Ausländer). Here, too, the 
actual origin and religion of the worker in question are irrelevant, most 
likely due to the prevailing assumption at the time that they would return 
home after a number of years. In the course of the 1990s, the focus shifted 
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away from the status of worker to that of religious affiliation. “Muslims” 
became the centre of attention. This shift went alongside a broadening of 
focus that moved “Muslim” women into the realm of public debate. They 
entered the picture in a very real sense. At the same time, a newly vigorous 
discourse on integration – connected with changes to citizenship law 
that culminated in the immigration law of 2004 – focused on migrants 
and especially “Muslims”.19 Rising numbers of naturalisations meant that 
“Muslims” increasingly took part in the discourse themselves, as newly 
German former foreigners, Turks, migrants or fellow citizens of foreign 
nationality (ausländische Mitbürger) – a contradiction in terms that nicely 
mirrors the internal contradiction of German attitudes; and could no longer 
simply be categorised as “other”. What nevertheless made them “other” was 
their religion. Overall, we can state that the power of the public discourse 
on “Muslims” in Germany that views them as observant adherents of a 
strictly normative reading of Islam goes almost unchallenged. Even German 
citizenship offers no protection from being labelled with the stigma of the 
cultural and religious “other”. The power to assign this definition lies with 
the majority, which keenly guards this presumed right. This seems to be one 
explanation of why citizenship alone does not make German “Muslims” 
equals. 
Believing and Belonging: the Adolescents’ Voices
The opening question in the interviews was, “What does it mean for you to 
be a ‘Muslim’ today?” It goes without saying that the findings do not provide 
answers, but they might deliver insights into “Muslim” adolescents’ realities, 
and at best they will contribute to a better or different understanding of 
recent dynamics regarding religion and religiosity, particularly believing and 
belonging, two of the most important indicators for religiosity.
The following quotations represent only a selection of the adolescents 
interviewed, namely those whose access to religion and religiosity lies 
beyond the bounds of dogmatic closure and outside the bounds of religious 
institutions. Interestingly, this group includes many who have experienced 
migration. This differentiation between migration experience and a family 
migration background has already been touched upon. The data indicates 
the importance for changes in the relationship between believing and 
belonging as it refers to both a changed context and a horizon of experience 
not shared by German-born “Muslims”. Migration not only changes the 
social context but also the terms of belonging. Social pressures to conform 
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and control are decreased, and this fosters a more individual religiosity and 
private faith. This phenomenon is not limited to Germany and “Muslims”. 
It has been observed by Grace Davie in the UK for the Christian context.20 
Belonging no longer consists of social considerations and the balance of 
advantage and disadvantage, but expresses individual acceptance of the 
fundamental beliefs of a concrete community arrived at by personal choice. 
This kind of development is exemplified by the statement of twenty-one-
year-old Faiz. He was strictly observant when he came to Germany from 
Afghanistan aged fourteen, and considered himself very religious during his 
first two years in the country: 
My parents did not force me, but the environment did. When I 
didn’t go to mosque, it was not my father who asked me about it but 
the neighbour or the teacher. These are things I don’t like, now. Now 
it’s totally different for me, I live in an open society, nobody can force 
me to do something I don’t want to do […] At some point I read my 
second book, I became a little more critical, I struggled with myself 
about what faith and religion really is. Why does religion exist? 
What is it good for? Why should we be religious? Why do I pray 
and for whom? Why should I get up at five in the morning and pray? 
If you are ‘Muslim’ and take religion seriously, you get up. I also got 
up for two years and then I stopped, I didn’t see the sense any more 
and I said to myself: ‘You’re still a “Muslim”, but you stay critical, you 
can critically address Islam and religion as a whole, you don’t need 
to take the one way prescribed by Mohammed or another prophet, 
i.e. you must find your own faith that you can stand up for and that 
fulfils you. You don’t need to follow anyone.’ My father allowed me 
to think the way I want to. I am free to think that this religion has 
those advantages and that one those and to choose the third. That is 
my affair. I can’t say whether I am religious, I can’t say whether I have 
a religion, I can’t say whether I’m an atheist. 21
Faiz, like many other youths with a migration background, speaks of an 
experience that second- or third-generation immigrant children did not 
have: that of a social presence of Islam, an Islamic lifestyle and a social 
“normality” of Islam, in which almost everyone is “Muslim”. In this case, 
the change in social context created new opportunities. This also applies at 
the mental level, where a consciousness opens new spaces and leaves behind 
the idea that religion, tradition, faith and habit need be conterminous. 
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In many cases this consciousness results in changes in believing, which 
is now characterised by a more individual approach to religion and a 
new critical perspective. Belonging, too, is changed in the course of this 
process of negotiation and individual decision. Finally, the relationship 
between believing and belonging shifts. However, there are differences 
from the findings of studies that investigated processes of religious changes 
unfolding in Europe, particularly religious changes concerning Christianity, 
such as the one described by Grace Davie. In the interviews, it emerged 
that belonging refers not only to a specific religious community, usually 
a mosque association in the German context, but also to a broader sense 
of being “Muslim” and belonging to a community of persons who share a 
common culture and spirituality without a concrete adherence to a specific 
orthodoxy. In Faiz’s case, the decision of how to position himself in terms of 
believing and belonging is not yet complete.
Kali, an eighteen-year-old Tunisian who came to Germany at the age 
of sixteen, provides an example of belonging in the sense of belonging to 
a common culture, without believing in concrete tenets of faith. She says: 
I really don’t know whether I’m a ‘Muslim’, but I am – as my father 
puts it – culturally ‘Muslim’. I don’t practise any religion, but I observe 
Ramadan, that is more out of habit. Tradition is something else. I 
don’t know if that means much but I know I would never convert. It’s 
the religion I have. Despite everything that has happened recently, 
even if I’m not observant, it is still my religion.22
Kali expresses a particular aspect of belonging by fasting during the month of 
Ramadan, although her fasting does not refer to the tenets of faith. Obviously 
she does not feel the ambivalence an outside person might perceive. On the 
contrary, she copes very well with it. Later she states vigorously, albeit with 
regret, that she will never enter a mosque, since she would be obliged to wear 
a headscarf: something which she finds unacceptable. 
Many of the youths used expressions such as “if you believe it in your 
heart” or “if your heart is pure” to describe their “Muslimity”. They distance 
themselves from notions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy and are highly 
critical of the mosque associations that structure religious practice in 
Germany. This type of community and this form of belonging seem to be of 
no importance for their faith or their experience of a “Muslim” normality. 
They re-appropriate the Qur’an and the traditions and, in the process, 
reinterpret them to fit their specific context. Their reinterpretations can 
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take on different shapes, though as a rule without recourse to the religious 
authorities present in mosques. Instead, they use modern communication 
media to access information on religious questions, to research literature 
and to exchange views. They meet to read the Qur’an together in the spirit of 
a halqa, and many of them, especially women, consciously practise positively 
modern forms of ijtihad. It is interesting that they do not allow polarities 
and paradoxes to disconcert them, but instead use the potential that they 
find in their position between two simultaneous systems of reference, which 
they do not experience as contradictory. 
“If you believe it in your heart, you don’t need to prove to anyone that 
you are a faithful ‘Muslim’, because as a believer I know that God sees it,” 
as nineteen-year-old Hamburg-born Tyson puts it.23 Such a position can 
be helpful when you are trying to understand inner conflicts such as the 
question of whether to wear a headscarf and risk losing an apprenticeship or 
whether to delay this choice and ensure yourself a better education. Another 
matter is adherence to prayer hours as well as school work despite the fatigue 
this entails. In most cases, religious considerations take second place to other 
concerns, and are frequently put off until later in good conscience. 
I will close this section with a statement from twenty-two-year-old Leyla, 
who comes from a mixed German–Turkish family and was socialised in both 
cultures and religions. I choose this example not least because the number of 
people from bicultural and bi-religious families is on the increase in Europe’s 
pluriform societies, and we should expect interesting developments in 
terms of believing and belonging. Leyla represents a specific form of hybrid 
identity emerging through cultural and religious cross-interferences in the 
immediate environment, holding considerable transgressive potential that 
goes hand in hand with a renewal of established structures. 
Well, part of my identity may be that I think of it as equally valid 
because I feel I somehow always feel bicultural, bilingual, that 
everything has two sides, that may be part of my identity. Maybe that 
is also the reason why I can always fit it together, somehow, that gives 
me a bit of freedom maybe, just to say I can believe this way […] Yes, 
that is my freedom in a way. […] But it has always been like that, 
I wasn’t aware of it, but it gives you a good feeling to somehow be 
comfortable with yourself.24
This approach to believing and belonging should hold quite a few challenges 
to theologians and other guardians of orthodoxy. 
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Conclusion
The selected adolescents’ voices are almost self-explanatory. They point 
out simultaneously that an intensive empirical study of young “Muslims”, 
who are sadly neglected in many academic contexts, can contribute to an 
overdue shift in perspective on the importance of Islam in the context of 
reflexive modernity, and the changing needs of believing and belonging. 
The few examples presented above show that it is not only religion that 
influences people, but that people also shape religion and believing. Even 
though the frame of reference might be unclear or does not correspond to 
what would be expected from “Muslims”, we should take the phenomenon 
into consideration. 
Furthermore, the data proves that in many cases educational processes 
are taking place, a concept introduced and developed by empirical research 
on education that might open up a horizon for further research: 
Education (Bildung), (i.e. what educational action should enable and 
promote) can be understood as a process of basic transformation of 
the way persons behave with regard to the world and to themselves. 
Bildung in terms of such transformations always then takes place (or 
better: can take place) when humans make experiences that cannot 
be coped with using the existing means and options. Formulated 
differently: Bildungs-processes exist in the emergence of new forms, 
new figures of world views and self concepts in dealing with issues 
that cannot be processed by the existing figures of world views and 
self concepts.25 
This kind of transformation also affects forms of believing and belonging, 
and reveals dynamics which could be interpreted as an individual integration 
of the achievements of intellectual modernity as well as a way of coping 
with a radical plurality of meaning. This kind of integrative effort is often 
experienced as emancipatory by the adolescents themselves.
The ultimate consequences this will have on theological and educational 
issues are as of now impossible to predict. One thing is certain, however: 
even though secularisation processes will not displace individual religiosity, 
we must expect significant changes that both Islamic theology and 
“Muslim” associations and organisations will need to react to; ideally, in 
the spirit of modernity, in a multi-perspective approach that will put an 
end to the shadowy existence of the paradox and that will lead us to a more 
comprehensive vision of religious change.
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Veiling and Unveiling Muslim Women:  
State Coercion, Islam, and  
the “Disciplines of the Heart” 
Malika Zeghal
As emphasised in the works of Mohammed Arkoun, theological and 
interpretive questions surrounding Islam must be read – as in any other 
religious tradition – not only as textual issues but also as political stakes.1 This 
is particularly true of the concept of reform (iṣlāḥ) in the history of Islam, 
a concept at the heart of the Prophet’s mission: “I only came to reform” (in 
urīdu illā al-iṣlāḥ) (Qur’an 11:88). Iṣlāḥ, or the operation of re-ordering, 
correcting and transforming necessitates an interpretation of the current 
situation and a vision for a future one. Its object may be the individual as 
much as the collective entity or institution. As such, the enterprise of reform 
is not only the aim of individual religious reformers who write essays about 
the purpose and methods of reform, but is also among the interests and 
concerns of the modern state that crafts policies. 
This paper will focus on the ways in which, in Tunisia, the postcolonial 
state elites, in their projects to build a cohesive nation and to reform their 
society, referred to Islam to mould specific domains of life, and developed, 
in the process, theological lines of reasoning and justifications. Among 
countries of the Middle East, independent Tunisia’s governments are often 
seen as having enacted policies shaped by a strong secularist ideology and 
having relegated Islam to the private sphere.2 Contrary to this common 
analysis, the case of Tunisia illustrates that far from being “secularist” 
128 the construction of belief
states circumscribing religion to the private domain, authoritarian Middle 
Eastern states often defined themselves as “Muslim” states and produced 
public theological definitions that were instrumental in their enterprises of 
reforming their societies and defining their national identity. One privileged 
domain of intervention for Middle Eastern postcolonial reformist state 
elites is that of “the woman question”. In Tunisia, the nationalist movements 
as well as the post-independence state elites aimed to improve women’s 
rights. Their project defined women as full participants in the nation and 
helped define all Tunisians, men and women, as citizens who shared the 
same national values, in particular their attachment to the new state. 
The “womans question” revolved around issues of gender equality in 
education, gender segregation, veiling, and polygamy and, as explained by 
Deniz Kandiyoti, “coincided with a broader agenda about ‘progress’ and 
the compatibility between Islam and modernity”.3 Kandiyoti describes 
two sides to the debate on women in the Middle East: on the one hand, a 
“secularist elite” with “progressive aspirations”, and on the other hand those 
who “expressed in Islamic terms” a “hankering for cultural authenticity.”4 
This article will show that this dichotomy, whereas used by many actors, 
was also highly unstable and dissimulated deep convergences between these 
two positions. The progressive aspirations of nationalist and state elites 
were framed within a repertoire of cultural authenticity that often included 
Islamic terms. As for the Islamist trend that emerged in the 1970s, its activists 
also articulated their conception of the “woman question” in the vocabulary 
that the nation state elites had built to speak of the “Tunisian woman” as a 
virtuous citizen.
The period I will concentrate on starts in the late 1920s – when Tunisian 
nationalism against French occupation had matured into an organised 
movement – and ends in 1987, the year that marked the end of Habib 
Bourguiba’s regime. I will focus on Bourguiba’s shifting position on veiling, to 
help us understand how the veil became a complex and multilayered political 
issue in Tunisia over the course of the twentieth century. I will emphasise 
Bourguiba’s continuities with Muslim reformist thought – in particular the 
Tunisian al-Tahar al-Haddad’s writings since the 1930s – and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, how the Islamist writings of the 1980s echoed the Bourguibian 
tropes about the Tunisian woman. In its reforming enterprise, the Tunisian 
independent state articulated a language and conception of religion that 
moulded themselves into older reformist tropes. These tropes were later 
re-appropriated by Islamist movements in their political opposition to the 
Tunisian government. If the political positions of state representatives and 
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Islamist opposition are conspicuously different on subjects such as the veil, 
they nonetheless operate under the same regime of thought regarding the 
relationships between nation, religion and reform. I will argue that the 
opposing views of the state’s elite and Islamists on the subject of women’s 
dress are in fact formulated within similar reformist vocabularies regarding 
female subjectivity, the place of women in the world, and the intentionality 
of religious norms. I will argue that state elites and Islamist activists shared 
similar conceptions of “religion” as circumscribed domains of interpretation 
and efficacy, which were in many ways comparable to the reformist ideas of 
the first part of the twentieth century. 
1. The Controversy of 1929: Nationalism, Westernisation,  
and the Islamic Identity of Tunisia
On 11 January 1929, the francophone Tunisian nationalist newspaper 
L’Etendard Tunisien published an article by Habib Bourguiba, then a young 
nationalist activist and member of the old Destour party. The publication 
of the article marked one of the heated moments of the “battle of the veil”. 
This article was Bourguiba’s account of a meeting held at L’Essor, a literary 
socialist club, where he participated in a fiery debate with Tunisian and 
French socialists – among them Muhammad No‘man and Joachim Durel – 
about the wearing of the veil by Tunisian women. In this debate, Bourguiba 
defended the wearing of the face veil, in particular against “a certain Miss 
Ourtani”,5 whom he accused of belonging to a group of “heroic apostles of 
dress feminism” supported by the French socialists.6 Referring to another 
Tunisian young female activist, he added not without irony: “Ms. Menchari, 
a charming young lady, came, her face uncovered, and wanted to move us 
about the fate of her unfortunate sisters who are deprived of air and light 
and live under the triple weight of ignorance, gossip and the veil.”7 Manoubia 
Ouertani and Habiba Menchari were indeed young feminist activists who, as 
early as 1924, had defended the possibility of unveiling, and they themselves 
had appeared unveiled in public.8 If Bourguiba stood against them, it was 
not because he was against sufūr (unveiling); it was because he wanted to 
publicly defend what he called “the Tunisian personality” (al-shakhsiyya 
al-tunisiyya) against the coloniser’s intent to Westernise Tunisia, which 
had been under French protectorate since 1881. Indeed, for the Bourguiba 
of 1929, the veil could not be abandoned as French socialists proposed, 
because it was a signifier of the identity of a nation under occupation. 
Hence, to defend the veil was to perform an act of resistance against the 
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coloniser. Bourguiba interpreted the wearing of the veil as a symbol of the 
nation, rather than as a religious obligation ordered by the revealed texts or 
a freely chosen way of dressing that resulted from voluntary and deliberate 
individual choices by women. 
Bourguiba did not see the veil as a religious prescription. He considered 
it a custom (‘āda) that had been anchored in the practices of the national 
community for a long time and that had become part of the mores of his 
society. Bourguiba’s justification made the veil the symbol of a collective 
tradition rather than an individual preference. 
We have in front of us a custom anchored for centuries in our mores, 
evolving with them at the same pace, which is quite slowly. The 
mores of a group, be it the family, the tribe or the nation, are what 
is most inherent, the most irremediably subjective to this group and 
what distinguishes it from all others. In a word, it is what makes its 
proper individuality, its personality … Is it in our interest to hasten 
the disappearing of our mores? … My response, given the very special 
circumstances we live is without doubt: No!9 
Bourguiba defined the concept of “personality” (shakhsiyya) again, when 
addressing Mr Durel: 
The unity of territory, the community of belief, language, customs, 
past, the joys lived together, the failures and humiliations experienced, 
all of this according to Mr. Durel does not contribute to create, 
between the children of this country, any sentiment of solidarity, 
no idea of patria. … Reality is entirely different. This is because the 
action of the individual on customs is extremely limited.10 
To build a nationalist ideology, Bourguiba drew upon the concept of a 
“national personality”, which he defined as a community of shared practices, 
sentiments and dispositions that crystallised through history and could be 
symbolised by a custom such as women’s wearing of the veil. The practice 
was so firmly anchored that it could not be eliminated by the efforts of a few 
individuals. Bourguiba would later affirm – and attempt to show – that it 
would take the power of an independent state to uproot the custom of veil 
wearing. 
His reaction contrasted with other opponents to unveiling, who argued 
that by abandoning the veil, Tunisian women would lose their respectability 
and fall into immorality and prostitution, subsequently leading Tunisian 
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society into corruption. They had described the veil as a woman’s “religious 
duty”.11 But for Bourguiba, the veil was not a device protecting women 
and defending the integrity of a certain moral order. He saw it as a social 
problem, even while defending its subsistence. In his 1929 article, he wrote, 
dismissing the veil’s religious meaning: “I believe that it is relevant to look at 
the subject from a social point of view, the only point of view that presents 
an interest.”12 
In the words of Bourguiba, the veil was the sign of women’s “unconscious 
atavism”, but it was the veil of the colonised, and as such, it had to remain: 
The day when the Tunisian woman, going out unveiled, does not 
experience the strange impression that is as a scream of revolt coming 
from her unconscious atavism, on that day, the veil will disappear 
by itself without danger, because what it will be the symbol of will 
have disappeared. But for the moment, we are not there yet. The best 
proof of this is that at the end of the meeting, none of the Muslim 
ladies who came to listen dared to throw their veils.13 
However, in his 1929 article he had already hinted at the necessity of unveiling 
in a society that had become independent, an idea that he developed later 
during his presidency: “Evolution must happen, otherwise, it is death. It 
will happen, but without a break, without a rupture. We must maintain in 
the perpetual evolution of our personality a unity through time that can be 
continually perceived by our conscience.”14 Ms Ouertani had thrown off her 
veil in a dramatic gesture during the debate at L’Essor. Bourguiba recognised 
that in principle the gesture was legitimate, and even a question of life and 
death, but he also warned that it was premature. 
Whereas Bourguiba described the veil as an element of the Tunisian 
personality, another Tunisian reformer, al-Tahar al-Haddad (1899–1935), 
who studied at the Zaytuna between 1911 and 1923 and frequented the 
reformist milieus,15 developed a notion of the veil as an obstacle to women’s 
participation in public life, announcing Bourguiba’s later shift of viewpoint. 
One year after the 1929 debate at L’Essor, Haddad published the controversial 
book Our Woman in the Shari‘a and Society.16 This book is relevant for my 
argument not only because it contains a justification for unveiling that 
Bourguiba would reassert after independence, but also because it deploys 
a line of reasoning about Islam as a potent religion (dīn) with a deep and 
positive impact on people’s lives. This idea of religion as an instrument of 
social change and progress became instrumental for reformists who wanted 
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to link projects of improving women’s status with Islam and was redeployed 
by Bourguiba in the context of the postcolonial authoritarian state. 
In the preface of his polemical book, Haddad wrote a long meditation 
on Islam and its role in social reform: 
The reform of our social condition is necessary for all aspects of our 
life (wujūh al-ḥayāt), and in particular for what touches our existence 
in life (wujūdinā fī al-ḥayāt). I see with certainty that Islam is not 
an obstacle against reform (iṣlāḥ) as the accusations proclaim. On 
the contrary, it is the religion relevant for reform (dīnuhu al-qawīm), 
and the inextinguishable source of reform. As for the decline of the 
Muslim world, it has no other cause than superstitions and customs 
that we have grown to like over a long time.17 
Haddad saw Islam as an intrinsic source of vitality. Islam was “the eternal 
book of life and the regulating principles for useful work” (dustūr al-‘amal 
al-nāfi‘).18 He made Islam a set of “regulating principles” (dustūr) that would 
prove to be “useful”. The use of the word dustūr was not politically neutral 
since the old nationalist Tunisian Destour party (al-ḥizb al-ḥurr al-dustūrī) 
had been established in 1920, demanding the drafting of a constitution for 
Tunisia. For Haddad, who had become a member of the Central Committee 
of the Destour in 1923, Islam had a social and political role to play in order 
to provide guiding principles for social life. In addition, for Haddad and 
Muslim reformers of his time, Islam’s meaning had to be recalibrated if it 
were to define the principles guiding social life. Hence, it was important for 
them to explain what Islam said as well as what it did not say. 
On this basis, Islam’s functionality in life could be established. There 
was a double purpose in Haddad’s enterprise of reform, which could be 
generalised to individual and state reformers of his as well as later generations: 
first, a principle of delimitation of the faith’s meaning, and second, a process 
of importing this meaning to the real world. There was therefore at the same 
time a limiting aspect (the circumscribing of meaning through a specific 
interpretive orientation) and an expanding one (the implementation of this 
meaning in society). Haddad, who was examining what Islam said and did 
not say about women, believed that in order to reform society in the light of 
the principles of Islam, it was necessary to sift out social practices that did not 
belong to the religion. Prescriptions such as polygamy or the face veil were 
not “inherent to the religion”.19 He distinguished between “the essence”20 of 
Islam and the prescriptions that could disappear without harming Islam. For 
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Haddad, laws had two essential aims: “noble morality and the person’s vital 
needs”.21 This was because Haddad saw the Qur’an as intrinsically related to 
life (ḥayāt); not only was Islam to be a constant source of life, but also “the 
[Qur’an’s] shari‘a was a result of life evolving, and not chapters formulated 
in advance to be imposed on life”.22 The revelation had thus been produced 
in response to questions emerging in everyday life and had been applied in 
life. Haddad felt that this dialectical relationship between religion and life – 
which implicitly made religion a humanly mediated set of principles – had 
to be reactivated.
One should note that Haddad, who had published an earlier essay on 
the condition of Tunisian workers and who himself came from a poor 
background, was deeply preoccupied with poverty, which he linked to social 
backwardness.23 In Our Women in the Shari‘a and Society, he describes at 
length the difficult living conditions of poor families and links this situation 
to the harsh treatment of women by their fathers and husbands. In these 
descriptions, Haddad relates misery to the “disorder” of the home.24 He 
mentions domestic accidents, unattended children and the disputes between 
wives in polygamous families. This disorder, according to Haddad, drove the 
husband to lead a private life out of the home: “the wife, therefore, finds 
herself isolated in a world of worries and suffering.”25 A reform of family 
life, in which respect and love between wife and husband would prevail, 
was therefore seen as the basis for the reform of society. Haddad defines 
marriage as “a sentiment (āṭifa) and a duty (wājib), the coming together of 
two people and reproduction (ta‘mīr)”.26 To extend the idea of sentiment, 
he quotes Qur’an 30:21 (Sūra al-Rūm), which uses the word mawadda 
(love) and describes marriage as a relation of reciprocal trust and intimacy 
through the idea of “tranquility of the soul with another soul” (sukūn al-nafs 
bi’l-nafs).27 
Haddad’s adversaries fiercely rejected this evocation and public 
recognition of “sentiment” as a basis for marriage. They identified several 
reasons for their rejection of Haddad, such as his treatment of Muhammad’s 
prophecy and his imitation of Westerners, if not his “alliance” with Christian 
missionaries; but one argument stood as crucial: they did not favour the 
public deployment of sentiments produced by the visibility of women’s 
uncovered bodies in society. Shaykh Ibn Murad, a high-ranking scholar from 
the Zaytuna University, in his response to Our Women, addressed Haddad: 
You find repugnant the education we give to the Muslim girl on 
the basis of the reserve (ḥayā) we teach her and that is one of the 
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branches of the faith. You claim that it kills sentiment (āṭifa). Let 
this sentiment die … Let us bury this sentiment and not raise our 
daughters on adornment (tabarruj).28 
After independence, Bourguiba followed Haddad in his attempt to mould 
a new female public persona. Through his own public relations with 
Tunisian women, he often exemplified a public intimacy showcasing a 
public persona of “the Tunisian woman” and what her virtuous behaviour 
should be. Indeed, Bourguiba did not produce a liberal conception of the 
role of women. He rather envisioned a shift that the Tunisian woman had 
to experience – from a position of seclusion and isolation to a position from 
which she could communicate with the world around her. Women were 
expected to participate in the public arena, and this participation proceeded 
from the construction of family as based on reciprocal relationships and 
shared sentiments between husband and wife. Bourguiba later wrote in his 
justification for the 1956 Personal Status Code:29 
The family is the basis of society. It lacks all happiness and harmony if 
it is not founded on a man and a woman who are united by love and 
respect … With our new reform, we do not only want to elevate the 
woman’s level, but we want also to elevate the level of the Tunisian 
family.30 
Hence, according to both Haddad and Bourguiba, the progress of society 
was irremediably linked to a reform of the family, of the woman’s role 
and status in it, leading to her integration in a public world of reciprocal 
relationships.
Haddad describes the face veil (which he calls at times ḥijab, at others 
niqab) as the device wrongly used to protect men and women from 
temptation: a “material barrier”,31 the “greatest separation between man 
and woman that prevents them to choose one another when they want 
marriage”32 and “a social protection against evil”.33 His critique takes a 
symbolically harsh tone when he writes: “There is not that big a difference 
between the niqab the woman uses to cover her face to prevent debauchery, 
and the muzzle that we put on a dog so that it does not bite the passers-by.”34 
For Haddad, the veil conjures the idea of separation, closure and lack of trust, 
which prevents a woman from opening up to the world and in particular 
from having access to knowledge, be it the knowledge of her future husband, 
technical and scholarly knowledge or her very consciousness of the world. 
Therefore, unveiling is an act by which a woman can access awareness and 
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knowledge: rather than being imprisoned in the home, her body must be 
located in the world to allow contact with society. Haddad also denounces 
segregation between a husband and wife at home, strangely relating this issue 
to the wearing of the veil, which in principle was not worn at home among 
family members: “The use of the veil has led the husband to lead a private 
life (ḥayāt khāṣṣa) outside of his home, a life that women do not know.”35 
This absence of a shared experience – or private life – between husband and 
wife could not logically be related to the wearing of the veil. The veil was 
in fact, in the work of Haddad, a metonymy for the broader problem of 
gender segregation and female seclusion, which were the themes that most 
preoccupied Haddad. The husband’s absence produces an “abyss of death”36 
for the family and a life of “debauchery”, “immoral activities, drinking, 
gambling and other distractions” for the husband.37 Haddad also relates the 
wearing of the veil to what he sees as problematic sexual practices that occur 
with gender segregation: “It is well established that hiding women from men 
has been one of the main factors in the spread of homosexuality, lesbianism 
and onanism.”38 Hence, not only will unveiling integrate women into social 
life, but it will also provide true intimacy in the home and reinvigorate the 
relationships between men and women within their families. 
While Haddad’s project of improving the status of Tunisian women was 
based in part on the idea of liberty (ḥurriyya), his essay does not recommend 
individualism and freedom to choose any type of dress. He did not defend 
a Western liberal conception of women, and while he saw the movement 
of unveiling as “triggered by European civilisation”, he was against a simple 
imitation of European ways.39 He was impressed by the level of education 
of European women, and wanted Tunisian women to emulate them in this 
regard, but he also considered western influence as harmful: “our sick society 
… is under the onslaught of a transformation that we do not understand 
and that completely assimilates us into a European trend dominating our 
current situation. We can only emerge alive from this … if we cling to our 
inherent strength.”40 Islam, he argues, is the religion of freedom (dīn al-
ḥurrīya), but Islam “accepts only the servitude towards Allah”.41 Although 
Haddad defends unveiling, “I will only accept emancipation in the limits 
of the law and morality.”42 Women will have to learn how to manage their 
home, which should be for them a “function” (waẓīfa) and not a “prison”.43 
The goal of their emancipation is to repair the “pain and injury” (alam wa 
jurḥ) that is felt by women as well as men, not the realisation of a liberal type 
of society.44
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2. “A Strong State Deeply Rooted in the Hearts”:  
How Can a State Shape Individual Preferences?
While Haddad was an individual thinker and scholar of Islam, Bourguiba 
was a political activist who became a statesman. Early in independent 
Tunisia, Bourguiba took the reins of the state and authoritatively imposed 
reforms on Islamic institutions: he standardised the legislation related to 
family matters with the codification of personal status law in 1956, closed 
down the University of Zaytuna, and nationalised the Habous (religious 
endowments). In this paper I do not intend to evaluate Bourguiba’s policies 
towards women in their effects on Tunisian social life, but rather, I attend to 
the subtle meanings deployed by Bourguiba when he dealt with the question 
of the veil, and to the personal proximity he built with Tunisian women to 
mobilize them in favour of the new Tunisian state. The ideas he developed 
with regard to the status of women were very close to Haddad’s, but during 
these reforms, Haddad’s name was not officially mentioned. Haddad had 
died young and politically isolated, his book having become the object of the 
ire of prominent ‘ulama’ of the Zaytuna.45 Bourguiba imposed his reforms 
authoritatively, and perhaps did not want to take the risk of invoking such a 
contentious figure as Haddad. 
Echoing the writings of Haddad, often word for word, the president 
of Tunisia shifted his earlier position on the veil and tried to persuade 
Tunisian women to unveil. His general views on the veil did not change: it 
was still a reproachable custom, the weight of which could not be lifted by 
mere individual efforts. However, the context had changed: a strong state 
was now presiding over the destiny of the Tunisian nation, and this state 
was robust enough to uproot such “atavistic” practices as the wearing of the 
veil. Within the larger context of state authoritarian reforms of religious 
institutions, Bourguiba attempted to convince Tunisians of the legitimacy 
of unveiling in his speeches as well as in his public performances, during 
which he unveiled Tunisian women in the streets. 
In a speech on 5 December 1957, Bourguiba tackled a combination of 
issues that demonstrate the close relationship between reform, the strength 
of a state apparatus and the building of an emotional relationship between 
the state and its subjects. He developed arguments about the state’s power 
of persuasion, the attachment of Tunisians to that state, and the question of 
the veil. He linked “the country’s prosperity and the individuals’ liberties” to 
the existence of “a strong state, deeply rooted in the hearts”.46 At this time, 
French troops were still evacuating the south of Tunisia. Bourguiba, the 
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Council’s president since 25 July 1957, was still affirming his power: “I know 
that my words are listened to, that they have an effect and that my directives 
are followed.”47 
The metaphor of “a state deeply rooted in the hearts” expressed 
Bourguiba’s desire for a direct and close relationship between the state and 
the Tunisian people. The moulding of a personality for a nation was possible 
only through state institutions: “There is one essential condition to safeguard 
a people’s personality. It is necessary to have political power.”48 The highest 
representative of the state was also attending to the deepest emotions of 
Tunisians. He wanted them not only to feel emotionally attached to their 
nation – which they had become already – but, more deeply, to have at heart 
the best interests of the institution of the state. In a sense, women, more 
than men, were to illustrate the emotional attachment of Tunisians to the 
Bourguibian state, through the physical proximity Bourguiba built with 
them in public performances, as I will describe. This physical proximity was 
infused with a sense of hierarchy and emotional attachment. At the end of 
his speech, Bourguiba introduced the issue of women under the rubric of 
“social problems”, as he had done in 1929, and mentioned resistances to his 
enterprises of persuasion regarding the veil.49 
We have been informed of satisfying progress in the movement that 
liberates the Tunisian woman from the veil. Nonetheless, it seems 
that there is still some resistance. I would like the public opinion to 
understand exactly what our aim is with this reform. Statistics reveal 
that sex crimes are decreasing. It is remarkable that the cases that are 
still occurring precisely only implicate those young women who are 
raised within traditional biases and in seclusion.50 
As in Haddad’s book Our Women in the Shari‘a and Society, the veil and 
women’s segregation were related in Bourguiba’s speech to immoral and 
criminal behaviour, through his reference to sex crimes. In the same speech, 
the veil became “a horrible rag that has nothing to do with religion”.51 
Unveiling was not imposed through a law by Bourguiba at that time, and 
nothing close to legal dress codes was put in place in Tunisia until at least 
1981. Rather, the Bourguibian strategy was a subtle mix of pedagogy and 
legal change. However, Bourguiba also considered direct coercion. From the 
same 1957 speech: 
At the social level, we understand the repugnance of aged women 
to abandon an ancient habit but we can only regret the obstinacy of 
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parents who constrain young women to wear the veil to go to school. 
We even see civil servants go to work rigged in this horrible rag. We 
continuously repeat that it is abandoned in Muslim countries and 
that it has nothing to do with religion.52
He continued with implicit threats of coercion: 
Parents should understand that we want the good of their children 
and that it is not suitable to stand against an important reform. They 
better not push us towards the means of constraint that we have 
refused to use so far.53 
The iṣlāḥ (reform), supported and implemented by the state, assured the 
“protection” of the “virtue and honour” of women, and was to be “more 
efficient than the protection of a miserable rag”.54 These statements were 
repeated over the years, in continuity with the metaphors of life and death 
Bourguiba had used in 1929 and that were present throughout Haddad’s 
essay.55 In a 1959 interview in the Tunisian magazine Faiza, Bourguiba 
described the veil as “a sinister shroud that hides the face”.56 He associated 
state reforms with life and progress, and communicated and implemented 
them in rather illiberal ways that domesticated religious institutions and 
produced state pedagogies on the proper bodily conduct. The subtle, 
ambiguous mix of physical and psychological persuasion with the threat of 
coercion that Bourguiba used vis-à-vis Tunisian women and their families, 
is reflected in a documentary about the emancipation of Tunisian women 
aired on French television on 8 January 1968.57 The fifty-minute black-and-
white film weaves footage of Bedouin women in remote areas, working in 
their traditional garb, with scenes of women wearing the urban traditional 
veil (safsārī) in the city, and women from the elite wearing sleeveless dresses 
– “the bourgeoisie of Tunis,” says the narrator, “who have not worn veils for 
a long time” – in the presidential palace in Carthage at a reception, being 
welcomed by President Bourguiba. Scenes of Bourguiba unveiling women 
on 13 August 1967, Tunisian’s Woman’s Day, help us to understand state 
reforms as a practice that deployed itself through direct, local interactions 
between the state’s elite and ordinary Tunisians. 
On the side of a road in an unknown location, where Bourguiba is 
probably visiting a town, Bedouin women in traditional dress are welcoming 
him. (Properly speaking, their dress is not a veil, since a safsārī, a long piece 
of white fabric attached at the waist and covering the whole body, would be 
impractical for women working in the fields.) Urban women wearing the 
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safsārī are also welcoming Bourguiba, who is guarded by policemen. It is 
difficult to say whether the crowds have gathered spontaneously. Bourguiba 
was popular at that time, but these events were closely monitored and served 
as propaganda to appear in newspapers and on the radio. 
To understand the performance of that day, it is important to comprehend 
the shape and use of the traditional urban veil that Tunisian women wore 
at that time. The safsārī provides some flexibility for a woman to cover and 
uncover because it is held on the head and shoulders by the hand or teeth 
rather than by pins. With a quick move of the hand, it is easy to cover and 
uncover one’s face and shoulders. 
Facing this crowd of women, Bourguiba embraces several Bedouin 
women and their children. The women seem spontaneously to go towards 
him and embrace him. He then directs his attention to a woman in a 
safsārī, and uncovers her head. This gesture seems easy and is not met 
with any resistance. The woman is holding the safsārī over her head with 
her hand, and the veil’s fabric slides down her hair. The woman smiles, but 
seems slightly embarrassed, and attempts to put her veil back on her head. 
Bourguiba uncovers her again in the same motion. This series of successive 
gestures, a silent yet public exchange through physical contact between the 
anonymous woman in the midst of the applauding crowd and the president, 
concludes with the woman remaining unveiled. We do not know if she 
covered herself again when the camera stopped filming, but it is a fact that 
the wearing of the safsārī by Tunisian women became uncommon in Tunisia 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a sign that the changes effected by the 
Bourguibian elite certainly had an impact on women’s dressing practices 
and gender relations in Tunisia. In the documentary, the atmosphere seems 
calm, and some policemen guarding the event are smiling and laughing 
with the women. The president continues to unveil some of the women 
before leaving with his motorcade. Revealing to the public and the camera 
the dresses they wear beneath their safsārī, the women seem happy. In this 
moment of public intimacy with Bourguiba, the process of unveiling does 
not seem to cause them pain. This atmosphere of liberation and happiness 
hides the enterprise of soft coercion at play in the public performance of 
unveiling. The unveiled women seem attracted to and entirely persuaded 
by – even if after slight hesitation – the path of change that Bourguiba has 
opened to them. 
While at the first glance the film does not suggest imposition or 
submission, the presence of the policemen and the slight hesitation of one 
woman subtly indicate that the state project of liberation of women was a 
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pedagogical endeavour disseminating new types of disciplines. A change 
of habitus – represented by the “habit” of the veil that was ingrained in 
body and mind – had to be brought about by the seemingly gentle physical 
intervention of the state’s highest representative. Bourguiba’s gesture was to 
be taken as a model to be replicated by all Tunisian women. 
The desire for such a general transformation was resented in some 
milieus, celebrated in others, but most importantly for the argument of 
this paper, the desire for transformation was moulded by a state that was 
progressive in the sense that it aimed for progress, but was not democratic 
and liberal. The state did not attempt to hide its illiberal nature, and its 
representatives saw their function as to shape the preferences and behaviours 
of their population authoritatively. Important elements of patriarchy and 
conservatism accompanied this vision, which was not necessarily based on a 
conception of the nation as a collection of free individuals.58 Family values in 
particular had to be preserved as well as a sense of morality, echoing Shaykh 
Ibn Merad’s appeal to ḥayā’ (a sense of modesty). For instance, in 1966, 
Bourguiba’s speech to the National Union of Tunisian Women addressed 
women on the necessity of adhering to moral behaviour: “one has to know 
how to discipline her heart.”59 Bourguiba’s woman, like Haddad’s, was 
expected to shape her behaviour according to the reformers’ conceptions of 
dignity and morality.
3. The “New” Veil: How State and Islamist Opposition  
Share a Reformist Stance
In the early 1970s, a new type of dress appeared in Tunisian towns and cities. 
Women were wearing a garment that was neither the face veil that Bourguiba 
was still protecting in 1929, nor the safsārī or any traditional type of veiling. 
It was the hijab we know today: a short veil covering the hair but not the 
face, secured with pins, and combined with a long dress or trousers. The 
hijab was not worn as an instrument of seclusion in the home and did not 
prevent women from going to school or from attending the workplace, since 
it was precisely in these public domains that women in this new attire made 
themselves visible. It showed itself publicly, exemplifying a new version of 
religiosity that was urban, young and educated. It was no longer the “horrible 
rag” that Bourguiba had associated with rural life and ignorance, but a sign 
that women had found the veil to be a relevant dress for the public arena. 
The varying interpretations of the wearing of the veil – as a way to discipline 
oneself into piety, an instrument for emancipation, a tool for patriarchal 
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reproduction, a sign of female submission, an instrument of liberation – are 
numerous and diversified. I will not explore them in this paper,60 but will 
instead underline the changes in the political elite’s perceptions of the veil 
and the possibility for these meanings to form a multilayered, complex set 
of interpretations. 
In the 1970s, when the new veil appeared in Tunisia, it surprised most of 
the intellectual and political elite, who saw it as the “symbol” of the nascent 
Islamist political opposition who wanted to signal its new power, and not 
as a way to public piety and virtue on the part of veiled women. The ways 
in which different segments of society viewed the hijab were in fact linked 
with the state of relations between government and the Islamist opposition. 
In 1981, an administrative decree (no. 108)61 that forbade the wearing of the 
hijab in schools, described it as “confessional and sectarian”.62 This was two 
years after the Iranian revolution, when Tunisia was witnessing the influence 
of foreign Islamist movements within its borders, as well as the emergence, 
since the end of the 1970s, of a potent domestic oppositional Islamist 
movement. This decree was not applied in any systematic way, but was used 
at random by the authorities when dealing with the Islamist opposition, in 
particular in secondary schools and on college campuses. 
To understand how the Islamist opposition dealt with the question 
of veiling and related to Bourguiba’s interpretation, I will refer to Rashid 
al-Ghannushi’s writings on the Tunisian woman. In his book The Muslim 
Woman in Tunisia,63 he develops a critique of the submission of women to 
men. Echoing Haddad and Bourguiba, he is critical of the conception of a 
woman as a person lacking strength and autonomy. However, his focus on 
the definition of the “ideal Muslim woman” differs in the sense that it is 
formulated in an anti-imperialist tone. For Ghannushi, the market economy 
and Westernisation had weakened women; they now submitted to a culture 
of consumption that gave physical appearance too much significance in 
their lives. For Ghannushi, Western colonisation as well as neo-colonialism 
had destroyed traditional life, and with it the sense of honour in women – 
a value that should be recovered. Against this new culture, he insisted on 
the primacy of “traditional values”. The Islamist discourse hence inverted 
Bourguiba’s dichotomy between the “modern” (associated with progress) 
and the “traditional” (related to ignorance). Indeed, Bourguiba criticised 
practices that he saw as “traditional” – that is, values and practices that 
merely imitated past customs (taqlīd). 
It is rarely noted that both the Bourguibian and Islamist visions rely 
on the desire to define and mould a national personality. Ghannushi 
142 the construction of belief
recognised the decline of religion and its institutions before independence, 
and the necessity to reform them. In his view, Bourguiba dissolved (tamyī‘) 
Islam,64 especially in his policies of reform toward the Zaytuna, the shari‘a, 
the religious endowments and the status of women. While both agreed 
that a shared community of sentiments was necessary to build a nation, the 
Islamist conception did not accept the Bourguibian state’s claims to shaping 
these “disciplines of the heart”. 
Ghannushi was in agreement with Bourguiba, however, about the 
condition of women in the twentieth century. According to Ghannushi, 
the twentieth-century woman “had been deprived of her personality 
(shakhsiyya) as a person entirely responsible”.65 “She had been deprived of 
the light (nūr) of knowledge and Gnosticism (irfān).”66 “Decline (inḥiṭāṭ) 
had touched her like it touched man, but worse.”67 In the same vein, Haddad 
and Bourguiba had diagnosed Tunisian women as twice subjugated. 
Bourguiba declared before and after independence that women were living 
under the yoke of both colonialism and patriarchy.68 Echoing Haddad’s 
Our Women, Ghannushi wrote in the 1970s: “She was not allowed to even 
choose her husband. She was deprived even of her part of inheritance and to 
decide what to do with her own property.”69 And, he added, “this was not, 
at that time and in that place, because of the values of Islam.”70 Here again, 
Islamist activist Ghannushi was in agreement with statesman Bourguiba’s 
diagnosis: Islam was not the culprit. But, he said, the fact that the Tunisian 
woman had progressed so far in education could not be attributed to the 
Personal Status Code or to Bourguiba himself. Such progress would have 
happened no matter what. “Nowadays women are educated and work in 
all Arab countries,” he wrote. “This is thanks to the movement of religious 
reform of the nineteenth century.”71 
For Ghannushi, it seemed, reform could not be conceived or implemented 
by the state, but came from the historical influence of new ideas. In this 
way, Ghannushi erased Bourguiba from the history of religious and social 
reform, whereas Bourguiba had tried to place himself in this historical 
line of Muslim reformers, whom, except for Haddad, he often quoted. The 
contention around the Personal Status Code, and more broadly Bourguiba’s 
understanding of the role of women, was not so much a struggle between 
two different visions of women’s role in the public arena as a competition 
– and an unequal one at that – between two political actors struggling to 
be part of the “reformist” legacy. Indeed, recognising the positive elements 
in the new 1956 code, Ghannushi wrote a discreet footnote to his al-Mar’a 
al-muslima fi tunis: “All is not bad in the Code of Personal Status. The great 
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majority of its texts are a copy and sometimes a distortion of Shaykh Dj ‘ayyit’s 
codification, after it was purged from its Islamic values and principles.”72 
His reference to Shaykh Muhammad al-‘Aziz al-Dj ‘ayyit’s 1948 codification 
of Tunisian law showed Ghannushi’s interest and desire to connect his 
own ideas to those of earlier reformers. He also quoted, in reference to 
the reform of the status of women, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 
‘Abduh, Hassan al-Banna and the two Tunisian shaykhs, al-Tahar and al-
Fadhel Ben Achour. These names formed an eclectic group. The reference to 
al-Fadhel Ben Achour – then in the service of the postcolonial Bourguibian 
regime – may seem strange, but perhaps Ghannushi’s point was to refer to 
the legacy of reformist ‘ulama’ that Bourguiba had submitted to the modern 
state, rather than build a rigorous intellectual chain of legacy and influence. 
For Ghannushi, the Personal Status Code went beyond the Bourguibian 
policies and was part of a strategy to “de-Islamise” the country on the part of 
the West: “It is indirect colonisation,” he wrote.73
Ghannushi believed that it was a mistake to “think that we only need 
little changes such as longer dresses and the abandoning of lipstick to 
become an Islamic society”.74 Islam, he wrote: 
does not interact with women by talking to them about their dresses’ 
length or width, but rather, it is interested in the woman’s vision of 
life and what this vision leads her towards. The aim is for her … to 
look at life as … an opportunity to elevate the persons from the level 
of the animal to the human level.75 
Bourguiba and Ghannushi had different understandings of the veil, but 
they shared a repertoire for talking about the Tunisian woman’s place in 
society. What mattered for both of them, as well as for Haddad, was the 
vision women had of the world that surrounded them. They were both 
interested in women’s subjectivity and awareness: they were particularly 
intent on linking female subjectivity with access to knowledge, morality 
and responsibility, all in the name of “progress”. Women also had to be 
integrated into the public arena. For Bourguiba, this path had to be taken 
without the veil; for Ghannushi, the path could only be taken with the veil. 
But for both of them, the destination was the same, especially in terms of 
women’s education. Ghannushi wrote: 
We have to differentiate between the question of the education of 
women and the question of dress. To insist that the young woman (al-
fatāt) must show modesty (ḥishma) and virtue (‘iffa) in her dress does 
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not mean depriving her of her legal right to learn all the sciences she 
wants. Or has it been written that the Muslim young woman, unlike 
all the other women, should not have access to knowledge without 
letting go of the principles that make her national personality? Was 
this imposed to the young Japanese and Chinese women? They have 
reached the highest scientific level and retained at the same time 
their national personalities. Why is it only the young Muslim woman 
who should accept to erase her personality in exchange for obtaining 
some knowledge?76 
In this particular writing, the defence of the veil by Ghannushi does not 
come as a “legal prescription” but as a defence of the national personality in 
opposition to the West, exactly as in Bourguiba’s words in the 1929 “battle of 
the veil”. One can recognise in this quotation the influence of Bourguibian 
postcolonial vocabulary, interweaving “the discipline of the heart”, morality 
and virtue with the primacy of a people’s personality. However, Ghannushi 
also reproached Bourguiba for his Western influences and the erasing of 
Islam that, in his view, the Personal Status Code caused.77 Knowing that 
Islamic theological justifications were given by Bourguiba for the Personal 
Status Code, he added: “If Islam was evoked, this was to prepare some of its 
texts and modify them in order to use them to feed the masses so that they 
swallow the bitter pill of the Western solutions.”78 
Conclusion
What can we infer from the continuities between the postcolonial 
state’s conception of veiling and that of the Islamist opposition? Both 
conceptions sprang from the desire to form a new and in the end similar 
“habitus” for Tunisians. Bourguiba’s intent was to mould the Tunisian 
woman’s personality and behaviour into the image he had of the Tunisian 
nation: a Muslim and Mediterranean entity anchored in European culture. 
Bourguiba wanted to regulate the physical behaviour and body of Tunisian 
women in combination with circumscribing the prerogatives of Islamic law. 
This combination did not reflect a “liberal” conception of the body but an 
authoritarian vision of the nation and of the subjectivity of its citizens as 
“enlightened”, “reasonable” and “virtuous”. In addition, Islam had to play 
a substantial part in the definition of this specific type of subjectivity. For 
Islamists such as Ghannushi, Bourguiba’s conception imposed a deplorable 
rupture in history. However, their evaluation of the postcolonial state’s 
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policies was the product of their oppositional standing, rather than of 
an entirely different conception of society. In fact, in Ghannushi’s idea 
of the Muslim veiled Tunisian woman, the body was disciplined within 
a representation of the nation that one could find in Zaytuna-educated 
Haddad’s, as well as in President Bourguiba’s unveiled woman. 
Veiling and unveiling were in fact two contrasting disciplines given to 
women to fulfil the same end: that of an educated woman taking care of 
her family, as well as integrated in the public arena. These political postures 
opposing and in favour of the veil perhaps also defined each other in a 
competition that reified the two positions as “Islamic” and “secularist”, and 
in which women were seldom authorised to intervene. The first difference 
between Ghannushi and Bourguiba was not their view on Islam, for both 
referenced it as a “religion of life”, but their will or refusal to refer to the 
West. Second – and as a direct consequence of their political roles – 
Bourguiba made Islam a province of the state, whereas Ghannushi did not 
accept the construction of such a monopoly, which made the state define 
and administer the conduct of individual and collective piety. Ghannushi’s 
refusal to accept this illiberal set of constraints on Islam could not prevent 
him from speaking the language of the state itself on normative conduct, a 
direct product of reformist thought and of the postcolonial state’s legal and 
ideological new constructs. 
These continuities between reformist thought, postcolonial conceptions 
of Islam and Islamist oppositional discourses help underline the role played 
by the modern postcolonial state (prior to the emergence of Islamist 
movements) in developing and disseminating normative prescriptions and 
body disciplines that also helped the state appropriate Islamic narratives and 
domesticate religious institutions. These normative prescriptions were in 
turn used by Islamist movements for their own political purposes. Whereas 
states and Islamists are today in a relationship of political opposition and 
competition, I argue that in order to explain the religious language of 
Islamist movements, and more generally the mobilising power of Islam on 
the political scene, one must turn to the shaping and use of the tradition of 
Islam by the postcolonial state’s elite. This elite institutionalised Islam as a 
political resource, thereby providing a foundation on which Islamists could 
formulate their ideologies. 
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Coming to Believe:  
the (Elusive) Time of Conversion
Souleymane Bachir Diagne
William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience establishes a distinction 
between two types or archetypes of conversion.1 Conversion being defined 
“in general terms” as “the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto 
divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and 
consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon 
religious realities”,2 two modalities of it are distinguished: on the one hand, 
the “striking instantaneous” conversion “of which Saint Paul’s is the most 
eminent” and the effect of which is that “a complete division is established in 
the twinkling of an eye between the old life and the new”;3 and on the other 
hand, the gradual conversion which is conscious and voluntary. Apparently, 
then, the crisis conversion, unlike the gradual conversion, has its moment. 
Thus, James gives the example of an Oxford graduate who converted “at 
precisely three o’clock in the afternoon of a hot July day ( July 13, 1886),”4 
experiencing that in that instant “his poor divided mind became unified for 
good.”5 In the same way, there is the moment when Saint Augustine heard 
“tolle lege” (“pick up and read!”); the moment when Saint Paul experienced 
rapture on the road to Damascus; and the moment of Blaise Pascal’s nuit de 
feu (night of fire) in 1654. 
It would be natural to think that authenticity is on the side of that type 
of conversion, while it would be assumed that there is too much preparation, 
hesitation and even calculation in the gradual type of conversion; that there 
is always in it something which sounds like Henri IV’s famous exclamation 
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“Paris vaut bien une messe!” (“Paris is worth a mass!”) when he announced 
his intention to convert to Catholicism in order to be accepted as the King 
of France. Conversions that aim to solve problems of intermarriages, to take 
a more banal example, would fall under the same category. As a psychologist, 
James examined how sudden conversions could be understood as “uprushes 
into the ordinary consciousness” of processes taking place in the subliminal 
region of the mind, so that “what makes the difference between a sudden 
and a gradual convert is not necessarily the presence of divine miracle in the 
case of one and something less divine in that of the other, but rather a simple 
psychological peculiarity, the fact, namely, that in the recipient of the more 
instantaneous grace we have one of those Subjects who are in possession of a 
large region in which mental work can go on subliminally …”6 
I would like to push that statement further and examine, with regard to 
conversion, the Sufi understanding that the experience of conversion is all 
about the “ruse of God” (makr Allah) which transforms even the “wrong” or 
unauthentic reasons for conversion – self-interested calculation, for example 
– into the divine favour of faith. Such a notion of a “ruse” implies that the 
distinction between gradual and critical conversion is to be relativised as 
irrelevant, any critical transformation being always prepared by a gradual 
process, while the gradual (maybe subliminal) development itself unfolds 
through critical moments. As this chapter examines different cases or figures 
of conversion, it raises the following interconnected questions: what is the 
time of conversion? At what moment can we say that a person has now 
entered a new belief system? What does conversion tell us about time?7
Allow me first to recall a story of conversion which impressed me when I 
was a little boy of about six. My parents had been sent by the administration 
of the Senegalese postal services, for which they both worked, to the 
Casamance region of Senegal. At that time, just a few years after the country’s 
independence, Casamance had an important population of recent converts 
to Islam and Christianity, as well as followers of traditional African religions 
(improperly called “animists”). The people who had a long ancient Islamic 
tradition were generally civil servants from the North, like my parents. My 
father, in particular, was born into a family of Islamic scholars. Like many 
middle-class families, we had hired local people to help run the house, and 
there was one young man, Alexis, whose main task was to take me to and 
from school. On Thursdays and Saturdays he would also take me to the 
Qur’anic school and wait for me to finish my classes and recite my verses 
for the day so that he could walk me back home. Alexis had a Christian first 
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name because the church was trying to convert his group, but in fact his 
religion was an African endogenous belief system. 
One day, people from his village saw Alexis waiting for me at the Qur’anic 
school and reported to his parents that he had become a Muslim. His father 
immediately sent a messenger with a letter written in red ink (my mother 
still recalls that ominous detail) threatening him with all sorts of calamities 
if the news of his conversion turned out to be true. Alexis was totally terrified 
and asked my parents for permission to return to his village and clarify that 
he was just my pedagogue in the Greek sense and not a student at the school. 
He explained that he had to do this, because in his anger his father could in 
fact make him fall ill or even die through mystical means. But then, before 
he left, he told my parents that there was actually some truth to the story – 
that he was attracted to the Islamic religion, especially, he added, since all 
the bosses (les patrons) in the city of Ziguinchor, most of them northerners, 
were Muslims: he wanted to become a “patron” too, one day. My parents 
paid him his wages plus some extra money and explained, without insisting, 
that in Islam, one does not believe that any power other than God’s could 
actually kill you using magical forces as punishment for becoming a Muslim 
convert. Many years later, when we were living in Dakar, Alexis came to see 
my father and told him that since his parents had passed away, he could 
now freely embrace Islam. My father had him proclaim the shahada. Let me 
add here that this story is an individual and personal expression of a larger 
sociological phenomenon, which is that of the rapid Islamisation of the 
southern regions of Senegal, under the influence of northern populations, 
whose Islamisation is many centuries more ancient. Obviously, Alexis’s case 
of conversion was not only gradual but calculated.
I will now consider the early days of Islam in Mecca, before the hijra to 
Medina. This was, of course, the time of the famous, historic conversions 
of those who are known as the companions of the Prophet: Khadija, who 
believed in her husband, the Prophet, even as he did not believe in himself; 
Ali, who entered Islam as a child; Umar, who was convinced by reading the 
Surah Ta Ha, and so on. But the narrative of conversion I will evoke is that of 
Hamzah, the Prophet’s uncle. The story is famous. The tradition is that Abu 
Jahl, one of those who showed the most hatred toward the Prophet, one 
day abused him with the worst possible insults, while the Prophet simply 
looked at him and said nothing. When Hamzah heard what happened and 
the way in which his nephew had been treated, he is reported to have felt an 
anger he had never experienced before; to have gone straight to Abu Jahl 
and struck him hard with his bow (he had been out hunting), shouting: 
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“Will you insult him now that I am of his religion, and now that I profess 
what he professes?” That was quite a singular profession of faith, on the spur 
of the moment, bursting out of anger and sounding like a dare.
Let me now compare Alexis’s long-delayed conversion to Hamzah’s 
instantaneous conversion by asking the questions: what happened and when 
did it happen? How did they come to believe? Considering the time frame, 
one could say that Alexis gradually constructed his Islamic “belief ” as he 
came to reflect on a religion he’d discovered to be the secret of the “bosses”, 
and on the very atmosphere of the Qur’anic school. One might even 
think that the miracle of the Qur’anic verses he was hearing, even though 
of course he did not understand them, gradually operated on him in the 
way Islamic traditions report: that they can lead many to think that there 
is something magical in them. But then the idea that Alexis’s attraction to 
Islam was not disinterested, that there was some calculation about the best 
way of becoming a “boss”, could also mean that there was something flawed 
and inauthentic in what drove him to “conversion”. Especially if we add that 
the main reason for delaying the formal profession of faith was the most 
anti-Islamic reason possible: conformity to the religion of the forefathers 
and belief that what they worship could be in any way useful or harmful. 
Many Qur’anic verses could be quoted. Suffice it to recall that what defines 
the Abrahamic faith is precisely the break from the fathers’ tradition: “But 
when they are told, ‘Follow what God has bestowed from on high,’ some 
answer, ‘Nay! We shall follow [only] that which we found our forefathers 
believing in and doing.’ Why, even if their forefathers did not use their 
reason at all, and were devoid of guidance?”8 and also: “(Abraham) said: 
‘Do you then worship, besides God, things that can neither be of any good 
to you nor do you harm?’”9
Shall we then say that to have waited until the time when there could 
be no objection from the family altered the nature of his conversion by 
showing that in fact he did not understand at all what he was converting to? 
But isn’t it natural that the meaning of Islam as a radical break from the ways 
of the fathers could only be clear to him after he actually converted from 
those ways and began to learn the belief system he was adopting? Are we 
saying then that (true) conversion comes only after conversion? One could 
perfectly imagine Alexis, many years later, thinking that he was lucky, or, in 
religious terms, blessed, not to have died before formally converting, having 
postponed his admission to the community of Muslims for so long. But if 
indeed in retrospect he were to understand that “luck” as a “blessing” or a 
“grace”, would he also think that God had already converted him before he 
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had even thought of conversion? “I convert” is indeed a strange performative, 
as in order for me to be able to say it, it means “I have already converted.” 
Hamzah’s conversion could then be understood not as something 
that happened instantaneously out of a burst of extreme anger, but as an 
expression of an already present but deeply buried belief in the new message 
and its promise of a new social and ethical order.10 What anger did then 
was tear down the barriers that repressed the belief inside his unconscious. 
It is the paradox of conversion that it cannot be assigned, as it seems to 
take place at some uncertain moment situated at once before and after the 
actual declaration of faith, or maybe at a time outside serial time, for which 
“before” and “after” make no sense.
 There is, I believe, no better account than Saint Augustine’s narrative 
of the paradox of conversion as a spiritual event that seems to have always 
already taken place before it actually happens, signalling therefore what 
seems to be a time outside the serial time which constitutes one’s life.11 In 
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s Le Différend (1983), we read an important passage 
in paragraph 125, about Augustine and time: “The God of Augustine or the 
Living Present of Husserl is presented as the name of the instance which 
synthesizes the nows. But it is such by means of the sentences in which it is 
presented, and the now of each of those sentences remains to be synthesized 
with the others, in a new sentence. God is for later, ‘in a moment’; the Living 
Present is to come. They only happen by not arriving. That is what Beckett 
means. Time does not fail consciousness, it makes it fail itself.”12 
“God is for later, ‘in a moment’.” That describes perfectly the Confessions 
as a narrative of the deferral or the continuous postponement of a 
conversion which, nevertheless, has somehow already happened. Augustine 
himself explains that his life had been just such a continuous postponement, 
comparing it to the state of the sleeper who always pleads for “just a minute”, 
“one more minute”, “let me have a little longer”: “No one wants to be asleep 
all the time,” he writes in Book VIII of Confessions, “and it is generally 
agreed among sensible people that being awake is a better state, yet it often 
happens that a person puts off the moment when he must shake himself 
out of sleep because his limbs are heavy with a lassitude that pulls him 
toward the more attractive alternative, even though he is already trying to 
resist it and the hour for rising has come …”13 First there is the deferral of his 
baptism. When he fell suddenly ill in his boyhood, baptism became a matter 
of extreme urgency, and it is “with distress and faith” that he “earnestly 
begged”, he recounts, “to be baptized into (…) Christ”.14 And, of course, 
his mother, Saint Monica, “would have hastened to ensure that [he] was 
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initiated into the saving sacraments”.15 But then he recovered and therefore, 
as he explains, “[his] cleansing was deferred on the pretext that if [he] lived 
[he] would inevitably soil himself again…”16 And as we know, soil himself 
he did! But during all that time of deferral, his mother never ceased to see 
things as going to an already accomplished divine plan. For example, while 
Augustine’s father wanted him to study for vain worldly reasons, his mother 
saw academic pursuits as “a considerable help toward [his] gaining [God] 
eventually”.17 And for that reason she did not want him to be encumbered 
with a wife, even though marriage could have been a way of securing a more 
Christian life. Her words, as when she cautioned him against fornication, 
especially against “adultery with any man’s wife”, were in fact the words 
of God that never ceased to be sung “into his ears”,18 although he did not 
recognise them as such at that stage. And when his mother felt desperate 
because of the kind of life her son was living, God sent a vision to console 
her and reassure her that where she was, her son would be too.19 
Finally, when the time comes, Augustine is able to hear the Word of God, 
even though it is not as direct and clear as when he heard it through his 
mother or in his own readings. (He confesses that he preferred Cicero to the 
Bible.) What distinguishes that moment? What makes it, in the words of 
Saint Augustine, “the hour for rising”? Nothing, compared to more dramatic 
moments in his life. Except that this time he is able to recognise it, as if he had 
already lived it before and knew exactly what response was expected from him. 
When a voice from a house (that of a boy or a girl, Augustine says) is heard 
saying, “Pick it up and read,” he knows that he is the addressee and then he 
knows exactly what to read and what that means. The only change that now 
makes him able to convert – that is, to turn around who he is and what his 
life is going to be – is that the time has come; that time which has always 
been present or a presence in his life: even if he deferred acknowledging the 
encounter with God’s Word addressed to him, that encounter is what was 
leading him all along. One can say, in the language of the quotation from 
Lyotard’s Le Différend, that the Confessions are the succession of “nows” 
towards the Living Present that would synthesize them. But that Living 
Present belongs to another order, and is not embarked on in the succession 
of serial time. Hence the paradoxical formula of Saint Augustine: to search 
for God is already to have found him. As he writes: “You were within me 
but I was outside and it was there that I searched for you.” Blaise Pascal 
will repeat the same fundamental truth of conversion in his Mystère de Jésus: 
“console-toi tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m’avais trouvé.” To search for 
God outside, while he is inside, is still to search. In that search there is no 
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opposite or wrong direction. What is said in the language of space is in fact 
meant to be understood in the language of time: I looked in serial time, in 
the time of succession, while what I was looking for remained in a living – 
that is eternal – Present. 
Following the story of Augustine’s conversion and reflections on 
memory, Book XI of the Confessions is devoted to the notions of “time” 
and “eternity”, sometimes put into meaningless questions such as, “What 
was God doing before he made heaven and earth?” His general response 
to this kind of paradox about “time before time” is to acknowledge that 
“you have precedence over the past by the loftiness of your ever-present 
eternity, and you live beyond all the future, because future times are future, 
but as soon as they have arrived they will be past, whereas you are ever the 
same, and your years fail not”;20 trying to think of time in itself, without 
spatialising it as the “movement of a body”21 or considering it as measurable 
while it has no extension.22 The Book ends with the opposition between 
“our time” and God’s eternity. The Confessions is a meditation on time and 
on that opposition between the outside of postponement and the inside of 
Presence. The time of conversion is eternity. 
About the archetypal nature of Augustine’s conversion, Ann H. Hawkins 
writes:
In the Confessions, as in many spiritual autobiographies that will 
pattern themselves after it, life before conversion is perceived as 
a kind of labyrinthine maze with numerous false passages and 
wrong turnings, but one that eventually and inevitably culminates 
in conversion. Accordingly the first nine books are the story of 
Augustine’s personal life, of his spiritual wandering in the ‘distant 
country’ that is the Earthly City. But in the last four books the quest 
of pagan epic and Old Testament Scripture turns into the metaphor 
of the Christian pilgrimage, the peregrinatio where the ‘true haven’ or 
‘final resting-place’ is the City of God […] a reality not attainable in 
this life. It is against this one eternal city that we are to see the many 
secular cities – Thagaste, Carthage, Rome, even Milan – in the story 
of Augustine’s spiritual quest.23 
The Confessions does allow many different narratives of conversion to 
“pattern themselves after it”. That is especially true, maybe unexpectedly, 
of The Autobiography of Malcolm X. It is indeed full of “false passages and 
wrong turnings”, especially the ones that “culminate in conversion”; the 
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pilgrimage, the peregrinatio to the “true haven”, is just such a culmination: in 
this case the City of God is Mecca, where Malcolm X found the peace that 
eluded him all his life, peace with others beyond the division of humanity 
into races, peace with himself beyond anger and hatred, and consequently 
peace with his newly found God. That peace is the very meaning of Islam.
Again, the question here is when did Malcolm’s conversion take place? 
When is the moment corresponding to his affirmation that “[he] found 
Allah and the religion of Islam and it completely transformed [his] life”?24 
Is it the first time he declared “I don’t eat pork”, having just received the 
message from his brother Philbert that by giving up pork and cigarettes, he 
would be shown how to get out of prison? He explains that later, after he 
had “read and studied Islam a good deal” he came to realise that the decision 
he thus made had been, without his being conscious of it, his “first pre-
Islamic submission”.25 That is, he adds, the meaning of the Muslim teaching 
about conversion, that “if you take one step toward Allah – Allah will take 
two steps toward you.”26 But which of the many steps that he took in his 
life was the first step on the path to conversion? Was it when his brother 
Reginald visited him in prison and told him about what he considered “the 
natural religion for the black man” which he called the “Nation of Islam”? 
When he felt the urge to study, to read, to write and to debate? When he 
prayed to Allah for his brother Reginald when he was suspended from the 
Nation of Islam? When he met Elijah Muhammad? When he lost faith in 
him? When he said to his sister Ella who had become what he himself calls 
in his autobiography “orthodox Muslims”: “I want to make the pilgrimage 
to Mecca”, thus “converting” again to mainstream Islam? When he started 
chanting the words that all pilgrims repeat again and again during the 
pilgrimage: “Here I come, O Lord! Here I come”? Or was it when, through 
the pilgrimage and in particular at the station of Arafat, he discovered 
the simple truth that had eluded him all his life, that “We are truly all the 
same”?27
When he explains that the pilgrimage to Mecca had “forced him to 
re-arrange much of [his] thought-patterns previously held” (and that is 
the meaning of conversion) he seems to indicate that the true moment of 
conversion happened then, but he also acknowledges that his “whole life 
had been a chronology of – changes”.28 So again, we can see in Malcolm X’s 
narrative of conversion the paradox of a life reconstructed after the fact as 
getting closer, by deferral, to a presence that never ceased to be active in one’s 
life.
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From these stories of conversion, I would like to draw two general 
conclusions.
1. Conversion appears as an experience of non-serial time that may be 
called the “living present” (Lyotard) or “duration” (Bergson). To say 
it in the language of Blaise Pascal, beyond the order of the flesh and 
beyond the order of the intellect, both under the domination of serial 
time, it takes place in a third order, incommensurable to those two: 
that of “charity”. As Pascal’s experience shows, in the move from one 
order to another there exist both gradualness and crisis. His “night of 
fire” was possible only when the path of the intellect met a dead end, 
which is similar to what Ghazali describes in his own Confession. In 
fact, if gradualism were not always part of conversion, there would be 
no sense in Pascal’s enterprise of converting the “Libertines”.
2. It follows, then, that conversion is an act of God and not of the 
subject, or that in and through every act of the subject God himself 
acts. This defines the “ruse of God” of which the Islamic tradition 
quoted by Malcolm X is an expression: “If you take one step toward 
God – God will take two steps toward you.” In fact, even that 
first step cannot be consciously taken as a voluntary step toward 
God. Actually, anything could count as a first step; the paradox of 
conversion being that its authenticity cannot be questioned. There 
are no bad reasons for it, only good ones, but in retrospect: wanting 
to become a boss, like Alexis; seeing it as a way of avenging an offence 
(Hamzah); or accepting the pressure to declare one’s faith in a given 
religion in order to marry the person you love. The Qur’anic word 
taūbah (conversion) captures the notion that although conversion is 
voluntary, its ultimate agent is God alone. “Accept our repentance, 
You are the Acceptor of repentance, the Dispenser of Grace” is a 
canonical translation of a prayer expressing conversion.29 Jacques 
Berque, whose rendition of the Qur’an always keeps the original 
meaning of words, translates the prayer as follows: “Repent in our 
favour, You are prone to repent.”30 That when his creature converts, it 
is God who converts (or repents) may be a strange translation. It is, 
nevertheless, a true account of the paradox of conversion.
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The Shadow of Terror on Distant Muslims
Akeel Bilgrami
Everybody is obsessively talking and writing about religion these days. 
Foundations fund its study more, perhaps, than any other subject in the 
study of human society. In drawing rooms and dining rooms all over the 
world people speak about religion as if they were all pundits. That in itself 
is hardly surprising since religious practice of one kind or another, orthodox 
and heterodox, established as well as populist, has shown no real decline, 
despite the spread of modern science and technology to most of the distant 
parts of the world. In fact, some of the most ardent practitioners of religion 
live in the most technologically developed and modern societies in the 
world. If Europe is something of an exception, the explanation that comes 
most readily to mind reveals a lot about the recent history of the West.
But first, it should be said that some of the writing on religion (by 
Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, to name just two recent authors) 
that is most widely read and considered the most controversial is in fact 
utterly irrelevant to the deep issues at stake. The prolific authors who scorn 
the irrationality of such beliefs as those that the world was created in six 
days a few thousand years ago have revived tired Victorian debates for our 
time, without understanding that what religion means for most people has 
very little to do with arcane beliefs of that kind. This is not to deny that 
large numbers of people hold those beliefs. But what religion means for 
the very people who might believe in such events goes much deeper than is 
often countenanced by the authors of these books. If they were to study the 
social and psychological issues at stake, they might deserve to be taken more 
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seriously. Until then, their books are a waste of our time and a waste of their 
great intelligence. 
It is a plain fact that religion today (and perhaps at all times in history) 
has been much more a matter of practice than of belief. It is true that 
religious people have always claimed the importance of their beliefs, and we 
know very well that they have persecuted those who did not share them. But 
for the most part, the beliefs mattered because practices of various kinds, 
which flowed from them or were tied to them, also mattered. What is more, 
often beliefs were dogmatically pronounced even as practices substantially 
changed without any corresponding articulation in revised beliefs. As a 
result, considerable de facto secularity has been achieved in many parts 
of the world, including within Islamic practice, without any formulated 
acknowledgement of the secular at the level of doctrine. 
In this respect, polls which report widespread religious rigidity are 
misleading. If you were to wave a microphone at someone in Teheran and 
ask, “Do you believe in the shari‘a?” he is very unlikely to say “No.” But if 
you cast a studious glance at his life and see how his practices square with the 
strict demands of the shari‘a, you will often find it quite distant from what 
he has avowed when polled. The same is true if you wave a microphone at 
someone in Nebraska and ask, “Do you believe in creationism?” The point 
is not that the polls that ask these questions and get these answers record 
nothing. The point is rather that they can’t always be taken at face value; 
what they track is much more complicated than the conclusion registered 
by polls: “X percentage of the population of such-and-such a place believes 
that society should subscribe to the shari‘a (or believes that creationism is 
a fact).” To put it differently, assent to such questions are “performatives” 
rather than strict avowals of one’s doctrinal beliefs. Like all performatives, 
they should be interpreted and diagnosed as expressing and revealing 
something deeply felt, often inarticulate; something that is often at the level 
of practice and personal aspiration and yearning rather than at the level of 
surface propositional statement and assertion. 
This descriptive distinction between religion as practice or way of life 
(which is essentially fluid and malleable) and religion as belief or doctrine 
(that, by contrast, can be susceptible to more rigidly codified and explicitly 
pronounced subscription) is well worth exploring as it applies to many 
regions of the world. Let me explore it briefly for the religion of my own 
background, Islam, and for the part of the world from where I grew up, 
before returning to more global political issues regarding religion.
Islam had travelled to India via trade from West Asia long before the 
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emergence of the Sultanates, who are usually described as forming the 
“Islamic period” of Indian history. Even when Islam arrived in the form of 
conquest and Sultanate and then Mughal rule, it came via Persia, Central 
Asia and Afghanistan. Through all this it acquired so many accretions of 
local customs and culture that it bears little resemblance to the scriptural 
and normative demands of the doctrine that is believed to mark the original 
Islam of the Arabian lands. Historians and anthropologists have compared 
the great continuity of Muslim practice and life with that of local Hindu 
religious culture when it settled into its Indian surroundings. 
In the midst of this livelier, slowly accreted and accumulated homegrown 
religious culture, for centuries the formal, bookish elements of Islam were 
often unknown to ordinary Muslims. These elements had to be recalled in 
self-conscious ways and unusual circumstances. For the most part, everyday 
life reflected the common syncretic culture that Muslims shared with 
Hindus, and it flowered vividly in such aesthetic forms as the great “gharanas” 
of Hindusthani music as well as in the distinctly twentieth-century culture 
around Bombay cinema. In the balance between these two contrasting 
elements – of form and root – the latter dominated the former through the 
centuries and continues to do so today. However, it is made increasingly 
precarious by developments of recent decades, and by some striking recent 
events – of which  9/11 and its aftermath are the most momentous. 
There is to begin with the relative poverty of Muslims in India ever 
since the more landed and educated Muslims, fearing loss of estate and 
discrimination in career opportunities in India, left for Pakistan during 
Partition. For those who stayed, those fears have largely been realised. 
There was also another major loss: that of their language, Urdu, indeed the 
language of many Hindus in north India as well, which was given away as an 
exclusive gift to Pakistan. 
The Indian leaders, for all their avowed pluralism and secularism, were 
unable to withstand the nationalistic pique of Hindu ideologues in their 
own Indian National Congress party, who applied great pressure to have 
Urdu dropped as a medium of instruction in the national and regional 
school curricula. And in general, ever since the passing of Nehru, the 
Congress party has tended to adopt the most debased and cynical strategy 
that democracy allows – that of trying to win elections by appealing to the 
majoritarian sentiment as opposed to minorities such as Muslims and Sikhs. 
This strategy culminated in three hideous events: the pogrom against the 
Sikhs after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the destruction of the mosque 
at Ayodhya by Hindu political activists, and the slaughter of roughly two 
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thousand Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. Ironically, the strategy had led 
(until recently) to the repeated defeat of the Congress party at the hands 
of a Hindu nationalist party which can play the majoritarian game much 
more openly and brazenly than the Congress, with its hypocritical avowals 
of secularism. Even when in power, as it has been in the last few years, the 
Congress has not reasserted the secularism towards which Nehru had tried 
(not always successfully) to steer it.
The Muslim “minority” in India, therefore, has had the ideological 
potential to vex this growing Hindu majoritarian outlook in at least two 
ways. First, it is open to perception as a minority descended from the 
Muslim conquerors who ruled for centuries over a predominantly Hindu 
people, and thus a good target for “historical” revenge. Second, it is open to 
the perception of being a “residual” population, one that had the choice of 
leaving for the newly created Muslim nation of Pakistan in 1947, but which 
chose to stay, so it must now adapt in accordance with the culture of the 
Hindu nation it opted for.
This ideological perception was once merely the vision of a fringe 
labelled the “Hindu Right”, which was opposed to the secular tendencies of 
the central leadership of the freedom movement and of post-Independent 
India, most particularly of Gandhi and Nehru. It is now very much the vision 
of the majoritarian Hindu ideology that pervaded the national government 
at the centre for a substantial period until very recently, as well as in some 
(but by no means all) of the states and regions in the country. 
Even putting aside the dubious conceptual elements in these perceptions 
(that is, the very idea of “historical” revenge, and the restriction of choice to 
the options “Either go to a Muslim nation or stay in a Hindu one”) there are 
plain historical facts that expose their falsity. 
With regard to the first perception, there is the fact that most Muslims 
today are not descendants of a conquering people, but Hindu converts; 
and there is the fact that a number of the Muslim rulers of India showed 
remarkable religious tolerance, comparable at least to the Muslim rule in 
medieval Spain. With regard to the second, there is the fact of the helplessly 
sedentary nature of the poor and labouring classes, which meant that 
immigration over thousands of miles was not a serious option. There is 
also the fact of the idealism of both this class and the much smaller – but 
admittedly more mobile – educated middle class of Muslims, who believed 
that a secular India was preferable to a nation created on the basis of religion. 
But these are mere contemptible facts; and ideological perceptions, as we 
know, are the products of a free social imagination. 
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This ideological situation has made Indian Muslims deeply resentful and 
defensive in their mentality. And this mentality is adversely affecting the 
double movement I have mentioned of rooted quotidian syncretic diversity 
and invocation of scriptural form and fundamentals. This mentality threatens 
to tilt the balance in favour of the latter over the former. In a situation where 
material life as well as self-respect is increasingly threatened by alarming 
majoritarian tendencies in the polity, the absolutist doctrinal side of the 
double movement is holding out promise of dignity and autonomy in the 
name of Islam, especially among the young. The attractions are illusory, 
of course: they are manifestly undemocratic; they are deeply reactionary 
on issues of gender; and they are phobic of modernity in the extreme – 
phobic even to a homegrown, non-Western path to modernity. They are 
“reactionary” in every sense of the term, including that of reacting to feelings 
of helplessness and defeat, and the seeming lack of viable alternatives to cope 
with these feelings. 
An example of reaction-formation is one response to the combination of 
poverty, lack of career opportunities and loss of Urdu, which has been the 
rise of the madrasa, which are religious schools peppered all over the country, 
especially in northern India. Often financed by Saudi Arabian largesse, these 
schools offer free education in Urdu and a place for boys from poverty-
stricken families to live for free while they are trained according to strict 
scriptural doctrine. To some extent, these schools provide a recruitment 
ground for future careers in fundamentalist movements. (I say “some” 
extent and mean it. The extent may well be highly exaggerated by a careless 
journalistic class.) This is just one example, and all of it predictably leads to 
a backlash from Hindu ideologues, and in turn defensiveness, surfacing in 
aggressive reactions among Muslims. 
I would like to say something about this defensive and reactive Muslim 
mentality. What is most striking is that precisely this mentality is found all 
over the Muslim world, even where Muslims are an overwhelming majority 
– the only difference being that the reaction is of course not to Hindus, 
but to American presence and dominance. I will not catalogue the familiar 
(and dreary if it weren’t so palpable) litany of the wrongs of American 
foreign policy in the Middle East, not to mention in Vietnam, East Timor, 
Chile and various other parts of Latin America. From the overthrow of 
a decent and humane leader like Mossadegh in Iran; to the support of 
corrupt, elitist, and tyrannical leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and so on; 
to the cynical arming and training of Muslim extremists in Afghanistan; 
to the longstanding support for occupation by expansionist settlement in 
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Palestinian territories; America – driven as always by corporate interests 
– has bred resentment among non-elite sections of the population all over 
Muslim lands. 
That all of this follows a long history of colonial subjugation and 
condescension by European powers, even after decolonisation, involves the 
West as the target of such reaction. For some years now, this resentment 
has taken on an explicitly religious, Islamist rhetoric – again because Islam 
seems to provide an ideological peg of dignity and resistance upon which to 
hang these resentments.
All this is familiar. Though perhaps what is less so is that initially, and 
even until a very few years ago, specifically “anti-American” (or what are 
sometimes called “anti-imperialist”) versions of Islamism were much 
more prevalent in Iran than in client states such as Saudi Arabia; but as a 
result of Al-Jazeera and other forms of communication made possible by 
new technologies, Muslims even in Saudi Arabia who had hitherto been 
uncritically “pro-American” in their sympathies have been exposed to some 
of the political and economic realities in Arab nations, and have been able 
to detach themselves from the cognitive clutch of the royal family and 
elites. And some of the most volatile and restless among them have (again 
as a result of the new communications technologies) been able to join with 
similar anti-American groups in both neighbouring and far-flung lands, 
from the caves of Afghanistan to cells in Hamburg, London and New Jersey.
The point of importance, however, is this: that this Islamist rhetoric is a 
dangerous, brittle source of self-respect is obvious to most Muslims in these 
countries, but there does not seem to be, even to them, any viable alternative. 
This conflicted position of many Muslims should be crucial to any analysis 
of our present time. 
I think it can safely be said that as a matter of ubiquitous empirical fact 
– whether in Mumbai or Cairo, Karachi or Tehran, Afghanistan or Saudi 
Arabia, New Jersey or Bradford – most Muslims are not absolutists, and are 
in fact deeply opposed to the absolutists in their midst. This is evident in the 
fact that before 9/11, during elections, the “fundamentalist” parties failed to 
gain power, whether in Iran or in Pakistan. Even those who did not oppose 
the fundamentalists were too busy with their own affairs to be seduced by 
absolutist fantasies about an Islamic revival. 
Yet these ordinary Muslims, who form the overwhelming majority in 
Muslim nations, have not had the confidence and courage to openly criticise 
the absolutists, and this is because they, too, are affected by the defensive 
mentality that pervades these regions. To them, to openly criticise seems 
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to capitulate to Western habits and attitudes of arrogant domination, in 
colonial history and even today. What would give them the confidence and 
courage to criticise the absolutists in their midst? This question is of utmost 
urgency in our time, and it should be on the mind of every humane and 
sensitive American and European today.
What is perfectly obvious is that destroying impoverished nations such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq is not going to help, nor is the constant portrayal of 
the problem as Islam versus freedom and modernity. It is not freedom that 
ordinary non-fundamentalist Muslims are against and it is not modernity 
they want to shun; it is the naked, corporate-driven, geo-politically 
motivated wrongs of American and Western dominance of their regions 
which they oppose. If they stand by, silent and confused, as Islam is invoked 
in grotesque distortions by the most detestable elements in their society as 
the ultimate source of resistance against this domination, it behoves those 
of us who have escaped these resentments and their causes to give them the 
confidence to see their way out of this confusion.
To do so, we will have to call things as they are, evident to everyone 
except some insular American and European citizens who are unaware 
of the effects of their governments' actions in the world, and much more 
culpably, the journalists who speak and write in the mainstream media as 
well as mandarin intellectuals in universities. We will have to say that what 
happened on 9/11 was an act of atrocious, senseless and unpardonable 
cruelty. No effort to understand Muslim mentality, as my effort is, should 
or could muffle this criticism. But we will also have to say that the bombing 
of a parched and hungry nation like Afghanistan, of creating what seems 
like almost permanent insurgent mayhem in Iraq – which was already 
devastated by years of a cruel and immoral embargo – and then allowing 
the destruction of Lebanon and now Gaza, are merely the last and among 
the worst in a century filled with such immoral interventions. All of this can 
be only the first step in addressing the deep historical and contemporary 
sources of this defensive mentality. 
We cannot forget that the confused Islamist rhetorical veneer, by which 
this defensive mentality presents itself to the world, is a reactionary rhetoric 
of the supposed pieties and glories of an Islamic past. But the hopes and 
aspirations of ordinary Muslims who have succumbed to their rhetoric are the 
existential hopes and aspirations for a future in which a radically politicised 
Islam has no particular place or point. If we clearly see this dialectical 
point, our own efforts need not fall into the confusion that the rhetoric 
encourages, as some writers (Christopher Hitchens, Martin Amis, Hirst 
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Ali, Irshad Manji, Michael Ignatieff, Niall Fergusson, Thomas Friedman, 
and Andrew Sullivan, to name just a few) clearly have done when they write 
widely read articles and books with titles such as “This is a Religious War”1 
and The Trouble with Islam.2 With their shrill rhetoric, these writers, much 
lauded in the mainstream Western press that shapes a great deal of public 
opinion, are buying into the very confusion of those whom they oppose. In 
so doing, they are letting down the millions of ordinary Muslims all over 
the world who, in the end, are the only weapons America and Europe have 
against their terrorist enemies.
Notes
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Citational Exegesis of the Qur’an:  
Towards a Theoretical Framework  
for the Construction of Meaning  
in Classical Islamic Thought.  
The Case of the Epistles of the Pure Brethren 
(Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’)*
Omar Alí-de-Unzaga
… the example of the Qur’an has been especially 
neglected, both by Muslim scholarship and 
Orientalist erudition. Very few attempts have 
been made to apply modern linguistic tools and 
conceptualization to Qur’anic Discourse without 
any concession to the theological vocabulary.
As for the literary approach, there is nothing 
equivalent to N. Frye (The great code).
Mohammed Arkoun1
* This paper was commissioned especially for this Festschrift; it was not presented at the 
workshop held at AKU-ISMC in October 2009. It was written as a tribute to Professor 
Arkoun by a former student of his, highlighting a particular aspect of Professor Arkoun’s 
work. Although it is not in the same vein as the other papers, we felt it appropriate to 
include it in the Festschrift.
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Nobody would attempt to study Islamic culture 
without starting with the Koran, or Hindu culture 
without starting with the Vedas and Upanishads.
Northrop Frye 2
The Bible has been called the Great Code of Christian 
culture [...]; this is true in at least a similar measure of 
the Qur’an’s role in Islamic culture. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the study of the Qur’an is not merely 
one particular field of study besides others, but that 
at the same time it fulfils the role of encyclopaedic 
knowledge for the devout Muslim. To us it becomes 
a source for the Muslim self-image.
Claude Gilliot3
I was Mohammed Arkoun’s student between 1994–6 at the newly 
established Graduate Programme in Islamic Studies and Humanities at 
the Institute of Ismaili Studies. Professor Arkoun opened up his students’ 
eyes to the possibility of exploring the subjects traditionally covered by 
Islamic Studies in a new way and continuously invited us to apply the 
tools developed by various disciplines to the study of the history, religion 
and thought of predominantly Muslim societies (a long circumlocution to 
avoid using the term “Islam” as an essentialised construct). This article is a 
contribution to honour his memory by applying concepts from linguistics, 
literary criticism, and philosophy of language to classical Arabic texts. It is 
part of a larger project on the citations of the Qur’an and their philosophical 
exegesis in the Epistles of the Pure Brethren (Rasā’il Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ ).
I. The Great Code
The two remarks used as heading quotes in the present chapter were both 
made in connection with The Great Code, a book by the Canadian literary 
critic Northrop Frye (d. 1991) on the influence of the Bible on Western 
literature, art and creative imagination (the equivalent to Arkoun’s French 
imaginaire) in general.4 Frye, an authority on the English Romantic poet 
William Blake (d. 1827), both borrowed from, and was inspired by, Blake’s 
memorable aphorism: ‘The Old & New Testaments are the Great Code of 
Art.’5 
Mohammed Arkoun lamented that neither traditional Muslim 
scholarship nor those engaged in critical Islamic Studies have produced 
anything comparable to Frye’s understanding of how a text or discourse 
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turned into seminal text (in his case, the Bible, in our case the Qur’an) has 
become an overwhelming referent, intrinsically woven into the intellectual 
and literary output of a culture (in his case Anglo-Saxon literature, in our 
case literature in Arabic but also Persian, Turkish, and so on). Frye himself 
hinted to this (as seen in the heading quote). 
Here I will take as a given premise that a culture or cultural network is 
best seen in the intertextual relations that occur between the texts produced 
in a socio-linguistic setting, an intertextuality that to a large extent revolves 
around an axial text which is both the main source of intellectual and 
creative inspiration, and the point to which all else relates in some way or 
the other. Intertextuality, however, does not merely refer to formal literary 
borrowings between texts but explains the dynamics of a whole socio-religio-
intellectual cultural sphere (classical Islamic thought) and its relation with 
the texts that –with time – come to be seen as “foundational”.6 The culture, 
then, perceives the text as its foundational text, although in reality the text 
is shaped and reshaped by virtue of being read and re-created, so to speak, 
by succeeding generations and in various contexts. In this regard, we can 
speak of the re-creation of meaning, which is the result of a long history of 
reception. This is also true of the Qur’an and Islamic culture. In this chapter, 
I will explore how we can approach the intertextuality of Islamic literature 
and thought vis-à-vis the Qur’an and the reshaping of its meanings, by 
looking at the phenomenon of citational exegesis. Arkoun, naturally, also 
expressed his dismay at the paucity of the application of the findings of the 
social sciences (linguistics, semiotics and literary criticism in particular) to 
the critical scholarship on Islamic thought. This chapter builds on two of 
the most central ideas if Mohamed Arkoun’s thought: applied islamology, 
on the one hand; and logocentricism on the other. 
The work of the virtuoso poet Abū’l-‘Alā’ al-Ma‘arrī contains many traces 
of an intimate thematic and structural intertextuality with the Qur’an. 
This is especially true of his work al-Fuṣūl wa’l-ghayāt, a book now only 
partially extant.7 Some accused him of attempting to imitate the Qur’an or 
to surpass it;8 others, however, did not see such intention.9 Regardless of the 
poet’s intention, what is interesting for our present purpose is that, due to 
religious scruples and the theological dogma of i‘jāz or inimitability of the 
Qur’an,10 Ma‘arrī’s critics failed to analyse this intertextuality from a literary 
point of view as well as from a stance of intellectual neutrality. Indeed, the 
poet is reported to have said about his book, when confronted about the 
similarities of his work and the Qur’an:
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ةنس ةئماعبرأ بيراحلما هلقصت لم
lam taṣqulhu’l-maḥārīb arba‘a-mi’a sana
The miḥrabs have not polished it for four hundred years11
As we can see from this quote, attributed to Ma‘arrī, he was allegedly 
commenting on the authority gained by the Qur’an over the centuries. This 
was partially due to the Qur’an’s exposure to, and acceptance by, generations 
and generations of minds for whom it was the ultimate source of authority 
and truth.
It is desirable to undertake a project that allows us to enhance our 
understanding of the construction of meaning in classical Islamic thought. 
The present study is part of a project that intends to analyse the engagement 
of authors in various fields of knowledge with the text of the Qur’an, 
with regards to their citational borrowings in particular and with a view 
to understand the exegesis implied in the citation processes. This must be 
done in a manner that is free from the constraints of religious affiliation and 
ideological persuasion that has dominated Islamic thought, traditionally 
concerned about what is “orthodox” or “correct”, and also without the 
Orientalist obsession with superficial origins of ideas, or what has been 
termed “parallelomania”, although it could easily be termed “origin-mania”.12 
The desideratum here is not to see how the Qur’an has influenced or coloured 
later literature and thought, but to understand the processes through which 
Muslim authors, in their attempt to understand the Qur’an, have actually 
recreated its meanings (and continue to do so) generation after generation 
and century after century, across all schools, approaches and disciplines by 
citing from the Qur’an in their works.
II. Citational Exegesis
This chapter is an attempt to contribute to the construction of a theoretical 
framework that aspires to facilitate the analysis of what can be termed 
citational exegesis, a terms that refers to the insertion or “quotational 
borrowing” of Qur’anic elements – verses, idioms, words, concepts, images 
and figures – verbatim or by way of reminiscence or echoing of the Qur’an, 
in works of classical Islamic thought. This citational process implies an 
interpretation, a particular reading, of the text which is the result of the 
process of transportation and adaptation that a textual element from the 
Qur’an undergoes from its original setting to its new interpretive locus. It is 
important to remark that here I am not referring to formal Qur’anic exegesis 
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(tafsīr), nor even to explicit interpretations of particular Qur’anic motifs in 
intellectual or literary works. By exegesis I mean the intellectual process that 
allows authors to confer, attach or impose meaning onto a Qur’anic element 
in the process of its quotation. The quotation, then, is a transposition of the 
Qur’anic element into a new setting (which we will call the recipient text) 
that inevitably results in the semantic transformation of both the recipient 
text and in the interpretive reading of the Qur’an. Once a Qur’anic element 
or textual unit is cited in another work with an implied meaning, this 
immediately indicates that the way that element is understood when reading 
it in the text of the Qur’an itself is coloured and limited by the meaning 
implied in the citation. 
Our case study here will be the Epistles of the Pure Brethren (Rasā’il 
Ikhwān al-ṣafā’), a fourth/tenth-century work produced in Iraq.13 The 
Epistles are an anonymous work, though presumably composed by a group 
of thinkers based in Basra whose names are identified by Abū Ḥayyān al-
Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023).14 They comprise fifty-two treatises organised in four 
parts: mathematics-logics, natural sciences, soul-related disciplines and 
treatises on religion and divine law.15
To illustrate the point I wish to make about citational exegesis, we may 
refer to the following cryptic expression of the Qur’an:16 wa ‘alayhā tis‘ata 
‘ashara – over it are nineteen and the way it is interpreted in the Epistles. The 
Qur’anic text is part of Sūrat al-Muddaththir, one of the very earliest suras to 
be communicated by Muhammad to his fellow Meccans. In this sura, through 
a powerful string of short verses mostly in rhyme (for the first part of the 
verse) the voice of the communicator (presumably God) addresses a second 
person singular (presumably Muhammad) who is described as shrouded in 
a mantle and is exhorted to arise and preach. It then goes on to refer to those 
who are successful but haughtily reject the revelation as “nothing but mortal 
speech”. The verse then describes the terrible destiny of such people: they 
will be roasted in “Saqar”, a mysterious word and place of which we are only 
told two things: lā tubqī wa lā tadharu, lawwāḥatun li’l-bashari, wa ‘alayhā 
tis‘ata ‘ashara – it spares not, neither leaves alone scorching the flesh; over it 
are nineteen. After this obscure numerical reference, the text continues into 
what seems to be a gloss verse,17 which contains a totally different internal 
structure and feel. It is a self-referential commentary on the allusive and 
metaphorical language of the Qur’an. The image (mathal) is explained: the 
Fire (al-nār) is guarded by angels, whose number is a “trial” (fitna) for all, 
believers and unbelievers alike. Due to this gloss verse, most commentators 
interpreted the over it are nineteen verse as containing an ellipsis which should 
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be understood as “nineteen angels”. However, when we read how this phrase 
has been cited by the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ we find a different interpretation. In 
Epistle 30, “On the Specificity of Pleasures and the Wisdom and Quiddity 
of Life and Death”, the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ define Hell (jahannam) as “the world 
of generation and decay” (‘ālam al-kawn wa’l-fasād) which corresponds to 
the sublunar world, and Paradise (janna) as “the world of spirits and the 
extent of heavens” (‘ālam al-arwāḥ wa sa‘at al-samāwāt).18 As a result, the 
inhabitants of the former are the souls that are attached to animal bodies 
that are affected by pain and aching; those of the latter are the angelic souls 
that inhabit the world of the spheres. For the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ it is possible to 
exit the lower world, given that jahannam (and they quote from a verse of 
Qur’an which refers to the followers of Iblīs19) has seven gates (lahā sab‘atu 
abwābin). They identify the seven gates with the seven planets (al-sab‘a al-
sayyāra, literally, the seven wandering [stars], the expression used to refer to 
the visibly travelling heavenly bodies – Moon, Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, 
Jupiter and Saturn, as opposed to the fixed stars). The influence of the seven 
planets on the affairs and beings of this world, in the astral philosophy of the 
Ikhwan al-ṣafā’ manifests itself through their passing by the twelve zodiacal 
signs, thus making in total nineteen.20 The point here is that it is only after 
the Qur’anic verse on the “nineteen” is cited in this astral context, that it 
is possible to read the Qur’an again in a new light: lā tubqī wa lā tadharu, 
lawwāḥatun li’l-bashari, wa ‘alayhā tis‘ata ‘ashara – it spares not, neither 
leaves alone scorching the flesh; over it are nineteen, would mean that the 
earth is the place of suffering for the souls trapped into bodies and which are 
under the influence of the seven planets and the twelve signs. The implied 
exegesis of a citation has had an effect on the received meaning of the Qur’an 
text and many readers would have understood the Qur’an differently after 
reading the citation in the Epistles of the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’.
I will limit myself here to suggesting some lines of enquiry based on a 
number of tools developed in recent decades in the fields of philosophy of 
language, literary criticism and theories of meaning and pragmatics. It is not 
possible here to provide material from a practical text analysis to contrast 
such a theory.21 Neither is this the place to elaborate on the philological and 
literary theory concepts elaborated in classical Arabic sources with regards 
to the phenomenon of citation. I am referring to the classifications of 
“quotational borrowings”, or unmarked, non-explicit citations – quotations 
in poetry and prose literature and in intellectual production in general, of 
poetic lines and later also of Qur’anic verses, hadiths, proverbs and aphorisms. 
The main technical terms used were taḍmīn (embedded quotation) and 
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iqtibās (umarked quotation), but also other terms whose positive or 
negative connotations change according to the critics – tamaththul and 
tamthīl (“citation”), ijtilāb and istilḥāq (“injection” and annexation of 
familiar verses in new compositions), istizāda (“supplementation”), ḥusn al-
taḍmīn (“good quotation”), intiḥāl (“plagiarism”), di‘āma (“propping up”), 
and iṣṭirāf (“expropriation” which implies claiming authorship), ihtidām 
(“cannibalisation”, a substantial borrowing with only a few changes from the 
original), iḥāla (“insinuation”), ishāra and talmīḥ (“allusion”), īrād al-mathal 
(borrowing of part of a proverb), tasmīṭ, tawshīḥ, talmīḥ, talwīḥ (later terms 
equivalent to taḍmīn), isti‘āna (borrowing a whole verse or more), īdā‘/rafw 
(“padding”, borrowing less than a line), istishhād (“illustrative citation” of 
poetry in prose), ḥall (“prosification”).22
It is worth nothing in this regard that classical Arabic literary theory, 
sophisticated as it is, is insufficient and even inadequate to tackle the issue at 
hand, the implicit citational exegesis of the Qur’an. By way of illustration we 
can refer to Gustav E. Grunebaum’s mention of the 4–5th/10–11th century 
Ash‘arī mutakallim and Mālikī jurisprudent Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-
Ṭayyib al-Baqillānī,23 “who disposes of a rich terminology with respect to 
poetical figures and tropes” and yet “has no terms to designate the different 
types of literary dependency with which he is constantly concerned in his 
discussion of the uniqueness of the Koran”. 24
III. Citing the Qur’an: Quotation Formulas and their Exegetical 
Rile. The Case of the Epistles of the Pure Brethren  
(Rasā’īl Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’)
The Qur’anic material present in the Epistles may be divided into three 
types: echoes, mentions and quotations. The echoes are Qur’anic words or 
phrases used in their original form or slightly modified in the text of the 
Epistles without an explicit reference to their Qur’anic origin (for example, 
“those firmly grounded in its knowledge” al-rāsikhūna fī ‘ilmihā, an echo 
of a Qur’anic verse;25 the Encompassing Pedestal al-kursiyy al-wāsi‘ another 
Qur’anic echo26). The most common example of Qur’anic echo in the 
Epistles is the oft-repeated formula “Know, oh brother, may God support 
you and us with a spirit [sent] from Him (…) I‘lam, yā akhī, ayyadaka’llāhu 
wa iyyānā bi-rūḥin minhu” which is used as a header for the introduction of 
new topics. This phrase derives from a Qur’anic verse27 in which the authors 
of the Epistles could find the basis of their spiritual brotherhood as opposed 
to blood or tribal kinship or partisanship.
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The mentions are references to particular subjects that are explicitly 
indicated as part of the Qur’an (or any of the other revealed Books). These 
mentions may be specified, followed by one or more Qur’anic verses, for 
example, “(...) the pleasure of the drinks of paradise (ladhdhat sharāb al-
jinān), [which is] mentioned in the Qur’an”, is followed by a Qur’anic 
verse28, or unspecified, in which no particular verse is given, for example “(...) 
the scent and breath al-rawḥ wa’l-rayḥān, [which are] mentioned in the 
Qur’an”29. Mentions can be quantified in three ways: 
a) in a general way, in which the subject is identified as being mentioned 
numerous times for example, “(...) and there are many verses in the Qur’an 
with that meaning”30; b) in a particular way, with reference to particular sūras 
of the Qur’an, for example, “(...) and He also mentioned the features of the 
hypocrites (...) in many verses, especially in Sūrat al-Anfāl , Sūrat al-Tawba, 
and Sūrat al-Aḥzāb”31 and c) in a numerical way, giving the number of verses 
in which the subject appears for example, “(...) and God has mentioned His 
promise to the believers in the Qur’an in about one thousand verses”32.
The quotations are the literal citations of whole verses or part of them 
that are usually found following an idea or concept developed in the Epistles. 
Whether they appear individually or as a series of verses joined together, 
quotations are introduced, expanded, commented on, or even interpreted 
by words or phrases placed both before and after the verses that will be 
termed prefixed and suffixed formulas, as the following sections explain.
1. Prefixed Introductory Formulas
More than one fifth of quotations (319 or 22.8 per cent) are unmarked, that 
is, they are introduced in the text with no textual indication that they are 
citations from the Qur’an. The rest, that is, more than three quarters of all 
quotations (1080 or 77.2 per cent) have prefixed introductory formulas, 
which can be divided into five categories: simple citation formulas, allusion, 
corroboration, deictic and direct speech formulas.
1.1 Simple Citation Formulas33
The quotations introduced by simple formulas are among the most common 
in the Epistles. They consist of expressions of the type ‘kamā qāla [Allāh]’, or 
kamā dhakara Allāh bi-qawlihi. Other variants include: wa qad qāla Allāh; 
wa qāla; thumma qāla; wa kadhālika qāla; wa innamā qāla; wa qawluhu; 
wa bi-qawlihi; wa ka-qawlihi; fa-hakadhā qawluhu; thumma yaqūlu’llāh; 
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wa Allāh yaqūl; wa huwa yuqāl. Some are in the impersonal passive: wa 
qīla; according to the type of verb used, they may imply mention (kamā / 
wa dhakara Allāh [+/- bi-qawlihi / fa-qāla]; kamā dhakarahu Allāh; kamā 
dhakara fa-qāla; wa qad dhakara Allāh dhālika fī’l-Qur’an al-Karīm idh 
yaqūl); command (kamā amara Allāh bi-qawlihi; lammā amara Allāh bi’l-
ta‘āwun ḥaythu qāl; wa amarahu bi’l-malāṭifa fa-qāla t.; … amara bi-jihādihi 
fa-qāla Allāh); explanation (kamā bayyana Allāh); description (kamā waṣafa 
Allāh) or promise (kamā wa‘ada Allāh [+/- bi-qawlihi]). Other less frequent 
verbs are: warn (mā qad nabbahaka Allāh lahu wa dhakaraka iyyāhu bi-
qawlihi; wa kamā nabbahanā Allāh wa qāl); summarise (wa’khtaṣara bi-
qawlihi); stamp, finish (mā khatamahā bihi qawluhu).
The role of the particle kamā is often exegetical, though not in a straight-
forward manner, as can be seen in the following example: the Epistles argue 
that every human being partakes from the “universal human soul” (al-nafs 
al-kulliyya al-insāniyya), and conclude “as [God] mentions in his statement 
(kamā dhakara bi-qawlihi) ‘your creation and your upraising are as but as a 
single soul (wa mā khalqukum wa-lā ba‘thukum illā ka-nafsin wāḥida)’.”34 
The particle kamā (and indeed other equivalent particles such as wa qad, 
thumma, wa kadhālika, wa innamā, and so forth) has a double function: 
it acts both as a link with the previous co-text and as introduction of the 
Qur’anic verse, in such a way that the Qur’anic individual is equated to the 
universal soul of Neoplatonist thought. The particularity of the Epistles 
is that these formulas are not textually transparent (as one would expect 
with the use of kamā), since they usually imply an interpretation of the 
text. Another example of this can be found when the Epistles discuss the 
universal force that gives life to all creatures.35 This force is said to have 
penetrated all the upper spheres down to the centre of the earth and is 
expected to return to the outer sphere (al-muḥīṭ), causing “the raising, 
the ascension and the resurrection (ba‘th, nushūr, mi‘rāj, qiyāma) as God 
mentions: ‘To Him the angels and the Spirit mount up in a day whereof 
the measure is fifty thousand years (ya‘ruju’l-malā’ikatu wa’l-rūḥu ilayhi 
fī yawmin kāna miqdāruhu khamsīna alfa sana)’.”36 Here, not only is this 
obscure eschatological reference identified with the resurrection (which in 
itself is already interpretative) but the angels and spirit are also equated with 
a universal physical force.
Occasionally, the simple citation formula includes additional, appended 
information which refers to the characters involved in the Qur’anic 
narration. Thus, we find: a) references to the addressee, following a formula 
of the type ‘wa qāla li-nabiyyihi.’ This addressee is usually Muḥammad, but 
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it can also be other prophets like Moses, or other characters like Iblīs and the 
angels; b) the speech of a Qur’anic character other than God, introduced by 
formulas of the type “kamā qāla/ dhakara Allāh ḥikāyatan ‘an …”37 in which 
the main speaker, God, “cites” or “relates” from (ḥikāyatan ‘an) the speech of 
different characters such as the angels, the prophets, Iblīs, the jinn, Pharaoh, 
other characters involved in Pharaoh’s story, and so on; c) the identification 
(exegetical in character) of some of the Qur’anic speakers. For instance, 
while discussing the spiritual force (quwwa rūḥāniyya) that upholds the 
existence of the “inhabitants of the heavens and the earth”, the authors 
say: “and [God] relates from them (wa qāla ḥikāyatan ‘anhum): ‘None of 
us is there, but has a known station …(wa mā minnā illā lahu maqāmun 
ma‘lūm)’.”38
1.2 Allusion Formulas
Allusion formulas follow the type “wa ilayhi ashāra bi-qawlihi” and are 
highly representative of the exegesis practised in the Epistles, one based on 
allusion, word-association and contextual interpretation. An example of 
this is the discussion of the status of souls after death. Evil souls are potential 
devils which become actual devils when they separate from the body and 
begin to “whisper” (waswasa) and incite those souls still embodied to evil 
acts. The authors add: “and it is to these souls that [God] alludes when He 
says ‘from the evil of the sneaking whisperer who whispers in the hearts of 
mankind [etc.] (min sharri’l-waswāsi’l-khannās, alladhī yuwaswisu fī ṣudūri’l-
nās)’.”39 Allusion formulas are also used to introduce an interpretation not 
of a particular person or a name, but of a concept, with the formula “wa 
ilā hādhā’l-ma‘nā ashāra bi-qawlihi”. For instance, the Epistles compare 
the relation between the number one and the other numbers (units, tens, 
hundreds and so forth) to the relation between the bringer of the religious 
path (ṣāḥib al-sharī‘a) and the successive generations of people, who are 
divided in a series of ranks till the day of resurrection, when “all of them 
will become a single group (jumla wāḥida) as [God] mentioned with his 
statement alluding to this concept: ‘Upon the day when the Spirit and the 
angels stand in ranks they shall speak not (yawma yaqūmu’l-rūḥu wa’l-
malā’ikatu ṣaffan lā yatakallamūn)’”40 and “‘We muster them so that We 
leave not so much as one of them behind; and they shall be presented before 
their Lord in ranks (wa ḥasharnāhum fa-lam nughādir minhum aḥad; wa 
‘uriḍū ‘alā rabbika ṣaffā)’.”41 The basis for the allusion is the term ṣaffan (in 
ranks), which the Epistles seem to interpret as meaning not only “ranks” but 
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also “one group.” The term rūḥ is also interpreted as referring to the totality 
of human souls, which, as was explained before, will return to their origin 
as one single soul.
1.3 Corroboration Formulas
Corroboration formulas are those used by the authors of the Epistles to 
present the verse as a proof of authority for what they have just said. These 
formulas follow the types wa taṣdīq dhālika qawl Allāh, wa al-dalīl ‘alā 
dhālika qawluhu, al-dalīl ‘alā ṣiḥḥat mā qulnā wa ḥaqīqat mā waṣafnā 
qawlu’llāh, among others.42 For instance, the Epistles identify the Hell of 
the revealed scriptures with the philosophical world of generation and 
corruption (‘ālam al-kawn wa’l-fasād). In order to substantiate that belief, 
they say: “and the proof (dalīl) of this is [God’s] statement: ‘depart unto the 
triple-massing shadow!43 (ẓillin dhī thalāthi shu‘ab)’.”44 This verse has been 
interpreted as referring to three columns of smoke rising from the fires of 
Hell.45 However, the Pure Brethren see it as “an allusion (ishāra) to the souls 
confined in bodies with length, breadth and depth, which are under in sub-
lunar sphere.” This is an indication of how the Epistles bridge the obscurities 
of revealed lexicon and philosophical concepts.
1.4 Deictic Formulas
Through these formulas, particular elements from the text of the Epistles 
are related to Qur’anic words and verses in a process of identification. 
They may contain relative pronouns (following the types ‘fa-hiya al-lātī 
dhakarahā Allāhu bi-qawlihi’; ‘al-ladhīna dhammahum bi-qawlihi’), 
personal pronouns (kamā madaḥahum Allāh) or regular nouns (wa 
akhbara ‘an ahl al-jahāla fa-qāla). The words used in these formulas vary 
from meanings of praise (al-ladhīna madaḥahum Allāh t. bi-qawlihi) to 
reproval (al-ladhīna dhammahum rabb al-‘ālamīn bi-qawlihi), promise 
(kamā wa‘ada Allāh dhālika bi-qawlihi), description (kamā waṣafahā Allāh; 
wa qāla fī ṣifat ahl al-janna; kamā dhakara Allāh a.j. fī waṣf al-malā’ika) 
and so on. Although this type of formula is the most likely to provide the 
ground for interpretation and semantic expansion, only two examples are 
mentioned here. In both cases, the Epistles easily identify Qur’anic elements 
by applying a verse to a particular kind of person, concept or situation. For 
instance, the authors exhort their reader: “be not of those who walk on 
[the earth] and forsake and are neglectful of its signs (āyāt),”46 and proceed: 
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“they are those about whom God says: ‘I made them not witnesses of the 
creation of the heavens and earth, neither of the creation of themselves; I 
would never take those who lead others astray to be My supporters’ (mā 
ashhattuhum khalqa’l-samāwāti wa’l-arḍi wa-lā khalqa anfusihim wa mā 
kuntu muttakhidha’l-muḍillīn ‘adudā).”47 On another occasion, we are told 
that if humans nurture their soul, they can reach the highest human level, 
which borders on the angelical condition, and come close to their Creator, 
a reward for which there can be no description; the authors add: “as God 
describes (waṣafa) when He says: ‘No soul knows what comfort is laid up 
for them secretly, as a recompense for what they were doing’ (fa-lā ta‘lamu 
nafsun mā ukhfiya lahum min qurrati a‘yunin jazā’a bi-mā kānū ya‘lamūn). 
”48 In this latter case the Epistles interpret the soul’s ignorance of the reward 
as the impossibility of describing it, since they themselves have identified 
the reward as the ascension of a human being to the angelical level and 
proximity to God.
1.5 Direct Speech Formulas
Finally, other quotations cite the words of different Qur’anic personae 
and are introduced with formulas of direct speech, such as: alladhīna 
yaqūlūna; ḥaythu qālū; wa qālū; wa min dhālika qawl al-mu’minīn; qawl 
al-rabbāniyyīn; ḥīna qālū li-Qārūn; wa Iblīs (…) qāla; wa qāla Yūsuf; kamā 
sa’ala Yūsuf al-ṣiddīq; wa kadhālika Ibrāhīm, and so on. 
2. Suffixed Formulas
Some quotations are followed by suffixed formulas, which are mostly 
exegetical as they consist of a single word or phrase such as ya‘nī, ay or wa 
huwa, devices typical of paraphrastic tafsīr.49 To cite just one example of the 
use of ya‘nī, let us consider the citation of the verse ‘ilayhi yaṣ‘adu’l-kalimu‘l-
ṭayyibu wa’l-‘amalu’l-ṣāliḥu yarfa‘uhu’ (Unto Him good words ascend, and 
the pious deed does He exalt).50 Five out of the six times this verse is quoted 
the authors add: ya‘nī rūḥ al-mu’min (“that is, the spirit of the believer”).51 
Thus, the Epistles interpret the ascension of good words to God as the 
ascension of the soul to the world of the spirits (‘ālam al-arwāḥ) after its 
separation from the body.52 
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IV. The Art of Ignoring Qur’anic Citations
The Epistles were criticised by Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī al-Sijistānī (d. 
c. 375/985) and a certain Jarīrī for supposedly having attempted to mix 
philosophy and revealed religion.53 My contention is that this is because of 
the high number of Qur’anic citations in a work whose thought is engrained 
in a Neoplatonic framework. There are more than 1,600 citations of the 
Qur’an in the Epistles, not counting the many echoes and reminiscences 
which do not count as actual citations. It is also my contention that while 
some classical sources condemned the Epistles’ use and interpretation of the 
Qur’an as unacceptable, most contemporary scholars have ignored their use 
of the Qur’an as irrelevant and superfluous.54
One such scholar is Ian Netton, whose book Muslim Neoplatonists 
(henceforth MN) was the only English monograph on the Epistles for a 
long time since its first publication in 1982.55 Netton’s book has become an 
important reference for students and scholars who approach the subject. 
Until recently it remained “the standard short introduction in English to 
the Brethren of Purity”.56 MN is commendable for its comprehensiveness 
and clarity, for having redirected attention to the text itself, away from 
discussions on the authorship, and for having identified and critically 
analysed the main sources of the Epistles.57 
However, MN presents a number of important limitations. By 
considering that “the Rasā’il contain not only Greek, Judaeo-Christian, 
and Qur’anic influences but also a variety of Persian, Indian, Buddhist, 
Zoroastrian, and Manichean elements as well”58 Netton downgrades the 
importance that the Qur’an has for the authors to a mere influence among 
many. In fact, the section on “The Cloak of the Qur’an”59 occupies less than 
two thirds of chapter 5 “Uses of Literature”, which also contains a section 
on “Indian literature.” In addition, Netton’s approach to the use of the 
Qur’an in the Epistles leads him to some questionable conclusions in two 
regards: the “disguise” of “heterodox” positions with a Qur’anic “garb” or 
“cloak,” and the issue of the authors’ “heterodoxy”. Netton’s approach may 
be summarised as follows:
1. The Qur’an as a “Smoke-Screen”
Netton states that there is “nothing unusual” about using the Qur’an “to 
document particular doctrines and concepts”, since “numerous Arab [sic] 
authors have done likewise.”60 In the Epistles both “Qur’anic revelation 
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and pagan dogma and philosophy have a place,” and therefore the Qur’an 
should be seen as a “fertile source of inspiration and backing” for the authors 
mainly Neoplatonic doctrine.61 According to Netton, however, the authors’ 
“relationship with Islam” was “uneasy to say the least.”62 As a result, in his 
view, the “thoroughly Qur’anic substrate”, which Netton admits the Epistles 
have,63 prevent them from being called “un-Islamic with no qualification.”64. 
Next, Netton asserts that the authors accepted the Qur’an, but adds that 
“they went far beyond” it. In Netton’s understanding, the authors used the 
Qur’an as “an excellent smoke-screen for doctrines which were entirely 
un-Qur’anic.”65 They attempted to “cloak” their “wilder Neoplatonic 
heresies” from “hostile eyes” with “the Islamic orthodoxy of the [Qur’an]” 
or, in other words, with a “liberal sprinkling of Qur’anic quotations.”66 In 
order to disguise (“or at least, make less obvious to unfriendly eyes”) their 
“Neoplatonism and eclectic toleration” the authors used an “external 
cloak” “woven from the Qur’an.”67 Netton’s explanation as to why it was 
“necessary” for the authors to cloak their doctrines “in an orthodox Islamic 
garb” is that “their teaching may provoke unrest” and their safety would be 
at risk.68 Finally, Netton says that the authors were successful in disguising 
“some of the unorthodox implications of their philosophy.” To support 
this claim, Netton presents the circulation of the Epistles “among orthodox 
Muslims” as a proof.69
2. Orthodoxy70
Netton’s approach to what “orthodoxy” is, is clear: the Qur’an, he says, is 
“the basic scriptural text of orthodox Islam.”71 He sees the Epistles operating 
“basically from a framework of Qur’anic orthodoxy”72 but he asks the 
question, “how Islamically orthodox are the Rasā’il?” Netton argues that 
the Epistles “contain much that would have been unacceptable to Sunnī 
Islam”,73 and that the authors’ tolerance and acceptance go “beyond the 
limited standards of early Islam; if argued to their logical conclusion they 
would result in heresy [sic] (bid‘a)”;74 similarly, “many of their beliefs were 
entirely outside the pale of Islam” and, for instance, their concept of God 
“differed radically from that of orthodox Islam”.75 The “single focus” that 
inspired the authors’ acceptance of diverse sources, Netton believes, was 
“the universal concept of purity, and not Islam.”76 He concludes that the 
authors are “reluctant Muslims”77 but that they are “eager to maintain” an 
“impression of orthodoxy”, as when they declare that their thought is “the 
creed of our father Abraham”.78 
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Netton’s arguments have remained unchallenged for several years,79 with 
a notable exception:80 Salim Kemal has questioned Netton’s idea that the 
authors included many Qur’anic quotations so that a superficial reading 
would “fail to identify” non-Islamic elements. Instead, Kemal highlights the 
importance of paying attention to the authors’ self-perception. As “doctors 
of the soul” they started from the acceptance of the Qur’anic injunctions 
and then attempted to show “the comprehensiveness of Islamic thought and 
doctrine” by examining critically and incorporating “much of the apparently 
non-Islamic cultural and philosophical alternatives”.81
To depict the tenth century, as Netton’s conclusions would suggest, in 
terms of a static distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy misses the 
complex realities of the time. The same view is held by other scholars, such 
as Bosworth, who holds that the “religious or philosophical orthodoxy” of 
the ikhwān al-ṣafā’ were “dubious in the eyes of the official spokesmen for 
Islam,”82 a vague and misleading denomination that is left unidentified. An 
important question is left unexplored: What happens when two or more 
competing groups claim to be orthodox at the same time and the same place 
with different dogmas?83 
Netton’s approach can be visualised in the following diagram:
V. Theoretical Framework
In order to study the use of the Qur’an in the Epistles of the Pure Brethren, 
I draw from a theoretical framework propounded by Arkoun in his study 
of al-I‘lām bi-Manāqib al-Islām84 by Abū’l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī.85 In Arkoun’s 
words, in order to “exploit a document related to the history of thought, 
we must restore the relationship writing-text-reading in all its complexity. 
[…] The relationship is further complicated by the fact that every author 
has been a reader before, while the reader has not always been an author.” 
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Arkoun’s approach to classical texts aims at a research that is “extended to 
include analysis of the implicit information contained in any discourse,” 
and strives to “become simultaneously aware of the content of a given 
discourse as an act of knowing and of our situation, as readers, in relation 
to that discourse.”86 With this in mind, our exegetical approach can be 
differentiated from Netton’s with the following diagram. 
Netton’s MN considers the authors of the Epistles fundamentally as 
Neoplatonist syncretists and only secondarily as “reluctant Muslims”. In this 
scheme, the Qur’an represents orthodoxy and Neoplatonism heterodoxy. The 
combination of the two in the Epistles leads Netton to suggest that the authors 
consciously concealed and embellished the “heterodox” character of their 
work with a façade of Qur’anic quotations. However, this view disregards the 
exegetical character of the Epistles, both as a writing and as a reading, that is, 
as an exercise in which the authors are as much writers as they are readers (of 
their sources). The Epistles-as-writing are a result of the Epistles-as-reading. 
Similarly, the use of Qur’anic quotations are the result of the way the authors 
interpreted them. Our approach is therefore fundamentally exegetical and 
contends that the Qur’anic quotations are best analysed when attention is 
paid to the implicit exegetical value of each use or quote. 
Four concepts originating in the field of philosophy of language as well 
as the disciplines of semantic linguistics and pragmatics can be applied 
for our purposes.87 These concepts are (1) the importance of usage for the 
meaning, and the role of the context and the co-text in the determination of 
meaning; (2) the principle of cooperation and implicature; (3) the principle 
of relevance; and (4) intertextuality and intratextuality. 88 
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1. Determining Meaning: Use and Context
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein highlighted the 
importance of analysing the use of words to understand their meaning. 
Wittgenstein set himself to examine the “language-game,” an expression 
used to refer to the whole consisting of language and the context into 
which it is woven. He advised: “Let the use of the words teach you their 
meaning.”89 In addition, he stated that “for a large class of cases – though 
not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: 
the meaning of a word is its use in the language,”90 and that “meaning is the 
use of the word.”91
This study retains Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use theory as well as the 
idea that language fulfils a multiplicity of communicative functions, and 
that those functions can be studied by paying attention to the actual uses 
of language and by retracing the steps by which those uses are reached. In 
Wittgenstein’s words: “one cannot guess the way a word functions. One 
must look at its use and learn from that.”92
These ideas are tested here in order to analyse the use (or rather, uses) of 
Qur’anic quotations in the Epistles. My contention is that the meaning that 
each quote from the scriptures (in this case the Qur’an, though the same 
is true of the Torah or the Gospels) has for the authors of the Epistles can 
be determined if we examine the uses of that quote in the text as a whole. 
Each quotation, each use of a Qur’anic verse in the Epistles, is embedded 
in a co-text, an immediate and surrounding textual context. The extended 
textual context or co-text are the Epistles as a whole, and the context of 
situation is the intellectual and political moment in history in which 
they were produced.93 The difficulties surrounding the exact historical 
contextualisation of the Epistles oblige us to look closely at the co-texts 
in which Qur’anic quotations are inserted. This perspective allows the 
researcher to focus on the disambiguation role – that is the role played by 
the co-text (in this case the Epistles) in the selection of one interpretation 
among many possible ones.
2. The Principle of Cooperation; the Concept of Implicature
Another crucial concept is the “principle of cooperation” as defined by 
philosopher Paul Grice. The participants in a conversation “cooperate” 
in order to communicate, and expect the others to make the required 
contributions in their exchange. For a speaking subject to mean something 
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by a certain utterance, according to Grice, is for him to intend that such an 
utterance has an effect on the audience “by means of the recognition of this 
intention.”94 
Moreover, the meaning of an utterance is said to include the proposition 
expressed and what the proposition implies or “implicature,” in Grace’s 
terminology.95 Therefore, in extrapolating these concepts to apply them to 
textual analysis – such as that performed here on the Epistles – the reader 
must assume that the authors are cooperative and therefore must make 
implicatures about the text, especially about exegetical ones. Furthermore, 
the reader must recognise the intention of the authors – in our case, in the 
way and manner in which they quote from the Qur’an.
3. The Principle of Relevance
The pragmatic principle of relevance96 says that to communicate is to claim 
an individual’s attention, which implies that the information communicated 
is relevant. In order to “perceive” the relevance of an utterance, the hearer 
must be able to supply some premises and derive contextual implications.97 
When the hearer fails to do so, he is unable to see the intended relevance. 
4. Intertextuality and Intratextuality
Intertextuality, a concept coined by linguist and psychoanalyst Julia 
Kristeva,98 refers to the participation of both author and reader in a variety 
of overlapping meanings with regard to the relationships between a given 
text and other texts. A more recent term, intratextuality, refers to the 
relationships that exist between parts of a text (or between the parts and the 
whole)99 that contribute to the understanding of the text. 
VI. How Context Determines Meaning
In the relationship between meaning and context, three levels must be 
considered: text (for example a verse), co-text (the surrounding text, which 
may include other verses too), and context (which may be textual, for 
example, the Epistles, or situational, for example, the intellectual and socio-
political conditions in which the work appeared).
A text is marked by connectedness, that is, cohesion in form (through 
certain devices) and coherence in content, and by relevance to the participants 
in the communicative process (authors-readers). Taking Netton’s smoke 
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screen theory to its logical consequences, the Epistles would appear to be a 
non-cohesive text, a text that can be read without the Qur’anic quotations 
without much modification (as in Bausani’s summary). In these readings, 
the quotations are regarded as not more than intrusions, or as a seal used 
to authenticate and sanctify certain ideas. In this way, the relevance of the 
quotations is considered to be minimal.
However, the intertextual character of the work is clear, since the 
reader of the Epistles is repeatedly referred to the Qur’an. Similarly, an 
intratextual approach is essential when one considers that a vast number 
of verses are quoted several times in different places in the Epistles. Each 
use is determined by the different contexts and the surrounding co-text. 
Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, in order to understand the total meaning given 
to a particular verse by the authors we must look for the sum of its uses, 
which will be found in how and where they are quoted.
The contention of this study is that the Qur’anic quotations provide 
cohesion to the Epistles. Each Qur’anic verse quoted is, in linguistic terms, a 
text-unit and each quotation represents a transfer of context, as can be seen 
in the following diagram. 
In the Epistles, Qur’anic quotations are normally introduced after an idea 
is developed. An introductory formula usually precedes the verses, though 
this is not always the case. The meaning given to the verse by the authors 
is intimately linked to the surrounding (mainly preceding) co-text. Often, 
it is possible to read the text backwards (the quotations first and then the 
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preceding paragraph) in such a way that the text seems to be an explanation, 
that is a tafsīr, of the verses quoted.100 Thus, the quotation of a verse in a 
particular context (or rather co-text) often implies an interpretation of the 
verse. In other words, the meaning of the verse and that of the context that 
surrounds it are intimately linked. They cannot be separated because they 
were conceived as different expressions of the same truths. 
Therefore, in order to “uncover” this contextual interpretation, we must: 
1. Identify the text-units that have undergone a transfer of context, the 
Qur’anic verses quoted in the Epistles.
2. Classify the co-textual relationship with each verse and determine: 
whether there is a) an explicit expansion of its meaning (by way of 
prefixed or suffixed formulas or other exegetical comments), or b) an 
implicit expansion (this happens in most cases). 
3. Detect the role of the context in order to understand the meaning 
assigned to the verses by the authors (contextual exegesis). 
In addition, it would be useful to carry out a comparative study with other 
exegetical works (such as formal, traditionalist commentaries of the Qur’an, 
or Sufi commentaries) to check the uniqueness or similarities of the use 
and interpretation of the Qur’anic material in the Epistles. However, this is 
outside the scope of this study. 
To address the issue of the combination of philosophy and scripture we 
may ask whether the Qur’an is in fact the authors’ doctrinal starting point 
and whether consequently they embrace philosophical ideas that agree 
with their Qur’anic interpretation, or rather (and this would be Netton’s 
position) whether their main purpose is to establish philosophical concepts 
and then to find solace in discovering coincidences in the Qur’an. This study 
has proposed that the answer lies in neither one nor the other approach. 
Instead, we find the answer in what can be described as the hermeneutics of 
correspondence or harmonising exegesis. 
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Afterword
Mohammed Arkoun Replies and Comments 
It is always a rich experience to listen to Professor van Ess. Whenever I read 
or hear him I am reminded of the wonderful expression, bihâr al-anwâr 
(“oceans of light”). However, I missed one strand of enlightenment in those 
which he presented to us today. This is the idea of legitimacy. Legitimacy 
is the basis for power as well as authority. Discourses in the spheres of 
politics, philosophy or theology are instances of a regime for truth. As I 
heard Professor van Ess speak, I kept asking myself whether he came across 
an explicit or implicit presence of claims to legitimacy in the materials he 
has researched. Even more importantly, I am curious about the Arabic word 
that might express the idea. This is important because of the danger of 
anachronism to which I am always opposed.
Take for example the famous formula, La Hukma illa li-Allah (there 
is no power but God’s). There is in this at least the pretence, if not more, 
of legitimacy. It is linked to the notion of the true religion which, as we 
know, is an ancient concept. St Augustine is one of the earliest voices on 
this topic for Catholics, constructing the idea of true religion employing 
a philosophical (Platonic) basis, and a basis for what was later to become 
theology. Again, there is the Dutch thinker, Grotius. He also had an 
enormous influence, through the idea of a true religion, in the development 
of a notion of legitimacy. True religion, in turn, enabled political legitimacy. 
For political legitimacy fails to exist if it is not founded on a regime of truth 
which is accepted, by agreement, to be a truth. 
The Qur’an employs the concept, din-al-haq, precisely in this way. The 
disputes mentioned in Professor van Ess’s paper would appear in a new light 
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if they were to be seen as part of a search for legitimacy, which I missed in 
the paper.
My interest in this all-important topic has its basis in what we find today. 
As we know, none of the states in the Muslim world today, which I call 
party states (a single party state) which emerged after the Second World 
War, can pretend to any legitimacy whatever. The absence of legitimacy is 
the most serious factor in the Muslim world today, because where there is no 
legitimacy there is no legality. People are conscious of its absence, and they 
see how the states cynically manipulate the show of political legitimacy, let 
alone the regime of truth. This is the reason why I am interested to see how 
the notion worked, or was manipulated, in the whole history of Islam and 
religion.
In Stephen Humphrey’s paper the concept in need of clarification is that 
of authenticity. Today we are obliged to distinguish between two kinds of 
authenticity, reflecting two kinds of history. There is the history practised in 
the tradition of the nineteenth century which took the form of philological 
criticism of texts. And there is the other branch of history, historical 
psychology, which still remains neglected. 
What counts as authentic in historical psychology is very different from 
what authenticity represents in traditional academic history. In the latter, 
anachronisms have no place. But believers in a faith typically indulge in 
anachronisms. When critical history insists on its own criteria of truth or 
authenticity as the face of what believers take to be authentic, when historians 
challenge the anachronisms which religious belief is constructed from, the 
result is a total failure of communication. The believer will not understand 
the critique of anachronism. Where there is no mutual understanding there 
can be no conversation. 
Belief belongs to the sphere of psychology. A believer’s speech is 
determined by emotion. He does not employ the tools of criticism that we 
do when we study history or take care to report something with accuracy.
A personal example is in order here. When, at an early age, I was a 
secondary school teacher, in a lycée near Algiers, I used to assume the idea 
of divine authenticity of the Qur’an. Afterwards I wrote an article on this 
concept which I presented in a festschrift to my teacher in philosophy when 
I was in Oran. My teacher challenged this idea, asking: how can God, who 
defines himself as invisible, eternal and mysterious, be considered to speak? 
That was when I first recognised the problematic character of the idea. I had 
simply assumed, like all Muslims, that God speaks. I recognised this belief as 
a mental obstacle in myself. It is still a prevalent belief. 
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That is why historical psychology is extremely important. There is the 
problem, of course, that we do not have access now to the people whose 
traditions have been reported in the texts we study as historians. All these 
texts, and the oral traditions quoted in them are, as Humphreys indicates, 
unreliable. But then there is this other kind of history, where we may use these 
texts to reconstruct the psychology of the societies concerned. Although the 
texts may not be taken as authentic representations of history, they are also 
authentic in that they express the spontaneous experience of the people. 
This text is of continued relevance today. Nowadays all Muslim discourses 
are a tissue of contradictions. It is no use simply opposing scientific history 
to these. It is more important to relate to Muslims today at the level of 
psychology. The Muslim world reflects a fait accompli at the end of a 
whole history of Islamic thought. From the earliest time Islamic discourse, 
represented in texts like those which Humphreys has discussed, was 
mythical rather than historical. Today, Islam is totally cut off from any kind 
of historical reasoning whatsoever. That is why it is impossible to engage in 
the kind of discussion we are having today in Cairo or Algiers or Pakistan. If 
you attempt to do so you will find people reacting very emotionally, making 
it impossible for you to continue. 
Your only option therefore is to converse at the level of the psychology 
of your interlocutors. This way you may hope to bring people pedagogically 
to a realisation that when you read the sira (the biography of the Prophet 
Muhammad) for example, you have before you a text which has a linguistically 
mythical structure, rather than historical inquiry. When Muslims read the 
sira they are throughout in the mode of devotion. It is nothing else but 
devotion. In this mode there is no place for thinking, analysing or discussing 
anything with reference to our modern understanding of authenticity. This 
is very clear when you consider, as I constantly find, that in Arabic there is 
no word for anachronism up to now. This shows that the people do not have 
an idea or need of this reality, this methodology of an open mind. 
Still, it may happen that by starting in terms of psychology, which is 
the foundation of all belief, you may be able to bring them ultimately to 
appreciate critical history, which is what we exclusively do in schools or 
universities. This is the approach I practise with my students. I start out by 
introducing them to this distinction between two levels of authenticity. I try 
to apply this to the Qur’an and the other texts which have been a basis for 
the construction of belief over so many centuries. In general I find that the 
students are very uncomfortable with this new idea at first. But after a year 
or so, they become receptive and enthusiastic. 
198 the construction of belief
What I have just said about the idea of history is also true of the idea of 
reason. It seems to me that the paper by Stefan Wild is based on the postulate 
that all the social actors he refers to, from Muhammad Abduh to Pope 
Benedict, are using reason. It is a common assumption that all discourses, 
whether religious, historical, political or theological, are founded on reason. 
But this assumption does not hold.
What is neglected when we appeal to reason is imaginaire: l’imaginaire 
social, and l’imaginaire religieux. The psychological reality of social life and 
of religious life is not reason. It is emotion. We make a big mistake when we 
take religious postulates to be postulates of reason. But religious discourse 
is built out of l’imaginaire, and l’imaginaire is always aligned to emotion 
rather than rational thought.
This was true of many discourses in the past. It is also true of the 
ideological discourses of today. The majority of discourses in the West 
today are dominated by emotion. I am reminded at this point of a recent 
book by Dominique Moisi called The Geopolitics of Emotion. This is a great 
idea, because it helps to free us from the assumption that we always argue 
rationally, that reason is free and autonomous. We tend, in the name of 
reason, to want to dominate and silence l’imaginaire. Reason in this sense 
has a dominating role, alienated from emotions. The attempt to ignore 
l’imaginaire never works, not even in learned conferences such as now. 
This dialectic is linked to another one I have been insisting on for a long 
time now. This is the “thought of ” and the “unthought”. In the first instance 
there are sociological concepts rather than philosophical or intellectual ones 
(these are secondary). There is a strong dialectic between these. Moreover, 
it keeps varying. Reason is full of vicissitudes. What we take to be a single, 
unproblematic reason is in fact an ever-changing reason, governed by 
changing epistemes. Every epistemic framework contains the un-thinkable, 
and together dictates the shape and operation of reason in every phase of 
history. 
The eighteenth century in Europe saw the breakdown of all traditional 
epistemes. The sequel to this is a new, emerging reason. But even in Europe 
the ancient epistemes have by no means disappeared. 
The type of reason prevailing in the first century of the Muslim era has 
nothing in comparison with our episteme today. Similarly, classical Islamic 
reason, what we find in the debate between al-Ghazzali and Averroes, has 
nothing in common with what is invoked in Muslim discourse today. 
In fact, the episteme of contemporary Muslim societies lies outside any 
kind of possible reference whatsoever and I find it impossible to define it, to 
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distinguish any criteria governing it. If you look at Muhammad Shahrur’s 
pronouncements, for example, you will see that they are simply assertions, 
and have nothing to do with either emotion or critical reason. When 
contemporary Muslims invoke the dawla (“state”), this does not refer to 
anything. Still, we report in our scholarly writings what Muslims “think” 
of dawla. In fact it is more correct to say that contemporary Muslims “talk” 
rather than “think”. They deliver discourses, but are not aware that this is 
really all that they do. This, as a fact, remains unthought. 
In Bachir Diagne we have a philosopher, with a philosophical 
presentation. This is fact to rejoice in, having a philosopher among us. Now, 
like mystics, philosophers enjoy a privilege, which consists of a certain 
freedom with words. We could apply to philosophy what Lévi-Strauss 
said about myth, that it is an ideological palace built out of the rubble of a 
people’s social discourse. This freedom is a privilege of philosophers – the 
freedom to make beautiful constructions. 
However, the topic on which Professor Diagne has spoken is conversion. 
This has aspects which make it necessary for us to think beyond philosophy. 
I always think that conversion, which occurs out of a subjective decision, 
carries risks. The person who converts is unable to see these risks because he 
acts out of an inner impulse to change the frame of his sense of belonging 
– to change his identity. This entails risks which are out of reach of the 
subject’s mind.
When you convert, you do so on the basis of an idea of truth. But, as a 
convert, you do not have a mastery or control over this idea. We all know 
how dangerous the concept of the true religion is. That is why, no matter 
what reasons you invoke in personal conversion, they remain subjective, and 
are linked to very specific, personal circumstances. Conversion is inevitably 
a personal adventure whose implications are not under the convert’s 
conscious mastery. 
 I appreciate the fact that Professor Diagne discussed four specific 
individuals. This is a way of focussing on the aspect of personality, and giving 
a clearer idea about the actual processes involved in conversion. Even more 
pleasing to me is his reference to St Augustine. About St Augustine I must 
say that I have a deeply personal relation to him – I don’t know how else to 
put it. I read Augustine’s Confessions when I was at the lycée, learning Latin 
from my Jesuit teachers. The process of converting to something which feels 
to be more full of truth than in your current state is described wonderfully 
in this book. 
Even more exciting was my discovery, through my teachers, that 
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Augustine was an Algerian! This is, of course, to talk anachronistically, but 
I hope the sense behind it will be clear. I emphasise this because I find it 
most intolerable that a mind like Augustine’s has been obliterated from the 
record in the very place in which he lived and taught. He belongs to the same 
territory which I call mine, so I have a right, in a certain sense, to demand 
his presence in this region of ours. If only the period of the achievements 
of Roman culture and civilisation and of the church had been preserved 
and made present in the history of what we call the Maghreb! We can only 
imagine what a rich presence this would be. It has been obliterated, however. 
All this is because of the concept of the true religion.
There is an example in this of how history is constructed. Because of this, 
we have been deprived, in what we today call “Algeria”, of an intellectually 
very rich part of its heritage. This is why I prefer to call the whole region 
North Africa rather than the Maghreb. For, in using the latter term, we 
reinforce the exclusion of this part of the history, so as to give it an exclusively 
Arabic and Muslim identity. 
Finally, with regard to Professor Diagne’s paper, I would plead with 
him to listen to the voice of history while he exercises the freedom which 
philosophy gives. Professor Diagne talked about tawbah. Of course, the word 
does have the religious meaning he mentions. But we must not forget that 
the same word occurs in Sura 9 in the Qur’an, in the so-called ayâtu-s-saif 
(the “verse of the sword”). There, tawbah signifies unconditional surrender. 
Read in context and, in linguistic terms, synchronically, it means just this: 
surrender without conditions, because this is the long-awaited true religion. 
The lesson to be learned is that philosophy should not ignore history. 
It is a wonderful subject, but if in the process, one ignores history one ends 
up putting up ideological palaces. The decoration on these palaces becomes 
illusory. It disguises the truth – the historical, linguistic truth; the truth in 
the context in which words are used.
The context which Malika Zeghal’s paper presents is of Bourguiba. 
Bourguiba is a case study in its own right. It illustrates the situation of party 
states in the whole Muslim world in modern times. Bourguiba exemplifies 
the model of the third French republic, a model in which education was 
provided free, by the state, and was founded on the principle of laicism. 
Laicism is more extreme than secularism. Bourguiba was completely under 
the influence of this model. However, his decisions reflected political 
strategy rather than his convictions as an intellectual in the image of the 
third French republic. This is true of the entire North Africa where, even 
though the French ruled for more than a century, there was no legacy of 
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statecraft. This is what accounts for the condition of these states. Contrary 
to what many assume, it has nothing to do with Islam.
We must not assume, to start with, that Islam was the single or all-
determining force in the traditions of the North African zone. My own 
background is a case in point. I come from the Kabyle tribe in Algeria. 
Where I grew up we never heard what we nowadays call the shahada. We did 
not have Islamic law or courts. We had none of the components of so-called 
“Islam”. We were truly a part of the African continent, with animist beliefs 
and practices. Where, in such a society, can one find a general “Islam”? Of 
course, the situation was different in Morocco or Tunisia, where there was 
the existence of the Universities of Qarawiyyin and Zaytuna. But, again, 
what kind of “Islam” shall we say existed there?
The lived Islam, the living Islam on the ground at the start of the Muslim 
period, was totally cut off from whatever we know of the Islamic tradition 
of the classical age, the formative period. From this Islam there was no link 
to the modern age. Consider Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, for instance, whose life 
was contemporaneous with that of Immanuel Kant. Kant was a major figure 
(among others of course) who radically changed the idea of human reason 
but was ignorant of this kind of thinking. Not only that, he did not even 
have the horizons of mind of someone like Ibn Hanbal in the eighth century. 
Men like him were, in a sense, religious humanists who were open to all the 
knowledge available at the time. 
Clearly, there was no way to build a sound system of modernity on the 
basis of the Islam of the early moments or out of the existing traditions. 
Today, people call for a revival of Islam. But what Islam is there to the 
revived? There is no intellectual Islam that can serve us in today’s world by 
being revived. 
The problem is not to do with Islam alone. It is also to do with modernity, 
which bears the aspect of its historical alliance with colonialism. Modernity 
has not risen as yet to a universal level of thought. Modernity has produced 
intellectual tools which have still a contribution to make. What is regrettable 
about it is its hegemonic aspect. This we must combat.
The dual problem of Islam and modernity is well illustrated in the history 
of modern Turkey. Mustapha Kemal was a courageous leader who dared to 
make a leap, but his lacked foundation in a culture that could support a new 
beginning. The two traditions available were, on one hand, an Islam which 
had no means for the construction of a modern state, and on the other hand, 
a modernity which was based in solidarity with colonial systems. 
The historical situation has affected the entire Muslim world. However, it 
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has never been properly analysed and understood. The generation at the time 
when the countries concerned became independent needed to understand 
this, but there were no teachers or scholars who could fulfil this task. The 
case remains exactly the same today. There are no educated teachers in our 
schools who can explain what I call the inverse temporalities in the history 
of Islam on one hand and of Europe on the other. Islam completely lost the 
theology, philosophy and aspects of humanism which had contributed to 
its glorious classical past, whereas Europe embarked on the Renaissance 
without discontinuity, and with cultural energy and enthusiasm at its hand. 
The result of all this is a total split in the Mediterranean region between 
the North and the South. This in itself is not properly understood in the so-
called Muslim countries of the region, which continued to exist in a state of 
what I call “institutionalised ignorance” of the historical processes affecting 
them.
In Ursula Günter’s paper what pleases me most is that it brings out 
the problems inherent in the word “Islam”. This word is used loosely and 
everywhere. It is a portmanteau word that I have wanted to be rid of. Yet it is 
impossible, even in scholarship, to do without it. It becomes a real obstacle 
to thinking and to realising the complexity it hides.
There is a real need for a more conceptualised language for such 
complexities, including in Western societies where the idea of secularisation 
is more complex than it appears. The concept of religion is similarly complex, 
hiding the difference between a religious expression of the self and religion 
as ideology.
Lack of a sophisticated conceptualisation of these words and ideas has 
huge effects – for example, in the classroom where the teacher who has 
not been made aware in his training to their complexity refers to Islam, 
Christianity, and so on, in straightforward terms.
I would like to preface my final remarks to this symposium by expressing 
my joy and my gratitude to everyone who is united, in a shared intellectual 
solidarity, in the search for a common intellectual and conceptual ground 
for scholars, visitors and artists in the face of the issues germane to Islam as 
a religion, Islam as a culture and, lately, Islam as a historical force which has 
today upset an established equilibrium, whatever its rights and wrongs, to 
generate a challenge based on violence. This is not a violence issuing from 
within Islamic history, or Islamic doctrines. It is in part a violence arising 
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from rivalry between Islam as a religion and Christianity as a religion. But 
there is also a lot more to it than this.
We cannot begin to understand this unless we get used to the idea of the 
geo-historical space of the Mediterranean, an idea that has concerned me for 
many years now. I say “geo-historical” rather than “geo-political”, because the 
latter limits us to a short-term perspective, dating from the Second World 
War – a period in which there has been one war after another, recapitulating 
all the problems that we have been discussing, with no resolution in sight. 
On the other side there is modernity which replaces earlier forms 
of authority, justified by political theologies (as opposed to political 
philosophies). In this, furthermore, there is a double axis, one going back 
to the origin of the monotheistic religions, the other to the Greeks. This 
double heritage still determines our struggle.
The Mediterranean space is the area where these two historical, doctrinal 
axis have unfolded and given rise to a violence which, to be sure, we cannot 
simply blame on either religion or modernity. But they have played their 
part in this violence. Both monotheistic religion at one time and modernity 
held up a promise for us – a promise to elevate the human mind, to liberate 
it from ignorance and violence, and to produce culture. 
I am not one of those who say that modernity has entirely failed in its 
promise. Undoubtedly, it brought new possibilities and new visions of the 
human condition. We cannot think or progress today, or develop a culture 
of peace without making use of the tools of modernity. But as historians we 
have to face up to its failures as well as achievements. Having done this, we 
must look forward to the future.
In doing so, we have to realise that we cannot continue thinking of this 
space by dividing it, as we once did, in separate theological streams. Each 
community built its theological vision of revelation and of the human 
condition in mutual exclusion of each other, each claiming to be the true 
religion. Even now, as is the case in divinity schools or departments of 
theology, we continue to think in terms of separate theological systems, 
with its implicit mutual exclusions. Political theology continues to influence 
us. Its historical effects are still with us, and neither the religions nor the 
democratic political regimes of today are able to break free from this history.
The Mediterranean space saw the two religions of Christianity and 
Islam spread from there to all over the world, crossing cultural, ethnic and 
political frontiers. With their expansion came the spread of Greek thought 
and the Roman concepts of law and the republic. In every society influenced 
by Islam or Christianity there is at least some consciousness of this legacy, 
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though more so in Christianity because there has been a more continuous 
interface there, while in Islam the contact with Greek thought was more 
tenuous, because Muslim jurists and theologians rejected it as alien (al-
Ulum al-Dakhila) representing the intrusion of a foreign mentality. It was in 
this belief that Ibn Qutayba wrote his main work attacking Aristotle, whom 
the Arab philosophers called the First Teacher (al-mu’allim al-awwal). 
This old controversy refers us back to the remarks of Pope Benedict 
mentioned earlier in this conference. Although he spoke rhetorically, 
quoting a text which he ought not to have quoted, there is a partial truth in 
what he said because of this denunciation of philosophy in classical Islam. 
The upshot of this is a complex and problematic situation, an incomplete 
modernity and a so-called Islam of which it is hard to make sense. That is why, 
in my view, we have to make a clean break with all this talk about Islam and 
about religion and develop a new vocabulary for a new conceptualisation of 
the situation in which we are today.
Failure to do this is what is keeping us back today. The way the Qur’an is 
taken as an absolute authority, is the way any inquiry is stopped well before 
it can produce results. You are forbidden from taking the Qur’an as anything 
but sacred. But, what one forgets is that this text or discourse that we call the 
Qur’an was made sacred, and is made sacred, through a historical and social 
process. If you truly understand this, you would stop using the Qur’an as a 
constant reference as is done today. You would go beyond what I call the 
official closed corpus. Only then will we have the chance to initiate a new 
conceptualisation.
This will not be a religious conceptualisation, referring to Islam or 
Christianity, and so on. What I have in mind is an anthropological vision in 
which all sacralised scriptures of every religion are opened up to a common 
inquiry. To close the texts to inquiry, to sacralise them, has enormous 
consequences. This is true of history, but it is equally true today. That is why 
I was disappointed by President Obama’s citations from the Qur’an in his 
speech at Cairo. To speak as he did is to reproduce the Muslim discourse 
of today, which is a demagogic way of talking about issues, where the issues 
get hidden rather than openly confronted. Today there is an urgent need 
to speak about the Qur’an in real terms. The Qur’an cannot function 
productively as a text of constant reference unless its status as knowledge is 
properly established. 
This is why I have called one of my studies, “the cognitive status of 
revelation”. My aim is to use a method of analysis that may apply equally to 
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all works which are sanctified through historical, social, political processes 
and turned into texts with a holy or divine attribution.
In the current controversies which surround Muslim beliefs and practices 
in the West today we find the Qur’an cited on all sides to justify this or that 
position. I am constantly asked by certain government ministers in France 
to clarify what the verses say, exactly, on these controversial positions. 
My response is always the same. I say to them “My dear sir, in asking this 
question, in this way, you are only reinforcing the dogmatic discourse of 
Muslim ideologies. Like them, you are treating the text as an obligatory 
source of reference before examining the basis of its authority. Let us first 
clarify this status, and only then see what it says.”
In other words, we need to put aside all theological discourse about the 
Qur’an, all exegeses of the text, so as to start with the question of the linguistic 
and epistemological status of the discourse. This is not to disregard belief, 
but to understand it in a new context, beyond the frontiers of theology.
Failure to carry out this task is responsible for the situation in Muslim 
societies which I describe as living on fictions. In fact, this is a wider problem, 
from which even democratic societies in Europe and America are not 
exempt. Even there we find manipulations leading to crises of legitimacy. 
In support of this point I only have to refer to the misinformation spread 
by George Bush and Tony Blair, in the very democratic societies they led, to 
wage the war in Iraq which had no legitimacy whatsoever. 
Legitimacy, or the lack of it, is an attribute of knowledge as well. The 
kind of beliefs propagated in Muslim societies since the rise of the modern 
states are purely ideological. The discourse in the ever-increasing numbers 
of mosques built in these countries is, without exception, ideological. There 
is a whole spate of books nowadays by sociologists or political scientists in 
the West talking about fundamentalism. But this present-minded approach 
sheds no light on the real issue, which requires long-term, historical 
analysis with the right tools. There is a difference between fundamental 
and foundational. This also needs to be explained. The fiction that the very 
“voice of God” speaks in the Qur’an and the Hadith, and that these are to 
be the basis of the Sharia, which is to be seen as divine law, was constructed 
long ago, and was maintained by special mechanisms over a long period 
leading to today. 
It was in history that what we call “belief ” and the “word of God” was 
created. Today, this belief is propagated, without any change, in madrasas 
(religious schools). To be sure, in the West as well the vocabulary of 
“transcendence”, “God”, “revelation” and so on, has an on-going existence. 
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I do not say that this vocabulary should be forgotten. It is what has formed 
our history. But this vocabulary, as it remains, will not help us tackle the 
serious problems of today – like how we might handle the phenomenon of 
religion in French schools, which is a big, serious, politically urgent issue in 
France today. 
In the Muslim world, what I call the fiction of Islam, which is disconnected 
from the realities of history or today, has been aggravated by the failure of 
modernity. In speaking of Algeria during the period I was growing up – for 
example, in the 1950s – I mentioned that “Islam” was a label which did not 
correspond to any reality – linguistic, ethnographic or cultural. But scholars, 
who should know better, continue to speak of the Islamic or Muslim world 
as if “Islam”, never properly defined, is a reality of this world. At the time of 
independence the people of this region hoped to benefit from the culture 
and products of modernity. But the party-states that came into being 
betrayed their hopes, and now, in the interests of identity and legitimacy, 
what is offered is the fiction of a return of an imaginary Medina promoted 
by the ulama, in alliance with party-states. This fiction has no connection 
whatsoever with history or with the needed modernity.
What role does a scholar have in this situation? I reject the stance of 
Orientalists who do their research on texts, working in Western universities, 
with no interest or involvement, through their scholarship, with the 
problems of knowledge and education in the relevant societies. It is as 
a means to this involvement that I have proposed the concept of applied 
Islamology, on the model of what is called applied anthropology. I believe 
that a scholar who studies a people must give them something in return for 
his privilege. This is the principle, combining scholarship with engagement, 
which has guided all my work. 
Mohammed Arkoun
Lecture delivered at Aga Khan University Institute 
for the Study of Muslim Civilisations, 
London, October 2009
Mohammed Arkoun: 
A Passionate Critic
Mohammed Arkoun (1928–2010) was an outstanding scholar of Islamic 
history. A Berber by birth, he grew up in Algeria, witnessing both French 
rule and its nationalist aftermath. This experience led him to a radical and 
critical revaluation of the role that religious and Islamic concepts as well as 
ideas of modernity have played in ideological struggles between and within 
so-called “Islamic” and “Western” societies in historical and contemporary 
times. 
He pursued these investigations by drawing on the theoretical resources 
of modern social sciences, especially linguistics, anthropology and semiology 
applying these to materials of Islamic traditions in novel and telling ways. 
He developed these methods during a long career in research and teaching at 
the University of Sorbonne in Paris. A series of publications on varied topics 
reflected his developing thinking on these issues. They ranged from the 
“humanist” thinker during the fourth century of Islam, al-Miskawayhi, to 
the Qur’an, on which he published a set of semiological readings, reflecting 
a highly original approach to this fundamental text for Muslims. The way 
this text has been understood and deployed in Muslim history excited his 
lifelong critical acumen, and he returned to it, time and again in his lecturing 
and publishing career.
Despite the academic and theoretical basis of his career, Arkoun was 
never content to work solely within academic confines. He longed to 
make a difference to Muslim cultures at large. This led him to a passionate 
engagement with Muslim institutions of learning and the arts with creative 
ambitions and possibilities. He contributed energetically, in an intellectual 
capacity, to the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, and to the Institute of 
Ismaili Studies in London, of whose Board of Governors (headed by His 
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Highness the Aga Khan) he was a member until his death. Arkoun valued 
the opportunities he had for these and other such contributions beyond 
the academia as part of what he called “Applied Islamology”, an endeavour 
in which he aimed at uniting his theoretical and practical concerns and 
interests.
Equally dissenting from traditionalism in Islamic theology as well as 
Orientalist scholarship and modernist trends in contemporary Islam, his 
was a highly original and individual voice in a field which is of undeniably 
increasing importance today.
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